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BLACK INNOCENCE AND THE WHITE JURY
Sheri Lynn Johnson*
Racial prejudice has come under increasingly close scrutiny during the
past thirty years, yet its influence on the decisionmaking of criminal juries
remains largely hidden from judicial and critical examination. In this
Article, Professor Johnson takes a close look at this neglected area. She
first sets forth a large body of social science research that reveals a widespread tendency among whites to convict black defendants in instances in
which white defendants would be acquitted. Next, she argues that none of
the existing techniques for eliminating the influence ofracial bias on criminal trials adequately protects minority-race defendants. She contends
that this will remain so even if the prosecution-oriented rules of Swain v.
Alabama (peremptory challenges) and Ristaino v. Ross (voir dire) are
modified or overruled in cases currently before the Supreme Court. Finally, Professor Johnson details an equal protection argument that turns
on accepting the social science data as proof ofpurposeful discrimination,
and she proposes a prophylactic remedy.
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INTRODUCTION

Justice is often painted with bandaged eyes, she is described in forensic
eloquence as utterly blind to wealth or poverty, high or low, white or
black, but a mask of iron however thick could never blind American
justice when a black man happens to be on trial. . . . It is not so much
the business of his enemies to prove him guilty, as it is the business of
himself to prove his innocence. The reasonable doubt which is usually
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interposed to save the life and liberty of a white man charged with crime,
seldom has any force or effect when a colored man is accused of crime. 1

These words, spoken by Frederick Douglass in 1883, are now generally accepted as an accurate depiction of a distant and unfortunate
past. 2 Of course, most contemporary judges - and laymen - would
have denied Douglass' accusation. 3 This is not merely because hindsight is better than foresight; it is also because it is easier to detect the
speck in another's eye than the log in one's own eye.
Complaints that adjudications of guilt are biased against the minority-race defendant persist.4 Such complaints cannot be dismissed
as the rantings of a few cranks with legal training, for survey data
show that many minority group members perceive unfairness in the
administration of the criminal law. 5 Do such perceptions reflect ongoing, albeit increasingly subtle, injustices, or are they anachronistic, the
psychological vestiges of a long history of convicting the innocent because of his color?
The Supreme Court has never ventured an opinion on this question
or even openly considered it. Furthermore, one cannot distill a coherent approach to the problem of racial prejudice in the jury box from
the cases involving minority-race defendants tried by all-white juries;
the holdings in these cases instead reflect a variety of discrete criminal
procedure doctrines. The Court has applied a fairly lenient standard
for proof of discrimination in the selection of jury venires, 6 but its insistence on nondiscriminatory selection of the venire sharply contrasts
with its laxity concerning the selection of the panel that will try a par1. Frederick Douglass as quoted in Symposium on The Black Lawyer in America Today,
HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Feb. 1971, at 6, 57.

2. See, e.g.• D. CARTER, SCOTI'SBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); R.
GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS (1962); Higginbotham, Racism and the Early American
Legal Process, 1619-1896, 401 ANNALS 1, 15 (1973).
3. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883):
When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid of beneficent legislation has
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special
favorite of the laws . . . .
4. See, e.g.• FROM THE BLACK BAR: VOICES FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (G. Ware ed. 1976); Bell,
Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black Disruption or Despair?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 165
(1973); Burns, Can a Black Man Get a Fair Trial in This Country?, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1970,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 5; Crockett, Racism in the Courts, 20 J. PUB. L. 385 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Hagan & Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in
America, 88 AM. J. Soc. 329 (1982); see also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 183 (1968) (noting that the courts "have lost the confidence of the
poor").
6. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). Compare this with the more stringent
standard for the proof of purposeful discrimination in civil matters. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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ticular defendant. Under Swain v. Alabama, 7 a prosecutor may deliberately use his peremptory challenges to exclude all blacks from a jury
trying a black defendant.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case challenging Swain on sixth amendment grounds, 8 and the state courts continue
to consider state constitutional challenges to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,9 but this instability cannot be read
to signal the evolution of a more unified - and sympathetic - judicial
view of the minority-race defendant's plight. In the voir dire area, the
Supreme Court has drastically cut back on the due process right to
question potential jurors about their racial prejudice. 1° Finally, the
Court remains unsympathetic to arguments that racial prejudice has in
fact infected jury deliberations, most notably when it has ignored
claims of racially discriminatory applications of the death penalty. 11
Some commentators have deplored each of these developments
while others have given their qualified approval, but virtually all have
confined their critique to cases within a single doctrinal area. Thus,
both the Court and its critics have largely ignored the question of
whether the entire package of protections against racial discrimination
in criminal trials is adequate. It is the purpose of this Article to address that question and those that flow from its answer.
Such an endeavor might seem peculiar, both misguided and
naively optimistic: misguided, because it is unlawyerly to criticize the
Court for adhering to doctrinal distinctions; naively optimistic, because it is impossible for the Court to assess the cumulative effectiveness of any system of protections with respect to every possible policy
objective. It is not my intention, however, to criticize the convention
of doctrinal distinctions or to propose that the Court embark upon a
long series of inquiries into how well the criminal process as a whole
accomplishes each of the numerous specific objectives of the criminal
justice system. Instead, my premise is that this particular holistic inquiry is constitutionally mandated, for if the amalgamated safeguards
7. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
8. Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-SC-733-MR (Ky. Dec. 20, 1984) (mem.), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 2111 (No. 84-6263).
9. See notes 249-81 infra and accompanying text.
10. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). But see Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir,),
cert granted sub nom. Turner v. Sielaff, 53 U.S.L.W. 3807 (U.S. May 13, 1985) (No. 84-6646).
11. See Wainwright v. Ford, 104 S. Ct. 3498 (1984) (denying state's application to vacate
stay on other grounds); Wainwright v. Adams, 104 S. Ct. 2183 (1984) (vacating stay); Sullivan v.
Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109 (1983) (denying stay of execution to allow evidentiary hearing on
eighth amendment claims based on statistics showing race-of-victim effect); see also Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (reversing conviction but ignoring substantial evidence of racial
disparities); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (same).
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of general criminal procedure doctrines fail to shield completely criminal defendants from racial prejudice, then one would expect the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to fill in the gaps. 12
In fact, equal protection theory has played a very minor role in
ferreting out racial discrimination in criminal trials; it is only in the
area of venire selection that equal protection claims have been successful.13 Even this limited role has diminished in importance with the
rise of an overlapping "fair cross section of the community" requirement stemming from the sixth amendment. 14 One might hypothesize
two very different explanations for the negligible contribution of the
equal protection clause to the rights of minority-race defendants. The
optimistic explanation is that prejudice has been largely eradicated
from the pool of white potential jurors and that standard criminal procedure safeguards eliminate the effects of any remaining bias. The pessimistic alternative is that current formulations of equal protection
doctrine are ill-suited to the task of uncovering discrimination in nonrepetitive decisions in which the process of decisionmaking is not open
to scrutiny: the emphasis on proving purposeful discrimination generally precludes relief for the defendant who has been convicted after a
racially biased determination of guilt. For the individual minorityrace defendant, producing evidence showing that covert or perhaps
even unconscious discrimination influenced the verdict in his case is
impossible.
Whether this impossibility is troubling depends upon whether
Douglass' assessment of the position of the minority-race defendant
remains accurate today. Part I of this Article will examine the evidence that racial prejudice influences jury deliberations, using a crossdisciplinary approach to surmount the problems of making inferences
from isolated cases. Part II will consider existing legal protections and
how they control - or fail to control - the effects of the prejudice
documented in Part I. Finally, Part III will argue that the empirical
evidence described in Part I constitutes proof of purposeful discrimination and will offer a proposed equal-protection-based remedy for
persisting discrimination against minority-race defendants. Parts I
and II focus on the black defendant because historically the injustice
done to black defendants was most egregious, because prejudice
against blacks is more virulent and more widespread than against any
other minority race, and because researchers have collected the most
12. See Part III. A. infra.
13. See notes 193-213 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 214-20 infra and accompanying text.
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data on black defendants. Part III nevertheless proposes a remedy for
all minority-race defendants who choose to claim it, because in some
areas of the country, prejudice against Hispanics, Asians, 15 or Native
Americans 16 is likely to have similar consequences for defendants who
are members of those groups.

l.

THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL BIAS ON THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT

How does racial bias influence the determination of guilt? If juries
were approximately half black and half white, we probably would not
need to ask this question because any individual juror's biases would
be unlikely to alter the verdict. But many American juries are all white
or almost all white, 17 in part because of the racial proportions of our
population and in part because of the system of juror selection. 18 This
state of affairs leads to a more specific question: Are innocent black
defendants tried by white juries disproportionately subject to
conviction?
Before turning to the empirical evidence, we must be clear about
the kind of innocence and the kind of disproportion that are relevant
to our inquiry. By the term "innocent" I mean to embrace all defendants who are wrongfully convicted; we are interested in the totally
blameless convicted defendants, the criminally culpable defendant
guilty of a lesser offense than the offense of which he is convicted, and
the factually guilty but legally not guilty convicted defendant. 19 Because some (unknown) number of wrongful convictions is inevitable,
15. See Smith & Dempsey, The Polls: Ethnic Social Distance and Prejudice, 47 Pun. OPJN•
ION Q. 584 (1983); see also Allcer, Hosticka & Mitchell, Jury Selection as a Biased Social Process,
11 LAW & SocY. REv. 9, 31-32 (1976); Lipton, Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HISPANIC J. BEHAVIORAL Set. 275 (1983); J. Solernou, Effects of Ethnic Group Member•
ship on Attribution of Responsibility (1977) (unpublished dissertation) (available at the
University of Kentucky).
16. Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, do not find a high level of antagonism toward Native
Americans, and this is probably an accurate reflection of national opinion since most Americans
do not have any contact with Native Americans. Stereotypes and even overt hostility are nevertheless present in areas with high concentrations of Native Americans - areas in which Native
Americans are most likely to be tried. See United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908,909,912
(8th Cir. 1974); see also C. O'Connor & S. Doherty, "Open Season" on Indians, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 30, 1985, at 35 (reporting racial tensions in Wisconsin arising from the Chippewa tribe's
hunting privileges, which prompted a campaign to plaster northern Wisconsin with bumper
stickers reading "Save a Deer, Shoot an Indian" and other offensive slogans).
17. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 28-32, app. G (1977),
18. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 30; Alker, Hosticka & Mitchell, supra note 15, at 33
(juror selection process underrepresents minorities in part because of reliance on voter registration lists and in part because of the higher mobility of the minority population).
19. A defendant is legally not guilty if his guilt has not been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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we need to know more than whether some black defendants are
wrongfully convicted; we need to know how many of those wrongful
convictions can be attributed to the defendant's race. The proper
comparison then is to otherwise similar white defendants tried by
white juries. If black defendants are convicted under the same circumstances in which white defendants are acquitted, then the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law is implicated. 20
Assuming that by and large the institution of trial by jury works
well, one would expect that if the defendant's race influences guilt determinations, it would do so by increasing the number of times that
innocent black defendants were convicted. However, an equal protection issue is raised even if the convicted black defendant is not innocent in any sense of the word, so long as a white defendant in the same
circumstances would have been acquitted. One might object that data
showing that black defendants are convicted in situations where white
defendants are acquitted do not show wrongful convictions; perhaps
observed differences are due to unwarranted leniency toward white defendants rather than unwarranted harshness toward black defendants.
For the purposes of an equal protection claim, however, it is irrelevant
whether own-race favoritism or other-race antagonism motivated the
discriminatory treatment. 21 If one is cynically convinced that white
defendants are often improperly acquitted - because jurors misunderstand the reasonable doubt standard or because they display sympathy
based on extralegal factors - then one is quarreling with the wisdom
of the institution of trial by jury. One might advocate reform of this
institution (or even its abolition through constitutional amendment),
but the obligation to treat defendants the same regardless of their race
remains. Just as a black defendant is entitled to the racially neutral
application of the legal standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he
is also entitled to the racially neutral exercise of the jury's traditional
function of mitigating the harshness of the law. Whatever system the
state uses to adjudicate guilt, that system must comply with the commands of the fourteenth amendment.
To answer the question of whether black defendants are more
likely to be convicted merely because they are black means, in social
science terms, testing the null hypothesis that race is not a factor in
the determination of guilt. The data relevant to the testing of this hy20. See Part III. A. infra.
21. Although some of the available data will not permit us to distinguish between disproportionate conviction of innocent black defendants and disproportionate acquittal of guilty white
defendants, it is important to keep in mind that such a distinction is unnecessary. The black
defendants' convictions are improper because similarly situated white defendants are acquitted.

1618

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:1611

pothesis may be divided into three categories: observations and statistics from real criminal trials, results of mock jury experiments, and
conclusions from general research on racial prejudice. Although each
of these data sources considered in isolation is incomplete, taken together they provide sufficient evidence to warrant rejecting the null
hypothesis.

A.

Trial Data

Data from the field, or "real life," are intuitively attractive; if large
numbers of events could be studied in great detail, the results of those
studies would be extremely persuasive. Unfortunately, it is extremely
expensive and time-consuming to study people's behavior in natural
settings. Refusals to cooperate often make such studies completely impossible. Therefore, observers usually must choose between studying a
small number of occurrences quite thoroughly and collecting rather
limited information about a large number of occurrences.
When an observer chooses the first alternative, he may label his
endeavor a "case study," but whatever the label, he will be recounting
essentially anecdotal information. Such information can provide great
insight into a single occurrence, but is very difficult to generalize to
other occurrences. Thus, data from those who have observed an entire
trial or interviewed all of the jurors concerning their deliberations may
convince us that prejudice did play a role in that particular trial, but
this conclusion does not speak to the question of whether prejudice
often affects verdicts.
If the observer chooses instead to collect more limited information
about a large number of occurrences, inferences from his observations
are marred by a lack of control. The observer may take a large sample
from court records and then calculate the correlation between race
and length of sentence. If he finds a statistically significant correlation, he can fairly confidently predict that the correlation will be present in cases he did not sample. However, he cannot tell us much about
what that correlation means. Correlations between two variables may
be spurious; that is, they may not reflect a causal relationship, but may
be due to a third intervening variable. For example, the correlation
between race and sentence length may be caused by the fact that both
race and sentence are correlated with prior criminal record. Although
the influence of some obviously relevant variables - such as prior
criminal record - may be statistically controlled for, it is impossible
to make sufficiently detailed observations of each case to control for all
of the variables that might produce spurious correlations. Because race
in American society is correlated with a very large number of other
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variables, it is difficult to control for even the obviously relevant variables, many of which may not appear in the court records used by the
researcher.
The inherent weaknesses of all field observations do not compel the
conclusion that trial data are worthless. Those weaknesses certainly
warn against heavy reliance on any one such study, regardless of the
direction of the findings in that study. The trends from a number of
different field observations, however, may have probative value, particularly when considered in conjunction with the outcomes of controlled
experiments.
l.

Case Studies

The widespread perception among minorities that the C?riminal justice system treats them unfairly22 probably has its origin in very large
numbers of individual observations; experiences in particular cases are
reported back to the minority community and form the basis of generalizations. Of course, many such observations are far from unbiased
because the observer has a strong and immediate stake in the proceedings, but the case studies by detached court observers, though limited
in number, tend to corroborate this perception.
One of the earliest case studies was conducted by the University of
Chicago Jury Project. 23 All jury trials arising in a single northern
United States district between January 1954 and June 1955 were observed and, following each trial, all lawyers and jurors were extensively interviewed. Of the twenty-three trials studied, four were
criminal trials involving black defendants. The interviewer reported
that racial prejudice influenced the jury deliberations in all four cases,
including the one case in which the defendant was acquitted. 24 Several
jurors explicitly argued during deliberations that the defendant should
be convicted simply because he was black. 25 Many other jurors expressed unsolicited derogatory views of blacks to the interviewer.26
In the early 1960s Kalvin and Zeisel investigated the functioning
of the jury through a different technique: they interviewed trial judges
concerning their views of jury verdicts in 1191 cases.27 In 293 of these
cases, the presiding judge disagreed with the jury's determination and
was asked to explain the jury's behavior. If the judges' observations
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
Breeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 20 n.3.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEJSEL, THE .AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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and impressions are to be trusted, the race of the defendant affected
jury deliberations in three ways. First, in only twenty-two cases did
the jury vote to convict when the judge would have acquitted; in four
of these cases, the judge saw substantial evidentiary problems and explained the jury's verdict as prompted by the jurors' antagonism toward the defendant's involvement in interracial sex. 28 Second, the
juries tended toward undue leniency in black defendant/black victim
assault cases. 29 Third, although judges thought that jurors often acquitted guilty defendants out of sympathy for the particular defendant
(this explanation was offered for 22 % of all judge/jury disagreements,
or 4% of all verdicts rendered30), black defendants were much less
likely than white defendants to be the recipients of such leniency because they were viewed as extremely unsympathetic. 31
There are no comparable recent studies. In part, this is because
permission from the courts to engage in direct and systematic inquiry
concerning the content of jury deliberations is very difficult to obtain.
Occasionally a particular verdict is attacked based upon convincing
evidence that jury deliberations were infected by racial prejudice. 32
Attorneys for black defendants who are allowed unusually extensive
voir dire on the question of a prospective juror's racial prejudice report
frequent instances where jurors initially deny any bias but eventually
admit to strong antagonism toward blacks and strong presumptions
about the defendant's guilt. 33 It is difficult, though, to infer from these
unsystematic observations that the frequency of prejudiced determinations of guilt observed in the 1950s and 1960s persists today.
2.

Conviction Rates

Three studies find significant differences in the conviction rates of
black and white defendants. Gerard and Terry report their analysis of
data gathered in several Missouri counties in 1962. 34 The data were
comprised of a randomly selected sample of all cases in which an information or indictment charging the commission of a felony had been
filed; nineteen of these cases were tried by a jury. 35 Juries convicted
28. Id. at 409. At least three of these cases involved a black defendant. Id. at 398.
29. Kalven and Zeise! reported four such cases. Id. at 340-41.
30. Id. at 217.
31. Id. at 343-44.
32. See cases cited in notes 373-75 infra.
33. See, e.g., Ginger, What Can be Done to Minimize Racism in Jury Trials?, 20 ]. Pua. L.
427, 434-38 (1971).
34. Gerard & Terry, Discrimination Against Negroes in the Administration of Criminal Law
in Missouri, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 415.
35. Id. at 430.
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ten of thirteen black defendants but only two of six white defendants. 36
Uhlman's sample of all felony cases docketed and disposed of between
July 1968 and June 1974 in a large northeastern metropolitan area also
found a statistically significant greater overall conviction rate for black
defendants; 72% of all white defendants were found guilty and 75.9%
of black defendants were found guilty. 37 Uhlman did not isolate jury
trial verdicts, but he did investigate 24,100 bench trials presided over
by twenty judges. Both black and white judges convicted black defendants more often than white defendants but the interracial disparity
was greater for white judges than for black judges. 38 Aggregating
these rates across judges concealed enormous individual variation: for
two white judges, the difference in conviction rates between black and
white defendants differed by more than 70%, and for another two the
conviction rates differed by more than 40%. 39 While it is possible that
factors not controlled for by the researchers accounted for the overall
difference in conviction rates of black and white defendants, it seems
unlikely that the extraordinary differences reported for these four
judges did not reflect racial bias. Finally, a study of all persons indicted for first degree murder in twenty-one Florida counties between
1972 and 1978 revealed that black defendants were significantly more
likely to be found guilty than were white defendants. 40
Another kind of conviction rate datum bears indirectly on the
question of prejudiced adjudication of guilt. When Baltimore jury
commissioners switched in 1969·from a juror selection method that
yielded at least 70% white jurors to one that yielded between 34% and
47% black jurors, the jury trial conviction rate dropped from almost
84% to less than 70%.41 Similarly, a temporary change in jury selection methods in Los Angeles County that led to the inclusion of more
black and Hispanic jurors produced lower conviction rates: the percentage of convictions fell from 67% in 1969 to 47.2% in 1971 and
36. Id.
37. T. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE 37, 78 (1979). A difference of 4% is statistically significant, extremely unlikely to have been caused by chance-because of the large number of cases
involved. Whether it is of practical importance depends upon the interpretation of the correlation. Is it spurious, resulting from correlations with other variables, or does it represent the effect
of racial prejudice in marginal evidence cases, as suggested by the mock jury studies described
infra? If the former interpretation is correct, there is no practical importance in these findings; if
the latter is correct, 4% of the black defendants who went to trial in that city were wrongfully
convicted.
38. Id. at 66.
39. Id. at 68.
40. L. Foley, The Effect of Race on the Imposition of the Death Penalty (1979) (paper
presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association in New York, Sept. 1979).
41. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 33.
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then rose again to 66.6% in 1972 when the older system of jury selection was reinstated. 42 We cannot infer from these statistics alone that
white jurors were improperly convicting black defendants because it is
possible to explain the conviction rate changes either by reference to
improper leniency by minority jurors toward minority defendants or
by greater leniency by minority jurors to all defendants. Nevertheless
the statistics do suggest that, for whatever reason, minority race jurors
may evaluate evidence differently than do white jurors. Prosecutors'
use of racially based peremptory challenges corroborates this impression; both empirical investigations and judicial observations show the
overwhelmingly frequent use of peremptory challenges to rid the jury
of black jurors when the defendant is black.43
3. Death Penalty Statistics

If one believes that the determination of guilt is influenced by racial prejudice, then one might expect that the determination to impose
the death penalty would also reflect racial bias. Conversely, if one discovered that imposition of the death penalty is infected by racial bias,
then one might infer that such bias also affects guilt determinations.
However, such inferences are risky, for they depend upon the nature
of the racial bias one hypothesizes to be affecting jurors. A jury might
be overtly and consciously hostile toward other-race offenders, in
which case one would predict greater racial discrepancies in the imposition of the death penalty than those observed in conviction rates; one
would expect hostility to lead to greater punitiveness toward those
judged guilty, but not necessarily to a greater willingness to find the
innocent guilty. Alternatively, juries might be subconsciously swayed
in their evaluation of the likelihood of guilt, in which case discrepancies in conviction rates would not necessarily predict death penalty
discrepancies; the task of guilt assessment probably would be more
vulnerable to the influence of unconscious stereotypes than would be
the selection of the appropriate penalty for a defendant already determined to be guilty. Thus, caution in interpreting death penalty statistics is also necessary; whether racial discrepancies are or are not
observed has a somewhat attenuated relationship to the question of
whether guilt determinations are racially biased.
42. Id. at 35.
43. See id. at 154-56; Crockett, supra note 4, at 387; Hayden, Senna & Siegel, Prosecutorial

Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation of Information Use in the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NEW ENG. L. REv. 768, 790 (1978); see also People v.
Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 152-53, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1210-11 (1983) (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing
numerous Illinois cases in which prosecutors had exercised the peremptory challenge in a racially
selective manner); cases cited in notes 243-99 infra.
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Two older studies point in opposite directions. The most extensive
death penalty study surveyed eleven southern states' death penalty
sentences for the crime of rape for the years 1945 through 1965. This
study produced overwhelming evidence that black defendants with
white victims were executed in disproportionate numbers. 44 The other
study, which analyzed California's first degree murder death sentences
imposed from 1958 to 1966, found no evidence of discrimination based
upon the victim's or defendant's race. 45
In contrast, three modern studies, all examining sentences imposed
after Furman v. Georgia, 46 produced consistent results. Bowers and
Pierce studied death sentences under post-Furman statutes through
1977 in Florida, Georgia, Ohio and Texas; in all four states they found
that the victim's race was an important determinant of sentence, and
that black offender/white victim cases were the most likely to result in
the death penalty. 47 Foley's study of data from twenty-one Florida
counties from 1972 to 1978 statistically controlled for the effects of
offender's and victim's occupations, number of prior convictions, and
number of victims in the incident; she found that the important selection factor for the death penalty was the victim's race. 48 Finally,
Baldus' study of all the death sentences imposed in Georgia between
1973 and 1979 found a statistically significant race-of-the-victim effect
even when the effects of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
strength of evidence, and time period and geographical area of sentence imposition were statistically controlled for. 49
4.

Other Sentencing Data

Because judges rather than juries determine noncapital sentences,
other sentencing data are even less directly probative of the bias in
guilt adjudications than are death penalty statistics. Nevertheless, evidence of bias in sentencing would be especially disturbing because one
would expect judges to be less racially biased - or to control their
44. Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119
(1973).
45. Special Issue, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21
STAN. L. R.Ev. 1297, 1421 (1969).
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman struck down standardless statutes that left imposition of
the death penalty entirely within the jury's discretion.
47. Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes,
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 578 (1980).
48. L. Foley, supra note 40.
49. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (describing findings of
study and holding that they did not suffice to show an eighth or fourteenth amendment violation), petition for cert. filed, No. 84-6811 (U.S. May 28, 1985).
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biases better - than jurors. so
Early studies of sentencing all showed substantial race effects, but
many such studies did not attempt to control for other factors, such as
type of offense or prior criminal record. 51 Numerous recent studies,
some with adequate controls, have produced conflicting results. 52 One
commentator has attempted to reconcile these studies by pointing out
that even those studies finding statistically significant discrepancies
show them to be of a small magnitude. 53 However, other commentators have argued that the apparent disparities may be only the tip of
the iceberg: several forms of racial bias may operate in the sentencing
of individual defendants but statistically cancel each other out. 54
There is some empirical support for this position. For example, harsher sentencing of black defendants convicted of interracial crimes
may be offset by more lenient sentencing of black defendants convicted
of intraracial crimes, as appears to be true in capital cases. 55 And, as
another study has suggested, whites may be favored in the decision to
incarcerate due to racial stereotypes about recidivism, but this may be
offset by longer sentences for whites who are incarcerated, because
their criminal success may be of a greater magnitude, particularly for
larcenous crimes. 56 Finally, the harshness of some judges toward
black defendants may sometimes be "balanced" by the lenience of
other judges toward black defendants. Thus, Gibson has found that
aggregate statistics showing no racial discrimination masked a mixture
of pro-black and anti-black judges. 57
50. Cf. S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 94-95, 109
(1969) (probation officers more often discriminated on the basis of race and economic class than
did judges).
51. See, e.g., Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 411 (1946) (classic study finding racial disparities in
sentence length); Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 SOCIAL
FORCES 369 (1949) (black offenders treated more severely than white offenders); Johnson, The
Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS 93 (1941) (differential sentencing for black offenders, particularly
those with white victims).
52. For a review ofrecent studies, see R. McNEELY & C. POPE, RACE, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 17-21 (1981); Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & SocY. R.Ev. 357 (1974).
53. Hagan, supra note 52, at 362-69.
54. Nagel & Neef, Racial Disparities that Supposedly Do Not Exist: Some Pitfalls in Analysis
of Court Records, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 87 (1976).
55. See notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
56. Nagel & Neef, supra note 54, at 90.
57. Gibson, Race as a Determinant of Criminal Sentences: A Methodological Critique and a
Case Study, 12 LAW & SOCY. R.Ev. 455 (1978). See also T. UHLMAN,supra note 37, at 37, 68, 78
(Although overall conviction rates varied only 4%, for two white judges the difference in conviction rates between black and white defendants was more than 70%, and for another two judges
the conviction rates differed by more than 40%.).
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B. Mock Jury Studies

Mock jury studies provide the strongest evidence that racial bias
frequently affects the determination of guilt. These studies, like other
laboratory experiments, do not suffer from lack of control, for the
good experimenter assures that the only variable altered is the one being investigated. The problem of external validity, however, now
arises; there is always the risk that causal relationships found in the
laboratory are not present in the real world. This may occur because
the laboratory setting interacted with the measured variables; for example, the condition of being observed might cause the subjects to try
to conceal their racial bias. A second reason laboratory findings may
not reflect real world phenomena is that the measured variables may
not affect the subjects in the same way that their real world counterparts do; for example, the stimulus of reading that the defendant is
black may not be functionally equivalent to the stimulus of seeing a
black defendant through the course of a trial. Because of the strength
and direction of the mock jury study findings, the question of external
validity assumes particular importance. After reviewing the substance
of these findings, that question will be considered in greater detail.
1. Laboratory Findings
Laboratory findings concerning the influence of race on white subjects' perception of criminal defendants are quite consistent. More
than a dozen mock jury studies provide support for the hypothesis
that racial bias affects the determination of guilt. Of the handful of
studies whose findings initially appear to support the null hypothesis,
all, upon close examination, are ambiguous in their import. The mock
jury studies may be divided into three categories: experiments investigating race and guilt attribution, experiments investigating race and
sentencing, and experiments investigating the interaction among race,
attractiveness, and blameworthiness.
a. Race and guilt attribution. Studies investigating the relationship between race and determination of guilt provide subjects with a
transcript or a videotape of a trial in which the race of one of the
participants - the defendant, the victim, or the attorney, depending
on the study - is randomly varied while all other aspects of the case
are held constant. The subject is asked to determine whether the defendant is guilty, and correlations between the race of the trial participant and the judgment of guilt are tested for statistical significance. 58
Because the only factor that has been varied is a participant's race,
58. Tests of statistical significance calculate the probability that the data obtained from an
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statistically significant differences can be interpreted as reflecting a
causal relationship between race and guilt attribution.
i. Race of the defendant. Nine very recent experiments find that
the race of the defendant significantly and directly affects the determination of guilt. 59 White subjects in all of these studies were more
likely to find a minority-race defendant guilty than they were to find
an identically situated white defendant guilty. Four studies find a significant interaction between the race of the defendant, guilt attribution, and some third variable. 60 The one study that did not find any
differences based on the race of the defendant may be reconciled with
these findings based upon a careful analysis of its methodology. 61 Because of the centrality of these studies to the question of whether black
defendants are treated fairly by white juries, it is appropriate to describe each study in some detail.
The least complicated of these studies was published by McGlynn,
Megas, and Benson in 1976. 62 The subjects were 208 white college
students at a Texas university. Subjects read a summary of a violent
murder case in which an insanity defense was presented, and were
asked to vote guilty or insane and to recommend a sentence for the
defendant. Black males were found guilty in 69% of the cases and
black females were found guilty in 56% of the cases; both white males
and females were found guilty in 54% of the cases. 63
Two experiments published by Ugwuegbu in 1978 systematically
varied the victim's race, the defendant's race, and the amount of evidence pointing toward guilt (near zero, marginal, or strong). 64 The
subjects in the first experiment were 256 white undergraduates at a
midwestem university; the subjects in the second were 196 black undergraduates at the African American Affairs Institute. 65 After reading case transcripts, subjects in both experiments were asked four
experiment could be the result of a random occurrence. See D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF
143-45 (1983); note 37 supra.
59. See notes 62-92 infra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 93-95, 101-03, & 105-06 infra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 96-100 infra and accompanying text.
62. McGlynn, Megas & Benson, Sex and Race as Factors Affecting the Attribution ofInsanity
in a Murder Trial, 93 J. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1976).
63. Id. at 96.
64. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15
J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1979).
65. The responses of twelve white and ten black undergraduates were deleted from the data
analysis for various reasons.
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questions assessing the defendant's culpability; 66 answers to those
questions were then correlated with each of the independent variables.
For white subjects, the correlation between the defendant's race and
culpability was significant: those subjects rated a black defendant more
culpable than a white defendant. 67 Additional statistical tests revealed
that the significance of the defendant's race varied with the strength of
the evidence: when the evidence of guilt was strong or near zero the
white subjects rated black and white defendants equally culpable, but
when the evidence was marginal they rated black defendants.more culpable. As the author explained, "[W]hen the evidence is not strong
enough for conviction a white juror gives the benefit of the doubt to a
white defendant but not to a black defendant." 68
U gwuegbu's second experiment, investigating the responses of
black subjects, revealed a similar pattern of own-race bias. Black subjects rated the black defendant as significantly less culpable than the
white defendant, and again the significance of the defendant's race depended upon the strength of the evidence. 69 Like white subjects, black
subjects held a racially dissimilar defendant more culpable than a racially similar defendant when the evidence was marginal and were unaffected by the defendant's race when the evidence was weak. 70
Unlike white subjects, however, black subjects also judged a dissimilar
defendant more harshly than a similar defendant k the strong evidence condition; "black subjects tended to grant the black defendant
the benefit of the doubt not only when the evidence is doubtful but
even when there was strong evidence against him." 71
In a sophisticated study published in 1979, Bernard examined the
66. The dependent variables include the following questionnaire items:
1. I feel that the defendant's intention was to cause the plaintiff, Miss Brown: (No harm
at all, Some harm, Extreme harm.)
2. To what extent was Mr. Williams, the defendant, responsible for the rape?: (Not at
all responsible, Moderately responsible, Very much responsible.)
3. With respect to my verdict, I feel the defendant is guilty as charged: (Not guilty of
any crime, Moderately guilty as charged, Exactly guilty as charged.) [sic]
4. Based on the evidence, I feel I would recommend for the defendant as punishment:
(No punishment at all; Suspended sentence; 1-5 years in the State Prison; 5-9 years; 10-14
years; 15-20 years; Over 20 years but not life; Life imprisonment; Death penalty.)
All of the items incorporated 9-point rating scales and were scored 1-9. The extremes
and midpoints of items 1, 2, and 3 were verbally anchored with 1 indicating no culpability, 5
average, and 9 strong culpability, respectively. Item 4 was rated on a scale of nine alternatives. In each case, the higher the number the more punitive the judgment.
Id. at 137-38 (emphasis in original). The four items were then summed for each subject to derive
a total score. Id. at 138.
61. Id. at 138-39.
68. Id. at 139-40.
69. Id. at 141.
10. Id. at 141-42.
71. Id. at 142.
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effect of the defendant's race on the verdicts of juries with various racial compositions. 72 To increase verisimilitude, the experiment
presented a videotaped "trial" (rather than a transcript) to a panel of
jurors who were first asked for an individual verdict and then asked to
deliberate and arrive at a unanimous verdict. The charge was assault
and battery on a police officer, to which a defense of provocation and
police brutality was offered. Deliberately ambiguous evidence was offered on the officer's propensity for violence and the defendant's intoxication. At the close of the testimony, the judge instructed the subjects
on the applicable law. Five juries saw the videotape with a black defendant and five saw the videotape with a white defendant; in each set,
one jury was 100% black, one jury was 75% black and 25% white,
one jury was 50% black and 50% white, one jury was 25% black and
75% white, and one jury was 100% white.
On the individual ballot, white jurors tended to find the black defendant guilty more often than the white defendant, and black jurors
showed a reciprocal tendency to find white defendants guilty more
often than black defendants, although neither trend was statistically
significant due to the small sample size. 73 There was a pronounced
tendency for jurors to shift their votes toward acquittal as a result of
group discussion, with one notable exception: white jurors who found
the black defendant guilty on their first ballot tended to hold to this
decision and not be influenced by group discussion. By the final individual ballot, the number voting guilty had decreased to 15% and all
of these guilty votes came from white subjects viewing the black
defendant. 74
An examination of the group verdicts is also anecdotally instructive. The only jury unable to reach a verdict was racially balanced
(50% black and 50% white) and assigned to view the black defendant.
By the second ballot, all white jurors in this jury voted guilty and all
black jurors voted not guilty; this polarization persisted through two
more ballots, when the jury reported itself incapable of reaching a decision. A second jury with the same jury-defendant combination was
run and this jury also reported itself unable to render a verdict. Furthermore, only one jury ultimately reached a unanimous verdict of
guilty: this was an all-white jury viewing the black defendant. 75
Lipton used a different methodology, examining the relationship
72. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That ofJurors in Determining Verdicts, 5 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY R.E.v. 103 (1979).
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 110.
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between the ethnic composition of juries and their assessments of the
guilt of Anglo and Hispanic defendants. 76 Realism was attempted in a
unique way; although transcripts were employed, the subjects were
students solicited by the Intercampus Grievance Committee of the
University of California and told that persons involved in the disciplinary hearings had chosen to have their cases decided by a jury of their
peers. All juries contained both Anglo and Hispanic jurors:77 one
quarter were predominantly Hispanic, one quarter were predominantly Anglo, and half had three Hispanic and three Anglo jurors.
Each jury decided two cases, one involving a Hispanic defendant
("Horacio Garcia") and one involving an Anglo defendant ("Richard
Nelson"). One of the cases involved an alleged cheating incident and
the other involved destruction of campus property; overall, each defendant was involved in each type of case an equal number of times.
Jurors completed predeliberation questionnaires, then deliberated until they reached a verdict or announced that they could not do so, and
finally were asked to fill out a postdeliberation questionnaire.
The jurors' ethnicity had significant effects on the predeliberation
assessment of guilt of the Hispanic defendant, with Anglo jurors attributing more guilt to the Hispanic defendant than did the Hispanic
jurors.78 In addition, Anglo jurors liked the Hispanic defendant less
than did Hispanic jurors, thought that he was less intelligent than did
Hispanic jurors, and rated him as more dishonest than did Hispanic
jurors.79 However, after deliberation with jurors of both ethnic
groups, the jurors' ethnicity no longer exerted a significant influence
on their verdicts. 80 Deliberations had similar effects in the Anglo defendant cases: the predeliberation tendency for Anglo jurors to rate
the Anglo defendant less guilty than the Hispanic jurors rated him
diminished, with Anglo jurors tending to change their minds toward
guilt and Hispanic jurors, toward innocence. 81
Klein and Creech published the results of two studies on race and
guilt attribution in 1982. 82 In the first study they used white students
as subjects, asking them to read two transcripts of four possible crimes
(rape, murder, drug sale, and burglary) and then rate which defendant
76. Lipton, supra note 15.
77. Lipton refers to the defendants as Anglo and Hispanic, but to the jurors as Anglo and
Chicano, without explanation.
78. Id. at 282.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Klein & Creech, Race, Rape and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and Meaning Changes, 3
BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 21 (1982).
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they thought was more,likely to be guilty. The race of the male defendant and of the female victim was systematically varied. The study
yielded eight comparisons of the jurors' estimated probability that the
defendant was really guilty. In seven out of the eight conditions, the
estimated probability of guilt was higher for the black defendant than
for the white defendant. 83 The disparities in two conditions were surprisingly high. After reading otherwise identical transcripts, white
subjects rated the probability that the white defendant had raped the
black victim at 33%, but rated the probability of the black defendant's
guilt of that crime at 52%; they also rated the probability that the
white defendant had burglarized the white victim at 52% but the
probability of the black defendant's guilt at 63%. 84
In their second experiment, Klein and Creech asked 133 white college students to watch the videotape of a trial and respond to seven
different segments of testimony. 85 In fact, the videotapes were four
versions of the same mock rape trial, all identical except for the race of
the actors playing the defendant and of the actresses playing the victim; pretests of each actor's warmth, attractiveness, and sincerity revealed no differences. The evidence was weak and entirely
circumstantial: the victim could not identify the defendant and the
medical tests were inconclusive. Each subject was asked to estimate
the probability of the defendant's guilt at the conclusion of each segment of the videotape, and at the conclusion of the entire tape the
subject was asked to vote guilty or not guilty. The black defendant
was believed more guilty in the preverdict assessment of guilt, particularly by male subjects during the detective's and the defendant's testimony. 86 Oddly enough, this main effect disappeared when jurors were
83.
TABLE 1
Probability that Defendant is "Really" Guilty.

Rape
Victim Race
White Black

Crime
Murder
Victim Race
White Black

Drug Sale
Victim Race
White Black

Burglary
Victim Race
White Black

Defendant race
.58
.52
.32
White
.68
.33
.44
.45
.41
.63
.36
Black
.70
.52
.60
.54
.43
.46
Probability
averaged
.44
across crime
.56
.54
.46
Id. at 24.
84. Id.
85. Only 129 responses were used.
86. When data were aggregated for all subjects, the correlations were of marginal statistical
significance, but the statistical relationship grew stronger when the responses of male subjects
were analyzed alone. Id. at 26-28.
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asked for their final votes, due to an interaction of sex of juror and
race of defendant: the white female subjects were more likely to convict the white defendant and the white male subjects were more likely
to convict the black defendant. 87
Feild's study, published in 1979, was conducted with 896 white
Alabama citizens with an average age of thirty-five, 19% of whom had
actually served as jurors. 88 One of the dependent variables in the
study combined the sentencing and guilt-determination questions zero years were assigned to the innocent defendant - and the author
decided to run statistical tests on this variable, rather than a pure
guilty/not guilty determination. He noted, however, that the correlation between this aggregated guilt-punishment variable and the pure
guilt variable was extremely high, making it unlikely that the results of
his analysis would have been different if the pure guilty/not guilty variable had been used instead. 89 Feild found that the black defendant
was judged much more culpable than the white defendant. 90
Solemou and Bray asked Cuban, white American, and black
American junior high school students to determine the guilt of a juvenile accused of shoplifting. 91 Cubans rated the white American defendant most guilty, white Americans rated the black American
defendant most guilty, and black Americans' assessments of guilt were
independent of the race of the suspect. 92
Three studies fail to find a direct cause and effect relationship between the race of the defendant and guilt attribution. However, two of
these studies found statistically significant interactions between race,
guilt attribution, and a third variable, and all three of them suffer from
a common methodological flaw so serious that the meaning of their
findings is impossible to interpret. Gleason and Harris gave jurors
"background material" on the defendant and a summary of testimony
from a fictitious case; they found that socioeconomic status rather
than race was the major determinant of simulated jurors' judgments of
87. Id. at 28.
88. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of Victim,
Defendant and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (1979).
89. Id. at 270.
90. Id. at 271.
91. J. Solemou & R. Bray, Effect of Ethnic Group Membership on Attribution of Guilt,
Sentence Length, and Liking for the Defendant (unpublished study reported in J. Solemou, supra
note 15, at 14). Solemou's subsequent study examined the more nebulous concept of the "responsibility" of perpetrators and victims for injuries. Asking about "responsibility" produced
much weaker race effects than had the earlier study inquiring about likelihood of guilt.
92. Id.
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guilt and sentencing. 93 While they did not find race to exert a significant direct effect on blameworthiness, they did find an interaction between race, socioeconomic status, and blameworthiness, with black
lower class defendants and white middle class defendants judged most
blameworthy. Andrews found significant sex-of-juror effects on the
degree of guilt assigned to a rape defendant, but found no direct effect
of the race of the defendant upon juror decisions when the decisions of
male and female jurors were aggregated. 94 However, a significant interaction between the sex of the juror, the race of the defendant, and
the certainty of guilt was uncovered: female subjects were more likely
to convict white defendants, and male subjects were less likely to convict white defendants. 95 McGuire and Bermant failed to find a significant effect of the race of the defendant on the verdict in a mock trial of
a woman accused of murdering her husband. 96
All three studies, however, are flawed by the failure to differentiate
between the responses of white and black subjects. 97 Because most
studies investigating minority-race subjects have found that those subjects display an own-race bias rather than a bias against minority-race
defendants, 98 mixing the responses of minority-race subjects with
white subjects could very easily conceal offsetting tendencies to judge
defendants of another race as more likely to be guilty than defendants
of the same race. Moreover, the particular crime chosen by McGuire
and Bermant may have further confounded their analysis. Because
subjects are likely to interpret the murder of a spouse as the murder of
a person of the same race as the defendant, the experiment may have
inadvertently introduced the variable of race of the victim. As discussed below, subjects tend to attribute more guilt to the defendant
when the victim is the same race as the subject. 99 Thus, any guiltattribution effect of the black defendant may have been offset by an
opposite effect from her black victim. 100
93. Gleason & Harris, Race, Socio-Economic Status, and Perceived Similarity as Determi•
nants of Judgements by Simulated Jurors, 3 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 175 (1975),
94. F. Andrews, The Influence of Evidenciary [sic] and Extraevidenciary [sic] Factors on
Decisions in a Simulated Rape Trial (1982) (unpublished dissertation) (available at the University of Michigan).
95. Id. at 121.
96. McGuire & Bennant, Individual and Group Decisions in Response to a Mock Trial: A
Methodological Note, 1 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 220, 224 (1977).
97. McGuire and Bennant describe their juries as "predominantly white," id. at 222, and
neither of the other two studies discusses the race of their subjects. See Bernard, supra note 72,
at 104-06.
98. See Bernard, supra note 72; Lipton, supra note 15; Ugwuegbu, supra note 64.
99. See notes 107-14 infra and accompanying text.
100. Also, the crime of murdering one's husband, because it may conjure up a host of family
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Two other studies relating to guilt attribution and the race of the
defendant are worthy of discussion. Hypothesizing that the race of the
defendant may affect guilt attribution in different ways depending on
the crime with which the defendant is charged, Sunnafrank. and
Fontes began their study by trying to identify what crimes were racially stereotyped. 101 Seventy-eight college students at a Michigan
university were given ten photographs, five of black individuals and
five of white individuals, and told that each of these persons had been
convicted of a crime. Subjects were then given a list of ten crimes and
asked to match each criminal with the crime he had been convicted of
committing. The forced choice aspect of the experiment precluded
any absolute conclusion that subjects thought blacks were more likely
to be guilty of a particular crime than were whites. For example, the
fact that only 36% of the subjects chose a black photograph as depicting the person convicted for rape 102 could mean that they thought
whites were more likely to commit rape than were blacks, but it might
merely mean that if a white person were convicted of a crime, he was
more likely to have committed rape than assault. Even with that caveat, the results of the study were striking. Participants attributed to
black criminals 83 % of the mugging assaults, 81 % of the auto thefts,
72% of the assaults on a police officer, and 95% of the soliciting offenses. To white criminals they assigned 65% of the frauds, 90% of
the embezzlements, 79% of the child molestations, 64% of the rapes,
and 77% of the counterfeiting offenses. Only with vehicular manslaughters were the disparities small enough to be explained by
chance. 103 These results provide strong evidence that crime-related
racial stereotypes exist, but do not permit more specific conclusions.
In their second study, Sunnafrank and Fontes investigated vehicular manslaughters, the one crime for which they did not find large
discrepancies between the attribution to black defendants and the attribution to white defendants. Using seventy-five college students as
subjects, they found no significant effect of defendant's race. 104 This
might be explained by the lack of a racial stereotype for this crime, but
it might also have resulted from the failure to analyze the responses of
black and white subjects separately.
issues, may not have a consistent racial stereotype. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying
text.
101. Sunnafrank & Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial Stereotypes and Influence on
Juridic Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. REL. 1 (1983).
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 9.
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Finally, Foley and Chamblin's 1982 study is relevant for its findings on interracial and intraracial crime and guilt attribution. 105 Subjects, 191 students at a university in Florida, were asked to listen to a
tape describing a trial in which an adult male was charged with sexual
battery on an eleven-year-old child. The race of the offender and the
race of the victim were randomly varied and each subject was asked to
indicate an individual verdict on a five point scale (not guilty, possibly
not guilty, undecided, possibly guilty, and guilty). White mock jurors
were most likely to find a black defendant with a white victim guilty,
but black jurors were much more likely to attribute guilt to intraracial
offenses regardless of the race of the defendant. 106
ii. Race of the victim. Three studies consider whether the race of
the victim influences guilt attribution and all find a statistically significant effect. 107 These findings are important in two ways. First, by
revealing one way in which racial bias affects determinations of guilt,
they increase the plausibility of the hypothesis that racial bias infects
criminal trials in other ways, thus indirectly supporting the findings
that the race of the defendant affects guilt attribution. Second, they
pose the possibility of a cumulative effect of the race of the defendant
and the race of the victim, such that the black defendant on trial for a
crime against a white victim is doubly disadvantaged.
Miller and Hewitt's subjects were 133 students at a Missouri university, approximately half of whom were black and half of whom
were white. 108 Subjects saw a videotape of the beginning of an actual
court case involving rape, showing a judge and a defense attorney conversing in the courtroom with the accused, a thirty-year-old black
male. Subjects were then given written summaries of the prosecution
and defense arguments actually used in the trial. All subjects were
told that the victim was a thirteen-year-old female, but half were told
that the victim was black and half were told that she was white. Subjects were then asked how they would have voted had they been on the
jury. When the mock jurors were white, 65% voted for conviction in
the white victim condition but only 32% voted for conviction in the
black victim condition; when the mock jurors were black, 80% voted
for conviction when the victim was black but only 48% voted for con105. Foley & Chamblin, The Effect ofRace and Personality on Mock Jurors' Decisions, 112 J.
47 (1982).
106. Id. at 49.

PSYCHOLOGY

107. See notes 108-14 infra and accompanying text.
108. Miller & Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial Similarity, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 159 (1978).

June 1985]

Black Innocence and the White Jury

1635

viction when the victim was white. 109
Ugwuegbu's study, described earlier for its findings on culpability
and the race of the defendant, also investigated the effect of the victim's race on culpability. 11° For both black and white subjects, the
defendant was rated significantly less culpable when his victim was
racially different from the subject. 111
Klein and Creech's study, also described above, 112 investigated
only white subjects. Their first experiment revealed that for three out
of four hypothetical crimes, regardless of the race of the defendant,
subjects estimated the defendant's guilt to be greater if the victim were
white than if the victim were black. 113 In their second experiment,
they found that the black victim of a black assailant was judged significantly less truthful than other victims. 114
m. Race of the defendant's attorney. Studies investigating the effect of the race of the defendant's attorney on guilt attribution may
also be important in two ways. First, they are relevant because they
provide evidence that racial bias affects guilt determinations in yet another way, again indirectly increasing the plausibility of the hypothesis
that the race of the defendant affects guilt attribution. Second, to the
extent that black defendants are more likely to be represented by black
attorneys than are white defendants, the black defendant is more likely
to be disadvantaged by bias against clients of black attorneys.
The only study investigating the effect of the defense attorney's
race on the determination of his client's guilt found a consistent antiblack defense attorney bias. 115 Subjects who saw the photo of a black
defense attorney were significantly more likely to find the defendant
109. For both black and white subjects, the greater tendency to vote for the conviction when
the victim was racially similar to themselves was significant at the .01 level. Id. at 160.
110. Ugwuegbu, supra note 64. See text at notes 64-71 supra for a description of the study's
methodology.
111. Id. at 139, 141.
112. Klein & Creech, supra note 82. See text at notes 82-87 supra for a description of the
study's methodology.
113. Klein and Creech reported positive results of statistical significance tests for the crime of
rape. They did not calculate the statistical significance for the other three crimes, although for
two of them (burglary and murder) the estimates of guilt were far higher.in the white victim
situation than in the black victim situation. It was only for the drug sale, where there were no
true victims, that the race-of-the-victim differences were small and interacted with the race of the
defendant: the estimates of guilt were slightly higher for black defendants with black "victims"
and for white defendants with white "victims." Id. at 24.
114. Id. at 29.
115. Cohen & Peterson, Bias in the Courtroom: Race and Sex Effects ofAttorneys On Juror
Verdicts, 9 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 81 (1981). The subjects were Los Angeles high school
students. The discussion of the results strongly implies that the subjects were white, but no
explicit racial description is provided.
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guilty. 116 In addition, a black defense attorney made the subjects significantly more likely to find the victim's mother a convincing witness,
significantly more likely to feel sympathy for the victim's brother, significantly more likely to find the description of the prosecution witness
complete, and significantly more likely to find the prosecutor honest
and convincing. 11 7
b. Race and sentencing. The results of mock jury studies investigating race and sentencing are not as consistent a~ those concerning
race and guilt attribution. Reflection upon these inconsistencies suggests that at least two different forms of prejudice may affect jurors'
deliberations.
Two studies found that the race of the defendant significantly affected sentencing decisions. In a study done at North Carolina State
University, Klein and Creech found that "convicted" black rape defendants were sentenced more harshly by white subjects than were
otherwise identical white rape defendants; furthermore, defendants
convicted of raping white victims were sentenced more harshly than
were defendants convicted of raping black victims. 118 In a study using
white Alabama citizens as subjects, Feild obtained the same results:
the subjects sentenced black rape defendants to significantly longer
terms of imprisonment than white rape defendants, and they sentenced defendants accused of raping white victims significantly longer
than defendants accused of raping black victims. 119 However, this
finding did not separate out the effects of differential guilt attribution:
the zero-year sentences of defendants who were acquitted by the subjects were included in the analysis of sentence length.
Four studies found that the race of the defendant did not affect
mock jurors' sentencing decisions. 120 McGlynn, Megas, and Benson,
using white Texas Tech University students, found that those students
were significantly more likely to convict black defendants of murder,
but of those defendants who were convicted, white male defendants
received somewhat longer sentences. 121 Oros and Elman, using white
student subjects at a large midwestern university, found no significant
difference in the sentences assigned to black and white rape defend116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 84.
Id.
Klein & Creech, supra note 82, at 28-29.
Feild, supra note 88, at 271.
See notes 121-24 infra and accompanying text.
McGlynn, Megas & Benson, supra note 62, at 96.

June 1985]

Black Innocence and the White Jury

1637

ants. 122 In this study, as in the Feild study, sentences of zero years
assigned to defendants found not guilty were included in the tabulation of results. Interestingly, subjects judging black defendants indicated that they would have felt significantly more responsible for their
decisions in a real trial than did subjects judging white defendants. 123
The two other studies investigating the effects of race on sentencing varied both the defendant's race and his social attractiveness.
Both of these studies found that subjects treated the socially attractive
defendant more leniently than his unattractive counterpart, but found
no disparity in the treatment of black and white offenders. 124
These findings, read with those concerning race and guilt attribution, suggest that for most white subjects, bias against black defendants is based upon subconscious stereotypes. Were the bias conscious
and motivated by hostility, one would expect white subjects to treat
blacks less favorably at every opportunity; because the bias seems always to operate at the guilt adjudication stage but only occasionally at
the sentencing stage, conscious hostility seems an unlikely explanation
for the white subjects' behavior. Instead, it appears that stereotypes
concerning blacks' propensity to commit crimes subconsciously sway
most white subjects' evaluations of a black defendant's guilt; these stereotypes have little or no effect on decisions concerning the harshness
of the penalty to be imposed upon a defendant already determined to
be guilty. A few subjects - perhaps more frequently subjects from the
South and perhaps particularly in rape cases - are also motivated by
hostility and therefore penalize black defendants at the sentencing
stage as well as at the guilt determination stage. This explanation of
the mock jury studies on guilt attribution and sentencing is consistent
with sentencing data from actual trials: racial discrepancies tend to
show up only in records that (1) are older (perhaps thus increasing the
likelihood of overt hostility toward black defendants), (2) are from
Southern states, or (3) involve rape cases. 125 As we shall see, this
hypothesis is also supported by more general research on racial
prejudice. 126
An alternative, even more pessimistic explanation is possible. Per122. Oros & Elman, Impact ofJudge's Instroctions Upon Jurors' Decisions: The "Cautionary
Charge" in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE REsEARCH IN Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 28, 34 (1979).
123. Id at 34.
124. Feild & Barnett, Simulated Jury Trials: Students vs. "Real" People as Jurors, 104 J.
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 287, 290 (1978); Nemeth & Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of
the Defendant and the Jurors, 90 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 221, 226 (1973).
125. See Parts I. A. 3. & 4. supra.
126. See Part I. C. infra.
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haps determining the guilt of a black defendant prejudices decisionmaking in only one direction: white subjects will either be racially
neutral or, because they are biased, will be more likely to convict black
defendants than white defendants. This leads to a significant correlation between the race of the defendant and findings of guilt. In determining the appropriate punishment for a convicted defendant,
however, white subjects might respond in three ways: they may be
racially neutral, they may be motivated by hostility and therefore treat
black defendants more harshly, or they may believe that because
bl_acks are inherently more likely to commit crimes they are less morally blameworthy and therefore treat them more leniently. Depending
upon the exact composition of the sample of mock jurors, and the particular facts of the case, these last two attitudes could offset each other,
thus appearing to reflect perfect neutrality, or they could be imperfectly balanced and thus appearing to reflect either greater harshness
or greater leniency toward black defendants. The older case studies 127
would support this explanation and the sentencing data from actual
trials could also be explained in this way.
Actually, these two explanations need not be viewed as inconsistent with each other, but may differ largely in the matter of emphasis.
It may be that most jurors are subconsciously biased and this influences the determination of guilt, but that most jurors, in most circumstances, are not consciously hostile. However, some subjects are
consciously hostile and some are consciously patronizing; the exact
number of subjects reacting to these motivations varies depending
upon the particulars of the crime and the demographic characteristics
of the pool from which the subjects were drawn.
c. Race, attractiveness, and blameworthiness. Studies relating attractiveness, race, and blameworthiness provide additional support and perhaps a partial explanation - for the findings on race and guilt
attribution discussed above.
i. Attractiveness and blameworthiness. Investigation of the relationship between attractiveness and perceived blameworthiness has
yielded consistent results. In their judgments of blameworthiness,
subjects respond to the defendant's physical beauty, his social status,
and the similarity of his attitudes to their own. One study found
crime-specific facial stereotypes and correlations of those stereotypes
with judgments of guilt, 128 while two more found that physically at127. See Part I. A. 1. supra.
128. Shoemaker, South & Lowe, Facial Stereotypes of Deviants and Judgments of Guilt or
Innocence, 51 Soc. FORCES 427 (1973).
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tractive defendants are less likely to be judged guilty. 129 Three mock
jury studies found greater leniency in the sentencing of physically attractive defendants. 13° Furthermore, as with findings on race and
blameworthiness, the effects of physical attractiveness operate on subjects through the victim's beauty as well as the defendant's: subjects
tend to punish offenders whose victims were physically attractive more
harshly than those whose victims were physically unattractive. 131 Socially desirable attributes, as well as physical beauty, appear to influence judgments of blameworthiness. One mock jury study found that
defendants described as middle class were judged less guilty and assigned fewer years in prison than were defendants of a lower class
background. 132 Three studies found that defendants described as
working class and divorced were sentenced more harshly than were
defendants described as middle class family men. 133 Finally, jurors'
judgments of blameworthiness are altered by the extent to which the
defendant's attitudes resemble their own: two studies found that subjects were more likely to find defendants with dissimilar attitudes
guilty than defendants with similar attitudes. 134
ii. Race and attractiveness. The findings on attractiveness and
blameworthiness assume significance when considered with findings
relating race to attractiveness. White subjects have more trouble dis129. Solender & Solender, Minimizing the Effect of the Unattractive Client on the Jury: A
Study of the Interaction ofPhysical Appearance with Assertions and Self-Experience References, 5
HUMAN RIGHTS 201, 206-07 (1976).
130. Efran, The Effect ofPhysical Appearance on the Judgment ofGuilt, Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. REsEARCH IN
PERSONALITY 45, 49 (1974); Sigall & Ostrove, Beautiful But Dangerous: Effects of Offender
Attractiveness and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 410, 413 (1975) (finding greater leniency in the sentencing of physically attractive
defendants, except where the crimes involved capitalizing on the defendant's attractiveness); Solomon & Schopler, The Relationship of Physical Attractiveness and Punitiveness: Is the Linearity
Assumption out of Line?, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 483, 485 (1978).
131. Kerr, Beautiful and Blameless: Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibility on
Mock Jurors' Verdtcts, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 479, 480 (1978).
132. Gleason & Harris, supra note 93, at 178.
133. Feild & Barnett, supra note 124, at 290; Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Crimtnal and His Victim on the Decistons of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 141, 148-51 (1969); Nemeth & Sosis, supra note 124, at 226; see also Kaplan
& Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as Information Intergratton: Combtntng Evtdenttal and
Nonevtdenttal Information, 30 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 493, 496 (1974) (defendants with negative personality characteristics were more likely to be found guilty and punished
severely than were defendants with positive personal traits).
134. Griffitt & Jackson, Stmulated Jury Decisions: The Influence ofJury-Defendant Attitude
Stmtlarity-Disstmtlarity, 1 Soc. BEHAVIOR & PERSONALITY 1, 5-6 (1973); Mitchell & Byrne, The
Defendant's Dtlemma: Effects ofJurors' Attttudes and Authoritarianism on Judtctal Decisions, 25
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125-26 (finding that similar attitudes influenced authoritarian subjects but did not influence egalitarian subjects).
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tinguishing black faces than white faces 135 and are likely to perceive
black faces as less beautiful than white faces; 136 white mock jurors
tend to perceive black defendants as coming from a lower socioecono_mic class than white defendants despite otherwise identical descriptions of the defendants; 137 and white subjects without information on
the attitude of other persons assume greater attitude dissimilarity from
black persons. 138 It would appear that white subjects tend to assume
less favorable characteristics about black defendants than white defendants and that such assumptions contribute to these subjects'
greater tendency to find black defendants guilty.
2.

External Validity

Given that white subjects consistently display an own-race bias in
guilt-attribution decisions as mock jurors in a laboratory setting, and
that the more limited studies on minority-race subjects suggest that
they display a reciprocal bias, can we infer that jurors in criminal trials
will tend to convict other-race defendants under circumstances in
which they would acquit same-race defendants? We will answer this
question affirmatively if the laboratory experiments have external validity, that is, if there is nothing peculiar to the laboratory experiments
135. See Barkowitz & Brigham, Recognition of Faces: Own Race Bias, Incentive, and Time
Delay, 12 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 255, 261 (1982); Brigham & Barkowitz, Do "They all
look alike?'~· The Effect ofRace, Sex, Experience and Attitudes on the Ability to Recognize Faces,
8 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 306, 314 (1978); Chance, Goldstein & McBride, Differential
Experience and Recognition Memory for Faces, 91 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 243 (1975) (reporting on
two experiments); Cross, Cross & Daley, Sex, Race, Age and Beauty As Factors in Recognition of
Faces, 10 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 393, 394 (1971); Galper, "Functional Race Membership" and Recognition of Faces, 31 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 455, 458 (1973); Luce, The
Role ofExperience in Inter-Racial Recognition, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY BULL, 39,
40 (1974); Malpass, Racial Bias in Eyewitness Identification?, 1 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL•
OGY BULL. 42, 43 (1974); Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 330, 332-33 (1969); Malpass, Lavigueur & Weldon, Verbal and V'zsual Training in Face Recognition, 14 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 285, 288 (1973);
see also Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification E"ors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934
(1984).
136. Bernstein, Lin & McClellan, Cross vs. Within-Racial Judgments of Attractiveness, 32
PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 495, 500-501 (1982); see also Newman, Liss & Sherman, Ethnic
Awareness in Children: Not a Unitary Concept, 143 J. GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY 103 (1983) (children prefer pictures of same-race children, with this effect particularly strong in white children).
137. Foley & Chamblin, supra note 105, at 49.
138. Byrne & Wong, Racial Prejudice, Interpersonal Attraction, and Assumed Dissimilarity of
Attitudes, 65 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 246, 247 (1962) (prejudiced white subjects
assumed greater attitude dissimilarity from blacks than whites, but unprejudiced subjects did
not); Hendrick, Bixenstine & Hawkins, Race Versus Belief Similarity as Determinants of Attraction: A Search for a Fair Test, 17 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 250, 257 (1971); see also
Stein, Hardyck & Smith, Race and Belief: An Open and Shut Case, 1 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 281 (1965) (white teenagers responded to stimulus teenagers on the basis of similarity of belief when extensive information on the target's belief was supplied, but when that
information was withheld, responded on the basis of racial similarity).
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that creates the race and guilt-attribution correlation. There are no
field experiments on race and guilt attribution and such experiments
are unlikely ever to be possible. 139 Nevertheless, if we examine possible sources of external invalidity, we will see that there is no support
for the position that the findings discussed above reflect a phenomenon
that occurs solely in the laboratory.
There are four sources of concern about generalizability: the subjects, the independent variable (race), the dependent variable (the verdict), and the setting. There is no basis for arguing that the subjects of
the experiments are more likely to respond to the race of the defendant
than are prospective jurors. 140 Most of the subjects were students and
they may differ in many respects from prospective jurors. However,
the relevant differences suggest that prospective jurors would display a
greater tendency toward racial bias in guilt attribution. Students are
somewhat more lenient than other prospective jurors. 141 More important, because they are younger and better educated than much of the
jury pool, they are likely to be less racially prejudiced. 142 In addition,
the one study designed to sample subjects whose demographic characteristics resembled those of real jurors found a strong effect of race
upon guilt attribution. 143
Similarly, there is no basis for arguing that the experimental manipulation of race has stronger effects upon subjects than does the race
of a defendant on trial. Most of the mock jury studies simply state in
words that the defendant is black or white; actually seeing the defendant certainly would make his race more salient. Even those studies
that use photographs or videotape clips exhibit the defendant for a
much briefer period of time than jurors would view him at a trial;
again, the increased exposure to the defendant at a real trial would
tend to make his race more salient. The increased salience of the defendant's race in a real trial would hardly lessen jurors' tendencies to
infer guilt from race. Indeed, the weakness of the experimental ma139. More field studies, such as those described in the preceding section on trial data, are of
course possible, but true field experiments would require tampering with real juries, which courts
are unlikely to permit.
140. Of course, it is possible that the jurors who actually decide cases are less biased than are
the student mock jurors due to the selection process of voir dire. This possibility is addressed
and rejected in Part II. B.
141. See Feild & Barnett, supra note 124, at 290-91.
142. See J. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 74, 78 (1972). The fact that the one study using
older subjects found some effects on guilt and sentencing also suggests that bias may be stronger
in prospective jurors than in students. See Feild, supra note 88. However, the apparent correlation between age and racism may be spurious; it may result from the correlations between age
and education, and education and racism. See notes 177-81 infra and accompanying text.
143. Feild, supra note 88, at 277-78.
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nipulation of race suggests that the results of the experiments may underestimate the magnitude of the effect of race upon guilt attribution
in the real trials. 144
The dependent variable in the experiment - the assessment of
guilt - differs in two ways from verdicts in real trials. First, most of
the experiments use individual assessments of guilt whereas real trials
rely upon the group's consensus or the majority verdict reached after
deliberation. 145 Second, real jurors would almost certainly feel more
responsibility for their decisions than do mock jurors. Neither of these
differences is likely to account for the effect of race upon guilt attribution observed in the laboratory. 146 The two studies using group verdicts suggest that the introduction of group deliberations, at least
where the group would be racially homogenous, would not eradicate the
effect of race upon guilt attribution. One of these studies found that
deliberations actually increased the tendency of white jurors to find
black defendants more guilty than white defendants; 147 the other
found that group deliberations did eliminate the effect of race upon
guilt attribution, but all of the juries in that study contained jurors of
both races. 148 Nor is it likely that the greater responsibility placed
upon real jurors would eliminate the correlation between race and
guilt attribution. Perhaps if we thought that the white subjects were
deliberately judging black defendants more harshly, we might expect
some inhibition of anti-black bias among real jurors, whose hostility
might be tempered by awareness of the grave consequences of their
decisions. On the other hand, conscious hostility might produce more
biased results in real trials than in the laboratory, for the knowledge
that no real harm would ensue from decisions in the laboratory would
seem to decrease the motivation to treat blacks more harshly than
whites. In any event, such speculation is not only inconclusive and
unhelpful, it is probably irrelevant. Because the process of attributing
guilt on the basis of race appears to be subconscious, jurors are un144. Other attributes of real trials may operate to increase the effects of racial bias. One
experiment suggests that adversarial presentations increase the likelihood that pro-guilt or proinnocence biases will affect jurors' decisions. Kaplan & Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror
Bias, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1443, 1449-50 (1978).
145. Although the requirement of a unanimous verdict is most common, some states permit
convictions based upon a majority vote. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (sixth
amendment does not require jury unanimity).
146. Simulations may, however, be very different from real trials in other respects. For example, the overall rate of acquittals may be quite different in simulations. See Bennant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, The Logic of Simulation in Jury Research, 1 CRIM. JuST. & BEHAV.
224 (1974).
147. Bernard, supra note 72, at 109.
148. Lipton, supra note 15, at 281-82.
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likely either to be aware of or to be able to control that process. 149
The seriousness of the consequences of bias cannot motivate jurors to
put that bias aside if they are unaware of that bias.
The last validity concern is that the laboratory setting interacts
with race and guilt attribution - that the condition of being observed
creates a correlation that does not exist anywhere but in the laboratory. Although this is possible, it is extremely unlikely where, as here,
the phenomenon observed is socially disapproved. Ordinarily we
would expect that awareness of an observer would discourage conscious manifestations of racial bias.
Thus, none of the ordinary sources of concern about external validity seriously threatens the significance of the laboratory findings on
race and guilt attribution. Moreover, as reviewed above, the data from
real trials generally support the laboratory findings that racial bias influences criminal trials. Although the case studies may be questioned
because of their age and limited number, and the conviction and sentencing data are accurately said to suffer from lack of control, their
consistency with the results of the mock jury studies bolsters the argu-:
ment that those results reflect real world phenomena. In tum, the
mock jury studies supply what is lacking from the trial data: first,
proof that the racial bias reported by the older case studies is not an
outdated or freakish phenomenon, but still operates upon many white
Americans; and second, evidence that the racial disparities found in
court records are not entirely the product of spurious correlations and may in fact underestimate the bias against black defendants due to
the offsetting effects of other variables not controlled for, such as the
victim's race. Finally, both the trial data and the mock jury studies are
supported by the results of research on prejudice in other settings, to
which we will now tum.
C.

General Research on Racial Prejudice

The third data source, the vast body of general research on racial
prejudice, in large part avoids both the problem of lack of control and
the concern about external validity because most of it was collected in
controlled laboratory settings and has been corroborated using a variety of measurement techniques. Although this research cannot substitute for a more specific inquiry into the effects of racial bias on guilt
attribution, a brief review of its results is useful for two reasons. Most
importantly, a review of the patterns observed in other research on
racial prejudice supports the external validity of the mock jury studies
149. See notes 118-27 supra and accompanying text.
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by demonstrating that the results of those studies are consistent with a
more general social phenomenon. Second, a summary of selected aspects of the general findings on racial prejudice provides some insight
into a matter not covered by the mock jury studies - the control of
discrimination.
1.

The Nature of Racial Prejudice

Allport, in his classic book on prejudice, defined ethnic prejudice
as "an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization." 150
Prejudice differs from ordinary errors of prejudgment in that prejudgments may be discussed and rectified without emotional resistance. 151
Racial prejudice causes a person to ignore information about an individual contrary to his generalization, or stereotype, about that person's racial group, 152 to fail to recognize errors of logic that would be
obvious to him were an object of his prejudice not involved, 153 and to
resist any implication that his conclusions resulted from prejudice. 154
In the United States, racial stereotypes of black people have been
overwhelmingly negative, and have encompassed a wide range of characteristics.155 This is not surprising. When a minority is required to
perform menial, distasteful, and dangerous types of work, it is convenient for the majority to believe that members of that minority are
unsuited for any other kind of task because they are stupid, lazy,
unambitious, unable or unwilling to plan for the future and thus oriented only toward immediate gratification, unclean, and otherwise unpleasant to associate with. It is also convenient for the majority to
profess a few trivial positive stereotypes of the disadvantaged minority
in order to persuade itself that it is not being unfair; disadvantaged
minorities are therefore often believed to be content, appreciative,
humble, and perhaps possessed of unusual musical or athletic abilities.
However, if the minority begins to show signs of rebelling, additional
negative stereotypes of dangerousness, unruliness, and criminal pro150. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954).
151. Id.
152. Id.; H. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 41-42 (1973); see also
Kruglanski & Freund, The Freezing and Unfreezing of Lay Inferences: Effects on Impressional
Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping and Numerical Anchoring, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYCHOL•
OGY 448, 454-58 (1983) (discussing the effect of ethnic stereotypes of Ashkenazi and Sephardic
Jews upon awareness of plausible alternative hypotheses and attention to inconsistent pieces of
evidence).
153. G. ALLPORT, supra note 150, at 168-69 (prejudiced subjects determined syllogisms identical in form to differ in validity depending upon whether the conclusion supported or contradicted their prejudices).
154. Id. at 169.
155. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 21 (1982).
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pensity are likely to be adopted. 156 One expert describes the evolution
of white beliefs about blacks and Hispanics as the prototypical examples of this kind of stereotyping. 157
There is ample empirical support for this characterization of white
attitudes toward blacks. Every ethnic group except blacks ranks
blacks at or near the bottom of the hierarchy of social preference. 158
Among the negative traits ascribed to blacks is a propensity for committing crimes. As early as 1946, a study of stereotypes in magazine
fiction found that blonde Americans tended to be the heroes, while
minority characters appeared only in minor roles and conformed to
ethnic stereotypes. 159 Numerous studies have since established that
the general populace also tends to ascribe unfavorable behavioral qualities to those with dark skin color, of whatever race. 160 When the darkskinned person is black, this tendency is often greatly exaggerated.
For example, Allport showed subjects a picture of several people in a
subway car, including a white man holding a razor and apparently
arguing with a black man. Over half of the subjects reported that the
black man held the razor. 161 A recent study asked white children between eight and ten years of age to select from a biracial set of photographs those individuals they believed to be murderers. Black males
were perceived primarily as murderers and white males were not. 162
This study also found differential perception of other violent crimes
such as homicide, robbery, and assault. 163 When reading news reports, whites (1) overwhelmingly ascribed violent crimes to black perpetrators even though the reports did not supply a basis for such
ascription, (2) overwhelmingly ascribed nonviolent crimes to white
perpetrators even when the report did not support such ascription, and
(3) made substantially greater attributions of crimes to black perpetrators than did black readers. 164 Another study found that newspaper
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 96; see also Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15 (reporting results of a variety of
measures of ethnic social distance and prejudice, all of which show blacks to be a disfavored
ethnic group).
159. Berelson & Salter, Majority and Minority Americans: An Analysis of Magazine Fiction,
10 PUB. OPINION Q. 168 (1946).
160. See Secord, Facial Features and Inference Processes in Interpersonal Perception, in PERSON PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 300, 303-04 (R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo eds.
1958) (reviewing the literature).
161. G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 111 (1965).
162. J. Mayas, Perceived Criminality: The Attribution of Criminal Race from News-Reported Crime, 9 (1977) (Ph.D. dissertation) (available at the University of Michigan) (citing
another study).
163. J. Mayas, supra note 162.
164. Id.
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accounts overemphasized black-on-white rape - and that white sample respondents perceived reality as consistent with the biased newspaper accounts rather than actual rape statistics. 165
The prevalance of phrases in the English language that link blackness to evil suggests the depth of the psychological process that causes
these distortions of reality: to name but a few, "black as sin," "black
heart," "black sheep," "black deed." 166 This imagery is so powerful
that white subjects do not make distinctions of degree; regardless of
actual color or proportion of ancestry, a person who is labeled black
will be assumed to have the full complement, full strength, of stereotypical characteristics. 167 If a person is described as black, white subjects are less interested in the other traits he possesses, and his
likeability will be less influenced by other attributes than would the
likeability of a person described as white. 168 Furthermore, a recent
study found that when a white subject was supplied with negative information about a black person, the subject would judge the person
more unfavorably than an otherwise identically described white person.169 Finally, an earlier study found that both high and low
prejudiced subjects describe blacks pictured in stereotyped settings
(jazz trio, rural slum, large family) with twice the frequency of negative stereotypes as the subjects would use to describe the same person
pictured in a nonstereotyped (generally interracial) setting. 170 These
findings are especially disturbing since they suggest that even "unprej165. Abbott & Calonico, Black Man, White Woman-The Maintenance of a Myth: Rape and
the Press in New Orleans, in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY: DIMENSIONS OF DEVIANCE 141, 147,
149 (M. Riedel & T. Thornberry eds. 1974).
166. See, e.g.• L. HUGHES, BLACK MISERY (1969) ("Misery is when you first realize so many
things bad have black in them, like black cats, black arts, blackball."),
167. See Secord, Bevan & Katz, The Negro Stereotype and Perceptual Accentuation, 53 J,
ABNORMAL AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 78, 81 (1956).
168. See EHRLICH, supra note 152, at 81-82 (citing Long, Ziller & Thompson, A Comparison
of Prejudices: The Effects Upon Friendship Ratings of Chronic Illness, Old Age, Education and
Race, 70 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 101, 108 (1966)); see also Linville & Jones,
Polarized Appraisals of Out-group Members, 38 J. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 689
(1980) (reporting several experiments showing that white subjects considered fewer dimensions
in evaluating the personality traits and abilities of individuals described as black than of individuals described as white).
169. Linville & Jones, supra note 168, at 701; see also Forgas & Brown, The Effects of Race
on Observer Judgments of Nonverbal Communications, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 243 (1978) (for
white subjects, effects of positive nonverbal communication from black stimulus models were
weaker than effects of positive nonverbal communication from white stimulus models); Whitehead, Smith & Eichhorn, The Effect ofSubject's Race and Other's Race on Judgments of Causality for Success and Failure, 50 J. PERSONALITY 193, 200 (1982) (both black and white subjects
tended to attribute the failure of another "more to lack of ability when the other [was] racially
dissimilar than when he [was] similar'').
170. EHRLICH, supra note 152, at 40 (citing Riddleberger & Motz, Prejudice and Perception,
62 AM. J. Soc. 498 (1957)).
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udiced" jurors will respond with many negative stereotypes to the image of a black person as a defendant in a criminal trial (which
newspapers and popular opinion deem an expected setting) and, that
given negative information in the form of the prosecution's evidence,
they will judge the defendant more harshly if he is black than if he is
white. Although disturbing, these inferences from the general research on racial prejudice are entirely consistent with the results of the
mock jury studies.
2.

The Persistence of Racially Prejudiced Attitudes

Some social commentators have argued that race relations in this
country have undergone such fundamental changes in recent years
that the opportunities of black individuals are more influenced by their
economic position than by race discrimination.I 7 I This argument
might be taken as support for the quite different proposition that prejudice no longer significantly affects the thinking of white Americans.
Whether or not the former is correct, the latter is untenable. All of the
mock jury studies (and many of the studies cited in the preceding section concerning other findings on racial prejudice) were performed in
the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, it is useful to note the ways in
which attitudes have and have not changed because some of the
changes carry implications concerning the control of discrimination.
Replications of early research on social preference reveal a relatively stable pattern of aversion toward blacks. 172 Blacks are still at or
near the bottom of general social preference scales.I 73 Many negative
feelings and stereotypes persist; 174 for example, a 1978 poll found that
a majority of Americans still opposed interracial marriage and 31 %
preferred to live in a neighborhood with no blacks as neighbors. 175
However, negative stereotypes appear to be less extreme and less widespread than in the 1950s and 1960s.I 76
The prospects for further change in the immediate future are not
171. See, e.g., w. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978). But see Willie,
The Inclining Significance of Race, SOCIETY, July-Aug. 1978, at 10.
172. EHRLICH, supra note 152, at 36, 14-15;see also Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 586
(polls show lessening hostility toward blacks but majorities still object to black/white intermarriage and sizable minorities are opposed still to black neighbors).
173. Blalock, supra note 155, at 96; see also Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15 (reporting
results of a variety of measures of ethnic social distance and prejudice, all of which show blacks
to be a disfavored ethnic group).
174. J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, FUNCTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND PREJUDICE 92-95 (1982)
(reviewing several recent studies); Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15.
175. Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 591, 590.
176. J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, supra note 174, at 92-95; Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at
591 (comparing poll data from different time periods).
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particularly bright. One study found that between 1972 and 1977 the
liberalizing trend drastically slowed down in some areas, halted entirely in other areas, and that in a few areas (such as attitudes toward
integrated housing and black assertiveness) intolerance was actually
increasing.I 77 Initially, correlations between age and prejudice suggested that society-wide decreases in prejudice would occur gradually,
but constantly, as older, more prejudiced persons were replaced by
younger, more enlightened persons. However, it now appears that
such correlations were spurious. There is a strong negative association
between anti-black attitudes and education, but the apparent relationship between anti-black attitudes and age is due primarily to the association of those variables with education.I 78 Furthermore, recent
observations of young white children continue to show a strong ownrace preference;I 79 the only change from earlier studies on children's
racial preferences is that more minority-race children now display an
own-race preference whereas in earlier studies they tended to prefer
white children. I80 One recent study found that white children between
three and six years of age found it funnier to see a child of another
racial or ethnic group victimized in humor than a white child; black
and Mexican American children did not display this racially selective
lack of empathy.I 8 I
Finally, any encouragement that might be drawn from the initial
decrease in extreme negative stereotypes must be qualified by the likelihood that newer data reflect some fading of stereotypes - but also
some faking. Sigall and Page investigated the possibility that a change
in the social acceptability of prejudice has tainted responses in the
newer studies. I82 White subjects were asked to indicate how characteristic each of twenty-two traits was of either "Americans" or "Negroes"; half of the subjects were presumably free to distort their
responses, but the other half were led to believe that the experimenter
had an accurate physiological measure of their true attitudes, and
these subjects were asked to predict that measure. The subjects attributed the favorable traits of intelligence, honesty, and sensitivity more

w.

177. J. LEVIN &
LEVIN, supra note 174, at 92.
178. J. JONES, supra note 142, at 75.
179. See Newman, Liss & Sherman, supra note 136, at 104, 108 (reviewing several studies
and reporting the results of a new study).
180. Id. at 108 (black, Hispanic, and white children all tended to prefer same-ethnic pictures,
although white children displayed this preference most strongly).
181. McGhee & Duffey, Children's Appreciation ofHumor Victimizing Different Racial-Eth•
nic Groups: Racial-Ethnic Differences, 14 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 29 (1983).
182. Sigall & Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little Faking, 18 J. PERSONAL•
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 247 (1971).
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often to "Americans" when they thought the experimenter would
know their true feelings and they attributed these traits less often to
"Negroes" when they thought the experimenter would know their true
feelings. 183 Of particular significance for our purpose is the fact that
the effect of being told that their physiological responses were being
monitored was the greatest for attribution of the trait of honesty. 184
Moreover, ratings of the unfavorable traits of ostentatiousness, laziness, ignorance, physical dirtiness, stupidity, and unreliability were
consistent with the ratings of the favorable traits: white subjects attributed them more often to blacks (and less often to whites) when
they thought the experimenter would know their true feelings. 185
These results, which suggest that many people may be more reluctant to admit prejudice than they were in the past, are complemented
by observations concerning the prevalence of two kinds of racism.
Dominative racists express their bigoted beliefs openly, frequently
through physical force, while aversive racists do not want to associate
with blacks but do not often express this feeling. 186 Social scientists
once described the aversive mode as characterizing the North and the
dominative mode as characterizing the South, but now suggest that
aversive manifestations of racism increasingly predominate in all parts
of the country. 187 Thus one might expect that many whites would
agree in principle with the general goal of racial equality yet strongly
resist specific reforms and perhaps believe that blacks are largely responsible for their inferior socioeconomic status. Poll data confirm the
prevalence of such response patterns. 188
3. Prejudice and Discrimination
Attitude/behavior congruence is a c~mplex phenomenon: the documentation of a certain level of racially prejudiced attitudes does not
necessarily imply the same level of discrimination. Many of the studies reviewed above have not inquired about "pure" attitudes toward
blacks but have instead investigated people's predictions about what
183. Id. at 252.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. J. JONES, supra note 142, at 121-24; J. KovEL, WHITE RACISM 54-55 (1970).
187. J. JONES, supra note 142, at 121-22.
188. I. KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 14-16 (1981) (reviewing a
variety of studies finding conflicting attitudes and ambivalent feelings toward blacks); Pettigrew,
The Mental Health Impact, in IMPACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS 97, 115 (B. Bowser
& R. Hunt eds. 1981); cf Smedley & Bayton, Categories of Attitudes Toward Behavior and the
Attitude-Behavior Relationship, 113 J. PSYCHOLOGY 277 (1983) (general attitudes toward blacks
did not correlate with students' predictions of successful treatment of black patients but attitudes
toward blacks in positions of superior status did).
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they would do in certain situations. Nevertheless, it is still possible
that individuals would predict one behavior, but, when actually confronted with the situation, would engage in another.
Either prejudice or discrimination may be present without the
other. Discrimination may be inhibited despite virulent prejudice.
Where discrimination is not legally or socially approved, social scientists predict that it will be practiced only when it is possible to do so
covertly and indirectly. 189 On the other hand, discrimination may be
engaged in without the presence of prejudiced attitudes when it will
lead to social approval. 190 In some cases, a person might cooperate
with another's discriminatory behavior without even being aware that
discrimination is taking place: many whites are quite insensitive to
cues of prejudiced behavior in others. 191 Finally, discrepancies between measured attitudes and actual behavior may occur because of
dissimulation in the reporting of attitudes. As the Sigall and Page
study suggests, it now may be quite common to underreport
prejudiced attitudes, which will result in attitudinal data that underestimate the number of persons likely to engage in discrimination.
Thus, it is not possible to generalize across types of discrimination
and settings as to whether the prevalence of prejudiced attitudes underestimates or overestimates the likelihood of discrimination. Consequently, we cannot be certain that the general findings on prejudiced
attitudes can be translated into accurate predictions of discriminatory
verdicts, just as we cannot be certain that the mock jury studies have
external validity. But, as with the mock jury studies, there are good
reasons to predict that these general findings do not overestimate discriminatory behavior in the jury box. First, this discrimination would
not require open acknowledgment of prejudicial attitudes to others: it
can be accomplished covertly by arguments that never allude to race.
Second, the prejudice may well be unconscious, and thus influence
judgments of guilt without the juror's acknowledging the prejudiced
attitudes even to himself. Finally, several studies investigating discrimination in real life situations similar to the trial assessment of guilt
189. G. ALLPORT, supra note 150, at 56-57.
190. Id. at 56; Bowser & Hunt, Afterthoughts and Reflections, in IMPACTS OF RACISM ON
WHITE AMERICANS 245, 247 (B. Bowser & R. Hunt eds. 1981). See generally Liska, Emergent
Issues in the Attitude-Behavior Consistency Controversy, 39 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1974).
191. Rollman, The Sensitivity ofBlack and White Americans to Nonverbal Cues of Prejudice,
105 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 73 (1978); see also M. Sherman, N. Sherman, & R. Smith, Racial and
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Fairness: When Race Is Involved in a Job Promotion, 57
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 719 (1983) (blacks and women perceived more unfairness in
situations where one employee was promoted over an equally qualified employee),
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have reported discriminatory behavior. 192
II.

EXISTING TECHNIQUES FOR ELIMINATING THE INFLUENCE OF
RACIAL BIAS ON CRIMINAL TRIALS

The compelling evidence that many prospective jurors walk into
the courtroom predisposed to convict black defendants must be measured against existing legal procedures designed to eliminate the influence of racial bias upon the jury's ultimate decision to convict or
acquit. If these procedures are adequate, the prospective jurors' predispositions are immaterial to the defendant. Unfortunately, all of the
traditional protections against racially biased verdicts - the assurance
of a representative jury, the screening out of biased jurors, or the control of the content of the jury's deliberations - are inappropriate tools
for neutralizing the effects of the amount and kind of bias documented
in Part I.
A. Assuring a Representative Jury
Whether the racial composition of a jury is representative of the
population depends upon a two-step process: the selection of the venire panel and the selection of prospective jurors from that panel to
serve on a particular case. Racially discriminatory procedures in either
phase of jury selection will result in an unrepresentative jury, but the
Court has taken a very different approach to the two varieties of
discrimination.
1. Selection of the Venire Panel
In 1875, Congress enacted a criminal prohibition against excluding
192. See, e.g., Dutton & Lake, Threat of Own Prejudice and Reverse Discrimination in Interracial Situations, 28 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 94 (1973); Gaertner, Doviclio &
Johnson, Race of Victim, Nonresponsive Bystanders and Helping Behavior, 117 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 69 (1982) (white subjects in the presence of passive bystanders helped black emergency
victims less quickly than white emergency victims); Lipton, supra note 15, at 277 (students who
believed they were actually determining the punishment of another student discriminated against
other-race students); Mukherjee, Shukla, Woodle, Rosen, & Olarte, Misdiagnosis of Schizophrenia in Bipolar Patients: A Multiethnic Comparison, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1571 (1983) (black
and Hispanic mental patients more likely to be misdiagnosed as schizophrenic even when other
variables are controlled for); Yee, Comment on Schulman's Anicle, 81 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 629,
632 (1975) (discussing finding that white subjects delivered more painful shocks to failing black
confederate than to failing white confederate). Dutton and Lake found that whites who had been
told that their responses to a questionnaire had shown them to be racially prejudiced gave more
money to black panhandlers than to white panhandlers, but that whites who had been told that
their responses showed them to be egalitarian gave less money to a black panhandler than to a
white panhandler. Would "passing" the voir dire examination have a similar effect, that is,
would it assure white jurors that they were unbiased and thus "free" them to discriminate against
black defendants?
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any qualified citizen from a jury on the basis of race. 193 Five years
later in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a
statute excluding blacks from jury service as a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 194 The Court held
that a defendant is entitled to a jury comprised of his "neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds"; 195 it further declared that denying blacks the right to
participate in the administration of law branded them as inferior and
stimulated prejudice. 196 Shortly thereafter the Court brought the
same rules to bear upon the selection of grand jurors, 197 and the following year the Court extended Strauder to racially discriminatory administration of facially neutral jury selection laws. 198
The impact of these early cases was quite limited for several decades because of the requirement that the defendant show a purpose to
discriminate on the part of jury oflicials. 199 However, in the 1935 case
of Norris v. Alabama the Court held that if a defendant in a criminal
case could show (1) the existence of a substantial number of blacks in
the community and (2) their total exclusion from jury service, then he
had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. 200 When he had
shown these facts, the burden of proof shifted to the state to prove that
the exclusion did not flow from discrimination. 201 The Court declared
that this burden could not be satisfied by general denials; testimony
that no one was excluqed because of his color or that qualified blacks
were not known to the commissioners would not be deemed suflicient. 202 As cases arose that did not involve total exclusion of blacks,
the Court extended the burden-shifting rule of Norris first to cases of
gross underrepresentation203 and then to cases where a substantial disparity between minority group members in the population and in the
jury list "originated, at least in part, at the one point in the selection
·process where the jury commissioners invoked their subjective judg193. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 4, 18 Stat. 336 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1982)).
194. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
195. 100 U.S. at 308.
196. 100 U.S. at 308.
197. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
198. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
199. Unless the defendant proved the contrary, state action was presumed constitutional and
lower courts findings were presumed correct. See, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909);
Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896).
200. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
201. 294 U.S. at 598.
202. 294 U.S. at 598-99.
203. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
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ment rather than objective criteria." 204 This trend culminated in the
1977 Castaneda v. Partida decision, which held that a prima facie case
of discrimination was established by a showing that the population of
the vicinage was 79.1% Mexican American but that only 39% of the
persons summoned for grand jury service over an eleven-year period
were Mexican American.205
Discriminatory jury (and grand jury) selection procedures may be
attacked in several ways. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the
federal government may bring a criminal action against state officials
responsible for the discrimination, but such prosecutions have been
quite rare. 206 Most common are direct appeals through the state
courts and petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
by black defendants who have been convicted or indicted by a jury or
grand jury from which blacks were excluded. Defendants who have
exhausted their appeals process may petition a federal district court
for habeas corpus relief. 207 Although civil rights era case law from the
Fifth Circuit had been receptive to discrimination claims raised for the
first time on habeas corpus, 208 in 1973 the Supreme Court ruled that
failure to comply with procedural rules concerning the timing of objections waived discrimination claims. 209 In the same year, the Court
held that a voluntary guilty plea insulated prior constitutional defects
from collateral review. 210 Ironically, as these decisions limited the
number of black defendants prevailing on jury selection claims, the
Court contemporaneously broadened the class of litigants permitted to
raise the issue of the jury selection. In Carter v. Jury Commission 211
and Turner v. Fouche, 212 the Court recognized the standing of black
citizens to raise constitutional and statutory challenges to the systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries. The plaintiffs did
not prevail in either Carter or Turner, however, and successful civil
class actions have been rare. 213
204. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970).
205. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
206. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979). See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880),
for an early conviction.
207. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977).
208. See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967);
United States ex rel Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850
(1959).
209. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
210. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
211. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
212. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
213. Most of the successful challenges appear to have arisen in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g.,
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A more drastic doctrinal change was brought about by the Court's
determination in Peters v. Kif! that a white defendant could raise the
issue of the exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries. 214 Justice
Marshall's plurality opinion concluded that a defendant is denied due
process of law when he is indicted or tried by grand or petit juries that
are plainly illegal in their composition. 215 He reasoned that
[W]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of
human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that
the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude,
as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented. 216

Three Justices concurred in the judgment, but relied upon the statutory policy of the 1875 Civil Rights Act rather than the due process
clause. 217
Evolution away from an equal protection basis for jury exclusion
claims was completed in Taylor v. Louisiana where the Court upheld a
male defendant's right to challenge a law excluding women from jury
service; 218 a majority of the Court agreed that the sixth amendment's
guarantee of an impartial jury required a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community. 219 The Court declared that
if large distinctive gro~ps were excluded from the jury pool, the purposes of the jury trial requirement might be frustrated and public confidence in the criminal justice system might be eroded. 220
The venire selection cases present several paradoxes. The language
of Strauder has been described as "the most vigorous statement of the
antidiscrimination principle to be found in the United States Reports
for a full century after Emancipation"; 221 yet, early Strauder progeny
Broadway v. Culpepper, 439 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1971); Black v. Curb, 422 F.2d 656 (5th Cir,
1970); cf. Bradley v. Judges of Superior Ct., 372 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Calif. 1974).
214. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
215. But cf. Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), holding that race or sex discrim•
ination in selection of the primarily ministerial position of foreman of a federal grand jury has no
appreciable effect on a white male defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness and thus
does not require reversal of his conviction and dismissal of the indictment. Whether the result
would be different under an equal protection challenge by a female or black defendant was left
unanswered.
216. 407 U.S. at 503-04.
217. 407 U.S. at 505.
218. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
219. 419 U.S. at 530.
220. 419 U.S. at 530-31.
221. Schmidt, Juries, Jurisdiction and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise o/Strauder v.
West Virginia, 61 TEXAS L. REv. 1401, 1414 (1983).
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may be criticized as indifferent to the practicalities of enforcing
Strauder's commands. 222 Still, it is obvious that jury selection was one
of a very few areas in which equal protection doctrine had any vitality
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 223 This enhanced
solicitude about venire selection processes persisted into the period in
which equal protection doctrine was more broadly applied: the standards for proof of discriminatory purpose developed in this area were
far more lenient than in virtually any other kind of equal protection
litigation. 224 Nevertheless, the apparently powerful equal protection
doctrine operating in this area was suddenly eclipsed by a broader
sixth amendment right. 22s
Perhaps even stranger than the historical development and demise
of an equal protection theory to explain venire selection requirements
is the Court's consistently sharp distinction between venire selection
and the composition of individual juries. All the venire selection cases
stress that the exclusion of minorities impairs the impartiality and legitimacy of the jury system; one might assume that this reasoning
would lead the Court to hold that a defendant's jury - and not simply
the panel from which the jury is selected - must include minorities.
Certainly bias can only manifest itself in individual cases and it is from
individual cases that an impression of unfairness is formed. Yet the
Court has adamantly maintained from Strauder to Taylor that all the
Constitution forbids is systematic exclusion from jury panels. A defendant may not "challenge the makeup of a jury merely because no
members of his race are on the jury," 226 for there is no requirement
that his particular jury be representative.
It is not clear how successful the fourteenth or sixth amendment
doctrines have been in increasing the representation of blacks in jury
venires. While these doctrines should be credited with eliminating the
most egregious exclusions of blacks, substantial underrepresentation
222. Id.
223. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (applying "separate but equal" doctrine to
segregation of public transportation facilities). The equal protection clause was also alive during
this period in cases involving property rights. See City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704
(1930); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
224. Compare, for example, the standard for proving discriminatory purpose in civil cases, as
set forth in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
225. But see Hobby v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), which dismissed a white male's
due process claim that race or sex discrimination in the selection of the federal grand jury
foreperson violated fundamental fairness without examining the impact of such discrimination
upon his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury selected from a representative cross section
of the community.
226. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972).
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persists.227 Regardless of the adequacy of these doctrines for their
avowed purpose, they provide only incidental protection against the
risk of wrongful, racially biased convictions. The prejudice documented in Part I operates in individual cases, altering the assessment
of the guilt of particular defendants. Even if the jury venire includes a
representative number of blacks, the black defendant may face an allwhite jury. This can occur when there are virtually no blacks in the
community in which the defendant is being tried and thus virtually no
blacks on the jury panel, or when the luck of the draw results in no
blacks being drawn to serve on his case despite a large number of
blacks being called for jury duty. It can even occur when blacks are
among those called to serve on the defendant's case if the prosecutor
uses his peremptory challenges to eliminate all prospective black jurors. The reason for the absence of black jurors is immaterial; if a
black defendant faces an all-white jury, he faces a substantial risk that
the assessment of his guilt will be affected by his race. The most that
can be said for the doctrines that assure the representative presence of
blacks on the jury rolls is that they seem to be a logical first step in
eliminating the influence of racial bias on verdicts.
2.

Racially Selective Use of Peremptory Challenges

If the doctrines that govern the first stage of jury selection make
only very modest progress toward eliminating racial bias in criminal
trials, the permissive rules that shape the second stage of jury selection
reverse even those limited gains. The procedures determining which
of the jurors on the jury panel will decide a case frequently result in
all-white juries trying black defendants even when a substantial
number of blacks had been present on the panel. The process begins
with a list of eligible jurors, from which the venire for a particular
term is chosen. After some jurors are excused for health or hardship
reasons, the venire is questioned and challenges are made. Prospective
jurors may be struck from a panel in two ways: a judge may remove
"for cause" any juror whose bias is demonstrated by either side, and
either side may exercise a given number of "peremptory" challenges,
for which no reason need be given. Although challenges for cause
may affect the black defendant's chances of an unbiased determination
of his guilt, 228 it is the peremptory challenge that affects these chances
by altering the representativeness of the jury's composition.
227. See, e.g., Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1968).
228. These effects are discussed in Part II. B. 1. infra.
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In Swain v. Alabama 229 the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all six blacks from the defendant's jury panel. The
Supreme Court held that it is "permissible to insulate from inquiry the
removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the
prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he
is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime
charged." 230 The Court reasoned that the function of the peremptory
challenge was "not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the
case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and
not otherwise."231 This function of the challenge could only be performed if each side could act upon vague impressions and even
grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of
people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or
nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is
less likely to be. 232

Swain had further argued that his was not an isolated case of racially selective use of the peremptory challenge but that prosecutors in
the county in which he was tried had systematically used their strikes
to prevent all blacks on the petit jury venire from serving on the jury
itself. The Court acknowledged that this claim "raise[d] a different
issue," and that if the defendant could prove that regardless of the
crime, the defendant, or the victim, the state were responsible for the
removal of all blacks from juries, then the allegation that blacks were
being denied the right to participate in the administration of justice
would be supported. 233 This use of the peremptory challenge would
pervert its purpose and raise ~ fourteenth amendment claim. 234 In
short, if the peremptory challenge were used to circumvent the Court's
jury venire selection requirements, thus denigrating the rights of prospective black jurors, this might be unconstitutional. But if it were
merely used in cases with black defendants, thus decreasing their
chances of acquittal, this was entirely proper.
The Court found no need actually to adjudicate the constitutionality of a uniform use of the peremptory challenge to strike all black
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

380 U.S.
380 U.S.
380 U.S.
380 U.S.
380 U.S.
380 U.S.

202 (1965).
at 223.
at 219.
at 220-21.
at 223-24.
at 224.
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jurors because it deemed Swain's proof of this practice insufficient.
Although Swain had shown that there had never been a black juror on
a civil or criminal case in his county, the Court ruled that this evidence did not demonstrate that the prosecutor alone was responsible
for such absence, citing testimony concerning several other cases in
which the defense had agreed with the prosecution not to include
blacks in the jury.23s
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas, dissented on the question of whether the defendant had met
the burden of proof on the systematic exclusion issue. 236 The dissent
viewed the testimony as establishing that "the general practice was not
to include Negroes by agreement between the prosecution and defense
or by the State acting alone." 237 The dissent further objected that the
defendant did not have an obligation to prove state involvement in the
systematic exclusion; according to the previous systematic exclusion
cases, proof that no black person had ever served on a petit jury in the
county made out a prima facie case of unlawful exclusion that shifted
the burden of proof to the state. 238 The dissent did not, however, dispute the majority's treatment of Swain's claim regarding the exclusion
of blacks from the jury impaneled in a particular case.239
The immediate effects of Swain were entirely predictable. As the
lower courts applied the Swain standard for proving systematic challenge, it turned out that no defendant could satisfy it. Adhering to the
language of Swain, the lower courts made clear that it was inappropriate to present as evidence only those cases involving black defendants. 240 Twenty years later, there are no reported cases in which a
court has determined that invidious discrimination under Swain has
been demonstrated. 241
235. 380 U.S. at 224-28.
236. 380 U.S. at 228-47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
237. 380 U.S. at 235.
238. 380 U.S. at 238.
239. 380 U.S. at 245.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
961 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the peremptory challenge was used against black jurors only when the defendant was black); McKinney
v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.C. 1974); State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1975); Ford v. State, 530 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Ridley v. State, 475 S.W.2d 769 (fex.
Crim. App. 1972).
241. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries,
86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1715 n.4, 1723 n.36 (1977); Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 14, 24 (1977) and 79
A.L.R. 3d 14-73, 1984 Supplement 3. Several cases acknowledged the difficulty in meeting the
Swain standard but concluded it is not an impossible task. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528
F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d
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Swain's total rejection of an equal protection claim based upon the
exclusion of blacks from a particular jury provoked a steady stream of
unusually harsh comments. 242 Initially these views found judicial approval only in sporadic dissenting opinions;243 even in extreme cases244
the lower courts unanimously followed Swain until 1974.245 That year
Judge Alvin Rubin rejected the defendant's equal protection claim,
but, relying upon a combination of factors including the prosecutor's
use of all his peremptory challenges to strike black jurors, granted a
new trial "in the interest of justice" under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33.246 In a subsequent case, the Eighth Circuit warned that
it viewed with concern the practice of striking black persons from juries hearing cases with black defendants and suggested to trial judges
that action in the exercise of their supervisory powers might be appropriate were abuses to continue.247 However, when then federal district
Judge Jon 0. Newman held that a pattern of exercising peremptory
challenges against blacks called for the exercise of his supervisory
power to halt further abuses, the Second Circuit granted a writ of
mandamus sought by the United States Attorney and vacated his
order.248
Hop·e for reform was rekindled by the 1978 decision of People v.
1207 (5th Cir. 1971); State v. Reed, 324 So. 2d 373 (La. 1975). The California Court of Appeals
noted the impossibility of meeting the Swain standard as one reason to abandon it. People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); see also State v. Crespin, 94
N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). One court has modified the Swain burden of
proof. See notes 273-74 infra and accompanying text.
242. Kuhn, supra note 227; Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic.-Exclusion of Prospec- _
tive Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MISS. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, supra note 241; Note, Fair Jury
Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322,325 (1965); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory
Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Loms U. L.J. 662 (1974);
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White
Jury, 52 V-A. L. REv. 1157 (1966); Recent Development, United States v. Robinson-Racial
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 41 ALB. L. REv. 623 (1977); see also Hayden, Senna & Siegel,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Peremptory Challenges: An Empirical Investigation ofInformation Use
in the Massachusetts Jury Selection Process, 13 NEW ENG. L. REv. 768, 769 nn. 3-4 (1978). But
see Recent Decisions, JURIES - Systematic Exercise ofPeremptory Challenge to Exclude Negro
Jurors May Violate the Equal Protection Clause, 1965 U. ILL L.F. 588 (arguing that Court struck
proper balance between competing concerns).
243. See, e.g.• State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); State v. Gray,
285 So. 2d 199 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 336
A.2d 290 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting).
244. See, e.g., State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970) (prosecutor used all of his 15
peremptory challenges to strike blacks from defendant's jury).
245. Annot., supra note 241, at 27-32.
·
246. United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974) (defendant failed to
prove the systemic exclusion of blacks from juries).
247. United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); see
also United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
248. United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), revd. sub nom. United
States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
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Wheeler. 249 In Wheeler, the Supreme Court of California held that the
use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the sole
ground of group bias violated the state analogue of the sixth amendment to the federal Constitution, article 1, section 16 of the California
constitution. 250 The opinion reasoned that the rationale of Taylor v.
Louisiana, 251 requiring a cross section of the community as an indispensable part of the right to an impartial jury, could not logically be
confined to venire selection. 252 It concluded that a party is entitled to
a petit jury that is as near an approximation of an ideal cross section of
the community as a random draw permits; 253 peremptory challenges
were therefore permissible to eliminate "specific bias" but not to eliminate bias presumed solely on the basis of group association. 254 The
court explained that the use of the peremptory challenge would be
presumed proper unless a party could make out a prima facie case of
improper use; this burden could be met by evidence such as proof that
(1) the opposing party had struck from the venire most or all of the
members of the identified group, or (2) the opposing party had exercised a disproportionate number of his peremptory challenges against
members of that group, or (3) the jurors in question shared only the
characteristic of membership in that group and in all other respects
were as heterogeneous as the community as a whole, or (4) the opposing party failed to engage those jurors in more than perfunctory voir
dire. 255 Upon such a showing, the party accused of using his peremptory challenges improperly would have to satisfy the court that the
challenges were not predicated upon group bias alone but based upon
grounds relevant to the particular case, its parties, or witnesses. 256 If
the accused party failed to rebut the prima facie case, the trial court
would be required to dismiss the jurors thus far selected and quash the
remaining venire. 257 Throughout its opinion the court made clear that
either the prosecution or defense could object to peremptory challenges based upon group bias, that the defendant need not be a member of the group he claimed was being improperly challenged, and that
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude any identifiable group
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
22 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
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cognizable under Taylor would be susceptible to this kind of attack. 258
Justice Richardson, dissenting, argued that the values protected by
Swain - the jury's impartiality and the litigant's confidence in the
jury's impartiality - were compromised by the majority's ruling. 259
He also objected that the remedy was standardless, ineffective, and
time-consuming. 260
A few months later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
decided Commonwealth v. Soares. 261 The defendants in Soares and its
three companion cases argued that peremptory challenges could not
be used to exclude prospective jurors solely by virtue of their membership within an ethnic group. The Massachusetts court agreed, and,
reasoning from the premise of a fair cross-section requirement in much
the same manner as the California court had in Wheeler, ruled that the
use of peremptory challenges against discrete groups violated the state
constitutional assurance of an impartial jury. 262 To enforce the state
constitutional guarantee of a petit jury as near to the ideal cross section of the community as the process of a random draw permits,
Soares adopted the mechanics worked out by the Wheeler court. 263
Unlike Wheeler, however, Soares identified in advance those group affiliations that could not be the object of peremptory challenges: sex,
race, color, creed, and national origin.264 This list was derived from
the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment, which prohibits denying
or abridging equality under the law based upon any of these characteristics. 265 The concurrence in Soares, joined by three justices, agreed
that the extraordinary circumstances of the case (the prosecutor
struck twelve of thirteen prospective black jurors) warranted reversal,
but found it unnecessary and unwise to establish the broad rule
adopted by the majority. 266
Wheeler and Soares have received substantial attention, both from
commentators and from other state courts. While much of the commentary has been favorable, 267 many critics dispute the Wheeler/
258. 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
259. 22 Cal. 3d at 292, 294, 583 P.2d at 771, 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
260. 22 Cal. 3d at 293,583 P.2d at 772, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
261. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).
262. 377 Mass. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
263. 377 Mass. at 488-91, 387 N.E.2d at 516-18.
264. 377 Mass. at 488-89, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
265. 377 Mass. at 488-89 n.33, 387 N.E.2d at 516 n.33.
266. 377 Mass. at 493-94, 387 N.E.2d at 519 (Braucher, J., concurring).
267. NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK § 4.01-4.04 (1983); Note, Systematic Exclusion
ofCognizable Groups by Use ofPeremptory Challenges, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927 (1983); Note,
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Soares premise that an impartial jury panel is necessarily obtained
from a random draw approximation of a fair cross section of the community, 268 and a few stress the practical difficulties pointed out by the
Wheeler dissent. 269 Only New Mexico has followed California in ruling that the state constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate any cognizable group. 270 However, four state
courts have procrastinated in interpreting their state constitutions by
ruling that the specific defendant before the court had failed to make
out a prima facie case under the Wheeler/Soares test, 271 and two state
c9urts have abandoned Swain and adopted intermediate positions.272
The Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that the defendant's showing that the prosecutor in his case had been involved in six cases in
which a disproportionate number of blacks had been struck from the
venire was sufficient to establish "systematic exclusion" of blacks,273
and that this showing shifted the burden of proof to the state to show
that no discrimination on the basis of race had been practiced. 274 The
Louisiana Supreme Court postponed resolution of the question of
whether _use of the peremptory challenge to eliminate black jurors in a
single case would have violated the right of individual dignity guaranteed by article I, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.275
Florida has chosen a different compromise. Relying on Florida's
People v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenge May Not Be Used to Remove Jurors Solely for Group
Association, 58 N.C. L. REv. 152 (1979); Comment, Discrimination in Jury Selection Via Peremp•
tory Challenge: Many are Called, But Few Are Chosen, 5 N. ILL U.L. REV. 71 (1984); Comment, Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Racial Minorities from Criminal
Juries, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 71 (1984); Comment, People v. Wheeler: California's Answer to
Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 897 (1979); Casenote, Prosecutoria/
Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Discrete Groups from the Petit Jury: Commonwealth v. Soares, 21 B.C. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
268. Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and
Group Representation, 41 Mo. L. REv. 337 (1982); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to
Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Note, The Defendant's Right]; Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury
Representation, 89 YALE LJ. 1177 (1980).
269. See Note, The Defendant's Right, supra note 268; Comment, A New Standard for Per•
emptory Challenges: People v. Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REv. 189 (1979).
270. State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
271. Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); People v. Smith, 622 P.2d 90 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981); Saunders v. State, 401 A.2d 629 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Futch, 492 Pa. 359, 424 A.2d 1231 (1981).
272. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La.
1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
273. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979).
274. 371 So. 2d at 754; see also People v. Frazier, 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 469 N.E.2d 594
(1984) (deciding to publish the names of prosecutors whose use of peremptory challenges have
been questioned to help defendants meet the Swain burden of proving systematic exclusion).
275. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 754 (La. 1979); see State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361 (La.
1979) (Dennis, J., concurring) (proposing broader protection under article I, section 3).
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constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that neither party may use peremptory challenges to excise a distinct racial group from a jury; 276 the court explicitly reserved
decision on the applicability of its rationale to the striking of other
cognizable groups such as those based on sex, ethnicity, or religion. 277
This alternative was first advanced in a New York intermediate appellate court case, People v. Thompson, 278 which has since been disapproved.279 The New York Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed its
adherence to Swain, 280 as have at least a dozen other state courts. 281
In May of 1983 the Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition
for certiorari in the New York case, McCray v. New York, 282 despite
the State of New York's request that the petition be granted. 283 Two
Justices dissented. 284 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan,
noted that Swain had been decided before the Court had held the sixth
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment and well before the Court had interpreted the sixth amendment
to require a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 285
He expressed the view that the fair cross-section right is "rendered
meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremptory challenges to exclude all Negroes from the jury,"286 and then concluded
that the Court should reexamine Swain to determine whether it could
276.
277.
278.
279.

State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
457 So. 2d at 487.
79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981).
People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). But see 57 N.Y.2d at 552 n.l, 443 N.E.2d at 920 n.1, 457 N.Y.S.2d
at 446 n.1 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
280. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (198i), cert
denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
281. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 450 So. 2d 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Blackwell v. State,
248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E.2d 599 (1981); People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983);
Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. 1982); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166
(1979); Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. 1984); Lawrence v. State, 51 Md.
App. 575, 444 A.2d 478 (1982), affd., 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (1983); State v. Sims, 639
S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Shelton, 53 N.C. App. 632, 281 S.E.2d 684 (1981),
review denied, appeal dismissed, 305 N.C. 306, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982); Lee v. State, 637 P.2d 879
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Thompson, 276 S.C. 616, 281 S.E.2d 216 (1981), habeas corpus
granted on other grounds sub nom. Thompson v. Leeke, 590 F. Supp. 110 (D.S.C. 1984), order
affd., 756 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (1979); see also
Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449 (D.C.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981) (white defendant challenging use of peremptory challenges to exclude all whites from his jury).
282. 461 U.S. 961 (1983). The Court also denied certiorari in two companion cases, Miller v.
Illinois and Perry v. Louisiana.
283. 461 U.S. at 970 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
284. 461 U.S. at 963.
285. 461 U.S. at 967.
286. 461 U.S. at 967.

Michigan Law Review

1664

[Vol. 83:1611

be reconciled with the sixth amendment. 287 Justice Stevens' opinion,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, explained that his vote to
deny certiorari did not reflect disagreement with the dissent's appraisal of the importance of the underlying issue,288 but rather the
view that sound exercise of the Court's discretion dictated "allow[ing]
the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives
further study before it is addressed by this Court."289
Four months later, in Gilliard v. Mississippi, 290 the majority again
declined to review the use of peremptory challenges to remove black
jurors from a black defendant's jury. Justice Marshall's dissent, joined
by Justice Brennan, addressed the position taken by Justices Stevens,
Powell, and Blackmun in McCray:
When a majority of this Court suspects that such rights are being regularly abridged, the Court shrinks from its constitutional duty by awaiting
developments in state or other federal courts. Because abuse of peremptory challenges appears to be most prevalent in capital cases, the need for
immediate review in this Court is all the more urgent. If we postpone
consideration of the issue much longer, petitioners in this and similar
cases will be put to death before their constitutional rights can be vindicated. Under the circumstances, I do not understand how in good conscience we can await further developments, regardless of how helpful
those developments might be to our own deliberations. 291

Reviewing the steadfast adherence of most state courts to Swain even
in the face of egregious factual circumstances, Justice Marshall also
expressed doubt that many states would engage in meaningful reconsideration of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges - at
least in the foreseeable future. 292
In 1984 the Court twice more avoided the peremptory challenge
issue. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, reiterated his sixth
amendment objections in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in
three companion cases from Illinois. 293 In the more recent case,
Thompson v. United States, 294 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, voiced a second reason for reexamining Swain. Brennan, who
had joined the majority's opinion in Swain in 1965, argued that the
decision's equal protection analysis was wrong:
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
(1984).
294.

461 U.S. at 970.
461 U.S. at 961 (Stevens, J., concurring).
461 U.S. at 963.
104 s. Ct. 40 (1983).
104 S. Ct. at 42.
104 S. Ct. at 42-44.
Williams v. Illinois, decided with Dixon v. Illinois and Yates v. Illinois, 104 S. Ct. 2364
105

s. Ct. 443 (1984).
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With the hindsight that two decades affords, it is apparent to me that
Swain's reasoning was misconceived. Stripped of its historical embellishments, Swain holds that the state may presume in exercising peremptory
challenges that only white jurors will be sufficiently impartial to try a
Negro defendant fairly. In other words, Swain authorizes the presumption that a Negro juror will be partial to a Negro defendant simply because both belong to the same race. Implicit in such a presumption is
profound disrespect for the ability of individual Negro jurors to judge
impartially. It is the race of the juror, and nothing more, that gives rise
to the doubt in the mind of the prosecutor. Whatever the justification
for permitting the idiosyncratic use of peremptory challenges in the run
of cases, that justification ought not extend to permit the Government to
make use of an unfounded racial presumption that disparages Negroes in
this way. 295

In the meantime, the defendant in McCray v. New York sought
relief from a federal district court by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging the violation of his sixth amendment rights.
The Eastern District of New York granted the writ296 and the Second
Circuit affirmed in part, holding that McCray had established a prima
facie case of a sixth amendment violation, but remanded the case for a
hearing to enable the state to rebut the showing. 297 The Second Circuit acknowledged that the defendant had no right to a petit jury of
any particular composition, but reasoned that the sixth amendment
prohibits a state from unreasonably restricting the possibility that the
petit jury will comprise a fair cross section of the community.298 The
court then outlined a procedure for implementing its holding similar
to those adopted in Wheeler and Soares. 299 The dissent objected that
the result reached by the majority was both unworkable and unsupported by the Supreme Court's sixth amendment decisions. 300 In
March of 1985 a majority of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
voted to deny rehearing in bane. 301
Perhaps because McCray created a ~onflict between the circuits, 302
the Supreme Court finally voted to consider a sixth amendment attack
on the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges; on April
22, 1985, the Court granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certi295. 105 S. Ct. at 445.
296. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
297. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
298. 750 F.2d at 1128-29.
299. 750 F.2d at 1131-32.
300. 750 F.2d at 1136-39 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
301. McCray v. Abrams, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985).
302. Cf. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting a Jack
of conflict between the circuits as one reason to postpone Supreme Court review).
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orari in Batson v. Kentucky. 303 Batson is pending as this Article goes to
press. 304
These developments are encouraging, but it is easy to overestimate
their significance for the black defendant. Swain itself is worse than
useless in protecting the black defendant from racial prejudice, for it
affirmatively sanctions the very practice that threatens equal justice:
the elimination of black jurors in cases involving black defendants. In
its focus on the rights of prospective black jurors, Swain neglects the
more compelling interests of the black defendant; in its focus on the
possibility of a pro-black bias on the part of black jurors, Swain ignores the existence of anti-black bias on the part of white jurors. Unfortunately, similar flaws also mar the reformers' proposals.
Because the Swain Court looked at the peremptory challenge issue
through the lens of the jury venire exclusio~ cases, it saw no equal
protection violation. In the jury exclusion cases, black citizens were
being denied the right to participate in the administration of justice and stigmatized as unfit to do so. Absent proof that the peremptory
challenge was being used to prevent blacks from ever participating as
jurors, the Court concluded that the analogy to the venire selection
cases (and hence, the constitutional claim) must fail. This analysis
forgot the interests of the person asserting that the Constitution had
been violated. From the defendant Swain's perspective, the opportunity of black jurors to sit on other juries was of no interest at all; his
sole concern was the racial composition of the jury determining his
guilt or innocence. Ironically, Justice Brennan's criticism of Swain's
equal protection reasoning does not depart from this focus on the prospective black juror. Instead, he refines the analysis of that perspective,
noting that black jurors are stigmatized even if permitted to participate in other cases because the exclusion from cases involving black
defendants presumes that black jurors are unable to be impartial toward persons of their own race.
To a lesser extent, the impartial jury/fair cross section of the community argument for overruling Swain, whether expressed in sixth
amendment or state constitutional terms, also fails to focus on the defendant. The state court decisions have been clear that the right to a
fair cross section of the community is not solely the defendant's right,
303. 105 S. Ct. 2111 (No. 84-6263).
304. Also pending is the state's petition for certiorari in the McCray case. McCray v.
Abrams, 53 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1985) (No. 84-1426). When the Court granted certio•
rari in Batson, the defendant-respondent in McCray moved for expedited consideration of the
state's petition and consolidation with Batson, but this motion was denied. McCray v. Abrams,
105 S. Ct. 2318 (1985) (order denying motion to expedite consideration and consolidate),
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but may be asserted by either party; really it is the community's right
to a representative jury that is being protected. Despite some ambiguity, both Justice Marshall's dissent from the denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York 305 and the Second Circuit's opinion in McCray v.
Abrams306 suggest that a sixth ~endment attack on the racially motivated case of the peremptory challenge would only be available to the
defendant. But even if the sixth amendment argument prevails and
the right is assigned only to the defendant, the focus is still blurred and
a significant gap will be left in the protection of individual d~fendants.
All formulations have described the fair cross-section right as the right
to as fair a cross section as a random draw produces. This will certainly protect more defendants from the influence of racial bias than
does Swain. For the individual defendant whose randomly drawn jury
turns out to be unrepresentative, however, the racial prejudice documented in Part I still may affect the determination of his guilt; that
other defendants will have representative juries is neither consolation
nor compensation. Furthermore, in nearly all-white communities,
even random draws that do produce a representative cross section of
the community will not eliminate the effects of racial prejudice; for
black defendants tried in such communities, a jury composed of a representative cross section provides no protection at all.
The second oversight in Swain is also worthy of comment, first,
because it has served to justify Swain and is empirically wrong, and
second, because the opponents of Swain attack the oversight but proceed upon empirically incorrect assumptions of their own. Swain justifies the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate black jurors from
cases involving black defendants as based upon the prosecutor's suspicion - which the Court views as reasonable - that these jurors will
be prejudiced in favor of black defendants. It is analogous, reasoned
the Court, to striking persons of the same religion, nationality, occupation, or affiliation as the defendant; the question for the prosecutor is
"not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be." 307 A
305. Justice Marshall writes only of the defendant's right to question the prosecutor's use of
his peremptory challenge, but he does note that the effect of excluding minorities is not limited to
the individual defendant, but produces "injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to
the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts."
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)).
306. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit also speaks only of the defendant's
right to challenge the prosecutor's striking of minorities, but does not address the dissent's contention, 750 F.2d at 1138 (Meskill, J., dissenting), that its ruling will have a negative impact on
the defense's use of peremptory challenges.
307. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965).
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federal district court judge rephrased this position more graphically:
[I]f statistics were compiled on the basis of any particular religion, e.g.,
Jewish, Catholic, or any particular nationality, e.g., Italian or Chinese,
similar results might be found, i.e., there is a pattern by state prosecutors
to peremptorily challenge veniremen from the same genetic, religious or
national background on the unstated grounds that such persons might be
partial toward a defendant of like kin. 308
Despite the superficial appeal of this comparison, it is inapt, for it
ignores the extraordinarily vulnerable position of black Americans, a
position not shared by religious, occupational, or white ethnic groups.
The history of widespread and virulent prejudice against blacks can
hardly be compared to the typical juror's sentiments about Italian
Americans or about carpenters. As the empirical evidence reviewed in
Part I demonstrates, white jurors discriminate against black defendants in the assessment of their guilt; one would not expect that white
jurors of non-Italian ancestry who work in other occupations will discriminate against Italian American carpenters. Instead of acknowledging the virulence of anti-black sentiment among whites, the Court
permitted the prosecutor to presume a pro-black bias among blacks.
But the mock jury studies revealed no distorting pro-black bias; black
jurors judged black defendants as white jurors judged white defendants. It may or may not be true that eliminating Italian American
carpenters from an Italian American carpenter's jury will result in a
more impartial jury, but, in any event, it is unlikely to result in a less
impartial jury. For this reason, a prosecutor's action in striking Italian American carpenters from an Italian American carpenter's jury
fits the Court's characterization of seeking a juror who is more likely
to be impartial. But this description does not fit the action of striking
a black juror from a black defendant's jury; the prosecutor hopes to
replace the black juror with a white juror - who is more likely to be
biased in the assessment of the defendant's guilt than was the black
juror. 309
All critics of Swain argue that black jurors will be as impartial to
black defendants as will white jurors, but they do not point out that
308. McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D.S.C. 1974).
309. The comparison is also inapt for its inattention to numerical considerations pertaining
to the victim's group affiliation. If the defendant is a Swedish American and the victim is a
Norwegian American, in most communities the prosecutor will use his peremptory challenges to
eliminate Swedish Americans while the defense attorney will use his peremptory challenges to
eliminate Norwegian Americans. This leaves none of the jurors with a sense of ethnic identification with either defendant or accuser. However, the black defendant with a white victim usually
cannot counteract the effects of the prosecutor's challenges in this manner because there are so
many more whites on the jury venire than blacks.
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they are more likely to be impartial. 310 Moreover, the reformers sometimes suggest that black jurors as a whole will not differ from white
jurors in their assessment of black defendants' guilt, 311 and this of
course is incorrect. The advocates of a "cross section of the community" approach to overruling Swain have an additional empirical blind
spot: they fail to recognize that prejudice against blacks differentiates
use of the peremptory challenge to eliminate racial groups from use of
the peremptory challenge against other kinds of cognizable groups. It
might be argued that this indifference to the kind of group being excluded only results in broader protection for the defendant, but its
broader "protection" doubtless stiffens resistance to the adoption of
this approach. As a practical matter, it also precludes evolution from
the currently advocated standard of "as representative a cross section
of the community as a random draw provides" to a standard looking
at the actual composition of particular juries.
Neither Strauder and Swain nor their likely successors protect the
black defendant from the racial prejudice prevalent among white jurors. While this "failure" is in part attributable to unsupported and
unsupportable empirical assumptions, it is also an inevitable consequence of the intended function of these doctrines, assuring representative juries. The goal of assuring representative juries only partially
coincides with the goal of protecting minorities from prejudicial assessment of their guilt. For this reason, the possible successors to
Swain could improve the prospects of an unbiased determination of
guilt for many black defendants, but such an improvement would not
approach comprehensive protection against racial prejudice for all
black defendants.
B. Eliminating Biased Jurors

Perhaps it is not so surprising that the procedures required to assure a representative jury do not provide much protection to the mi310. Quarrels with terminology are possible here. One might say that black jurors are partial
toward black defendants and that white jurors are partial toward white defendants rather than
that black jurors are impartial only toward black defendants and that white jurors are impartial
only toward white defendants. This dispute rehashes the question of whether disparities in the
tendency to convict result from inappropriate lenience toward own-race defendants or inappropriate harshness toward other-race defendants. As explained in Part I, for the purposes of an
equal protection argument, the interpretation of the disparity makes no difference. It is of some
importance in argument based upon the right to an impartial jury, but here I think it is necessary
to deem the white jury judging the white defendant as the standard for impartiality, rather than
lenient partiality; otherwise we must say that the overwhelming majority of defendants are
judged by partial juries, and this conclusion seems at odds with the intention behind the use of
the word "impartial" in the sixth amendment.
311. See notes 294-95 supra and accompanying text.
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nority race defendant. What is much more surprising is that the
procedures designed to eliminate biased jurors - voir dire of individual jurors and change of venue - provide even less protection. These
procedures have never been adequate to the task of eliminating racially
prejudiced jurors and recent developments in the voir dire area are
particularly discouraging, for the Supreme Court has virtually eliminated any constitutional right to question jurors concerning their racial prejudice.
1.

Voir Dire of the Venire

The primary purpose of voir dire is to uncover biases in jurors that
would prevent their impartial evaluation of the facts and application of
the law to these facts. When such a bias is uncovered, the juror will be
dismissed by the court "for cause." Voir dire also serves to facilitate
the use of peremptory challenges; the prospective juror may reveal
facts that do not establish a disqualifying bias, but suggest to one party
or the other an unsympathetic attitude. That party will then exercise
one of its peremptory challenges to strike the juror in question.
Neither purpose of voir dire can be fulfilled, however, unless sufficient
questions are asked to probe relevant attitudes. In the federal courts,
these questions are usually asked by the judge, following the submission of proposed questions by each party. 312 In most state courts, voir
dire is conducted by the parties themselves, but is subject to limitations imposed by the judge. 313 Regardless of who conducts the questioning, two issues may arise: first, what questions must be permitted,
and second, what answers to those questions establish bias as a matter
of law and thus require dismissal for cause. In some kinds of litigation, such as death penalty cases, the second issue has provoked the
most controversy, 314 but in recent cases concerning jurors' racial prejudice, disputes over what questions must be allowed overwhelmingly
predominate. 315
In the earliest Supreme Court case on point, Aldridge v. United
312. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides that the court has discretion either to conduct the voir
dire itself or to permit counsel to do so.
313. Ten states follow the federal rule and about the same number permit examination only
by the judge; twenty-two states provide for examination by both the judge and the attorney, and
in the remaining states counsel conducts the examination. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J.
lsRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1344 (5th ed. 1980); see also G. BERMANT & J.
SHAPARD, THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, JUROR CHALLENGES, AND ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 22 (fig.I) (1978).
314. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
315. See notes 320-44 infra and accompanying text. For a review of the cases (most of which
are quite old) concerning racially biased juror views that require dismissal for cause, see Annot.,
94 A.L.R.3d 15, 47-51 (1979).
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States, 316 the Court held that refusal to permit inquiry into racial prejudice was reversible error, at least where the defendant was black and
the victim white. 317 The basis for the Court's ruling was unclear; the
opinion merely cited state court cases recognizing the black defendant's right to question potential jurors about their racial prejudices318
and reasoned that "[d]espite the privileges accorded to the negro, we
do not think that it can be said that the possibility of [racial] prejudice
is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the inquiry." 319 Aldridge was decided in 1931, and it was not until the Court's 1973 decision in Ham v. South Carolina 320 that the Court returned to the issue
ofvoir dire about racial prejudice. 321 Ham concerned a bearded black
civil rights worker convicted of possession of marijuana. Ham's defense was that law enforcement officials had framed him on the drug
charge because of his civil rights activities. During voir dire, the trial
judge asked general questions concerning the jurors' possible
prejudices, but refused to inquire specifically into possible prejudice
against the defendant due to his beard or race. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that under these facts the fourteenth amendment due
process clause required the judge to question the jurors on the subject
of racial prejudice, although it did not require a particular form or
number of questions. 322 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distinguished inquiry about prejudice against people with beards, explaining
that the inquiry regarding racial prejudice derived its constitutional
status "from a principal purpose as well as from the language of those
who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment." 323
Most state courts interpreted Ham as requiring questions concerning racial prejudice in all cases in which a black defendant requested
such an inquiry324 until the Supreme Court drastically curtailed Ham
316. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
317. 283 U.S. at 311.
318. 283 U.S. at 311-13.
319. 283 U.S. at 314.
320. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
321. In the interim, some state courts followed Aldridge. See, e.g., State v. Higgs, 143 Conn.
138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956); Matthews v. State, 276 A.2d 265 (Del. 1971); Brown v. State, 220 Md.
29, 150 A.2d 895 (1959). Others did not. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee, 324 Mass. 714, 88
N.E.2d 713 (1949); State v. Ham, 256 S.C. 1, 180 S.E.2d 628 (1971), rev'd sub nom., Ham v.
South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Preston v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 228, 242 S.W.2d 436
(1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 933 (1952).
322. 409 U.S. at 527.
323. 409 U.S. at 528. Justices Douglas and Marshall both dissented in part, arguing that
Ham should have been permitted to inquire about prejudice against bearded people as well as
about prejudice against blacks. 409 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 534 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
324. State v. Marsh, 168 Conn. 520, 522, 362 A.2d 523, 525 (1975); Reid v. State, 129 Ga.
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only five years later in Ristaino v. Ross. 325 Over the dissents of Justices
Marshall and Brennan, 326 the Court ruled that Ham did not announce
a rule of "universal applicability," 327 but "reflected an assessment of
whether under all the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial
prejudice, the jurors would not be [impartial]." 328 The Court explained that the nature of Ham's defense and his prominence as a civil
rights activist made race an issue in the conduct of his trial; the fact
that Ross was a black man accused of committing violent crimes
against a white man was not as likely to distort his trial as were the
special factors present in Ham. 329 The Court then concluded that
"[t]he circumstances . . . did not suggest a significant likelihood that
racial prejudice might infect Ross' trial" 330 and that the demands of
due process therefore were satisfied by the trial judge's general questions about impartiality. 331 Although the Court's grant of certiorari in
Turner v. Sielaff332 raises the possibility that Ristaino will be modified,
the facts of Turner suggest that the most the Court will do is create a
narrow exception to the Ristaino rule: the defendant in Turner is
black, his victim was white, and the case was tried in a state where
statistics show that the death penalty is disproportionately imposed on
defendants with white victims.
The majority in Ristaino commented in a footnote that it thought
that voir dire questioiµng directed at racial prejudice was generally
"the wiser course" and could have been required of a federal court
faced with the circumstances of Ristaino as a matter of the Supreme
Court's supervisory power. 333 However, in Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 334 the Court upheld a federal trial court's decision to reject the
defendant's request for voir dire on racial prejudice toward persons of
Mexican descent in an illegal immigration case. The Court explained
that the trial judge might be reluctant to inquire about racial prejudice
App. 657, 658, 200 S.E.2d 454,455 (1973); People v. Wray, 49 Mich. App. 344, 346, 212 N.W.2d
78, 79 (1973); People v. Williams, 41 A.D.2d 611, 611, 340 N.Y.S.2d 504, 504 (App. Div. 1973).
325. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
326. 424 U.S. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White concurred in the result only.
424 U.S. at 598 (Ham should not be applied retroactively).
327. 424 U.S. at 596.
328. 424 U.S. at 596.
329. 424 U.S. at 596-97.
330. 424 U.S. at 598.
331. 424 U.S. at 598.
332. 53 U.S.L.W. 3807 (U.S. May 13, 1985) (No. 84-6646).
333. 424 U.S. at 597 n.9.
334. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
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for fear of creating an impression that justice might tum upon skin
color335 and that unless there was a "reasonable possibility that racial
or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury," this reluctance
would not be deemed reversible error. 336 The plurality opinion cautioned that this "reasonable possibility" supervisory rule would, however, encompass cases where a defendant was accused of a violent
crime against a victim of another race. 337 Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. 338
Although commentary on Ristaino and Rosales-Lopez has been
universally negative, 339 the lower courts have viewed these decisions
with enthusiasm. Very few state courts have recognized a universal
state statutory or constitutional requirement for voir dire on racial
prejudice, 340 and most do not recognize the right even under inflammatory factual circumstances. At least four states have already declined to adopt a rule requiring that black defendants accused of
violent crimes against white victims be permitted to question jurors
concerning racial prejudice; 341 two state appeals courts have upheld
335. 451 U.S. at 190.
336. 451 U.S. at 191.
337. 451 U.S. at 192. But see Justice Rehnquist's concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Burger, arguing that no flat rule should be pronounced. 451 U.S. at 194-95 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
338. 451 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
339. Gaba, Vair Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into Prejudice,
48 U. CoLo. L. R.Ev. 525 (1977); Hicks, Vair Dire on Racial Prejudice, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 180
(1975-1976); Note, Constitutional Law: The Right of an Accused to Question Prospective Jurors
Concerning a Specific Prejudice at Vair Dire, 20 HOWARD L.J. 527 (1977); Note, The Right to
Question Jurors on Racial Prejudice, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 412 (1976); Comment, Racial Bias and the
Right to an Impartial Jury: A Standard for Allowing Vair Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959
(1982); see also Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on Vair Dire: Constitutional Requirements and
Policy Considerations, 54 B.U. L. R.Ev. 394 (1974) (criticizing a predecessor of Ristaino, Commonwealth v. Ross, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973)).
340. See, e.g., Swan v. State, 268 Ind. 317, 321, 375 N.E.2d 198, 201 (1978) (dicta); State v.
Taylor, 423 A.2d 1174, 1175 (R.I. 1980); see also State v. Marsh, 168 Conn. 520, 522-23, 362
A.2d 523, 525 (1975) (citing both state and federal constitutions); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App.
657, 657-58, 200 S.E.2d 454,455 (1973) (citing both Ham and a general statute permitting voir
dire); cf, e.g., Thornton v. State, 31 Md. App. 205, 215, 355 A.2d 767, 772 (1976) (noting that
Maryland does not always require voir dire on racial prejudice); State v. Long, 137 N.J. Super.
124, 131, 348 A.2d 202, 205-06 (1975) (voir dire on racial prejudice is required constitutionally
only in "cases involving special circumstances pointing to the presence of racial overtones or
prejudices.").
341. Neal v. State, 372 So. 2d 1331, 1341 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 1348
(Ala. 1979) (robbery and murder); Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 214, 418 N.E.2d
585, 595 (1981) (assault); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 365 Mass. 66, 67, 309 N.E.2d 491, 493
(1974) (murder); State v. Jones, 268 S.C. 227, 234, 233 S.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1977) (rape and
armed robbery); State v. Gibbs, 267 S.C. 365,368,228 S.E.2d 104, 105 (1976) (robbery); Turner
v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523, 273 S.E.2d 36, 42 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981)
(brutal and wanton murder); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 36, 235 S.E.2d 320, 323
(1977) (murder of white prison guard). But see State v. Sims, 140 N.J. Super. 164,173,355 A.2d
695, 700 (1976) (interracial mur~er requires voir dire on racial prejudice); Commonwealth v.

1674

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 83:1611

the conviction of a black defendant accused of raping a white woman
despite the trial court's refusal to permit voir dire on racial
prejudice. 342
Moreover, even when trial courts permit questions concerning racial prejudice, questions are often limited to one or two, 343 and sometimes are directed at the entire venire panel rather than addressed to
individual jurors. 344 Despite commentators' repeated pleas for more
probing voir dire on all subjects, 345 no trend in that direction is likely;
curtailing voir dire recently received a moral boost from the Supreme
Court, which gratuitously criticized the length of the voir dire in a
rape and strangulation killing of a fifteen-year-old white girl by a
twenty-six-year-old black man with a prior conviction for forcible rape
on an adolescent white girl.346
There are, then, several reasons why voir dire does not protect the
black defendant from a racially biased determination of his guilt. The
most obvious is that it is not required in every case involving a black
Holland, 298 Pa. Super. 289, 292, 444 A.2d 1179, 1181 (1982) (black defendant/white victim
case requires voir dire of jury where all jurors are white).
342. State v. Jones, 268 S.C. 227, 234, 233 S.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1977); see Braxton v. Estelle,
641 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1981) (denying habeas corpus petition after unsuccessful appeal in Texas
state court; the reported opinion in the state case does not discuss the voir dire issue, Braxton v.
State, 528 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)). Two circuit courts have upheld state court
determinations that refusal to allow voir dire into racial prejudice in interracial rape cases does
not violate due process. Braxton v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1981); Dukes v.
Waitkevitch, 536 F.2d 469, 470 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976), But see Commonwealth v. Sanders, 383 Mass. 637, 640-41, 421 N.E.2d 436,438 (1981) (in future trials involving
interracial rape, jurors are to be examined with respect to interracial prejudice, but not reversible
error in instant case).
343. See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d ISO, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1981) (two questions
sufficient); Johnson v. Maryland, 425 F. Supp. 538, 540-41 (D. Md. 1976) (one question sufficient); see also United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119, 1129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
969 (1972), 413 U.S. 919 (1973); Annot., supra note 315, at 39-41 and cases cited therein. But see
Commonwealth v. Christian, 480 Pa. 131, 137-40, 389 A.2d 545, 547-49 (1978) (defendant entitled to probe specific prejudices bearing on the case, such as juror's views regarding blacks' sexual drives in rape case).
344. See, e.g., United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Dixon, 596 F.2d 178, 181-82 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124-25 (3d
Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Maryland, 425 F. Supp. 538, 540-41 (D. Md. 1976); People v. Harrell, 398
Mich. 384, 392, 247 N.W.2d 829, 832 (1976).
345. See, e.g., A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, ch. 10 (1975); Babcock,
Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power': 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975); Bush, The Case/or
Expansive Voir Dire, 2 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 9 (1976); Soler, ·~ Woman's Place • •• ·~
Combatting Sex-Based Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW, 535
(1975); Note, Juror Bias -A Practical Screening Device and the Case for Permitting Its Use, 64
MINN. L. REV. 987 (1980).
346. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 n.9 (1984); see also
People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 819, 506 P.2d 193, 195, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1973) ("excess
rococo examination" endangers structure of trial). But see Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 829-31
(Marshall, J., concurring) (criticizing as "gratuitous" the Court's comments on the length ofvoir
dire).
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defendant - and is not even required in white victim cases, which are
likely to provoke a double dose of bias. The Court's view that such
factual situations do not create a "significant likelihood" that racial
prejudice will infect the defendant's trial can only be described as ludicrous in light of available empirical evidence.
But even if the Court were to reverse Ristaino, voir dire would still
be ineffective in eliminating the effect of racial bias on jury deliberations. First, superficial questions concerning whether the jurors harbor prejudice against blacks that would prevent them from being
impartial are extremely unlikely to provoke disclosure of such bias.
General questions do not reach hidden inconsistent attitudes, which
research has shown are now prevalent about race. Asking a general
question about impartiality and race is like asking whether one believes in equality for blacks; jurors may sincerely answer yes, they believe in equality and yes, they can be impartial, yet oppose interracial
marriage and believe that blacks are more prone to violence. Those
attorneys who have been permitted to conduct extended voir dire report that it is only when numerous sensitive and specific questions are
asked that prospective jurors reveal racial prejudice. 347 Furthermore,
even if extensive questions were asked, jurors might not answer honestly. Most prejudiced attitudes are now highly disapproved, and jurors would naturally be reluctant to admit them, particularly since
they know that social disapproval will be publicly expressed by dismissing them from the venire. This natural reluctance is probably exacerbated by the practice of questioning the entire venire as a group,
for it is easier to stay quiet untruthfully than to respond untruthfully. 348 Even if extensive individual questioning were routinely permitted in black defendants' cases, fear of social disapproval would
probably inhibit many individuals from expressing their true views.
Finally, even if the courts were to adopt the extremely time-consuming practice of extensive individual voir dire and arrange the setting to encourage disclosure of prejudice, voir dire could not eliminate
all white jurors whose guilt assessments will be affected by the race of
the defendant. Social scientists say it would be possible to encourage
disclosure in several ways. For example, voir dire might be made private as well as individual; the process might be lengthened by a cordial
347. See, e.g., NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 267, at§ 10.03[4]; Ginger, supra note
33, at 434-38; Soler, supra note 345; see also notes 186-88 supra and accompanying text.
348. The jurors' natural reluctance to admit prejudice may be further exacerbated by judgeconducted voir dires. When the distinguished white-haired, black-robed judge seated above the
jurors (and below the American flag) asks "Do you have any racial prejudice that will prevent
you from rendering a fair verdict?" honest responses may be further inhibited.
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chat with the potential juror; and the attorney might encourage expression of prejudice by disclosing his own (real or imagined) biases. 349
Of course, this would make voir dire even more expensive and timeconsuming than it already is. Unfortunately, voir dire would still not
be entirely effective in weeding out biased jurors, because the research
suggests that most jurors are unaware of their bias; the process of race
affecting guilt attribution is probably most often an unconscious
one.350
2.

Change of Venue

Defendants occasionally seek a change of venue to avoid the effects
of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In Invin v. Dowd, 351 the Supreme
Court held that voir dire of individual jurors and the striking for cause
of those who admitted bias was an inadequate assurance of impartiality when a "'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' [was] shown to be
present throughout the community." 352 The Court reasoned that
upon such a showing, the declarations of impartiality by individual
jurors could be given little weight, and a refusal to grant a change of
venue denied the defendant due process. 353
Recent cases indicate that the standard for showing that a fair trial
was precluded in a given community is quite difficult to meet, 354 but
the exact dimensions of the right to a change of venue are irrelevant to
most black defendants. Occasionally racial prejudice may be inflamed
by pretrial publicity and a change of venue would therefore be mandated, 355 but the kind of bias documented in Part I would never support a change of venue motion. More to the point, a change of venue
would probably be useless in these "ordinary" cases, since it is almost
certain that the same kind of bias would affect the guilt determinations
of white jurors in a neighboring county. Only if the change of venue
349. Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND.
L.J. 245, 267 (1981) (reviewing the literature); see also NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note
267, at § 10.01[3].
350. See notes 124-27 & 182-88 supra and accompanying text; cf. Efran, supra note 130 (93%
of subjects thought attractiveness of defendant should play no role in judicial decisions, yet subjects' actual decisions showed a strong effect of attractiveness on certainty of guilt and severity of
punishment).
351. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
352. 366 U.S. at 727 (quoting local newspaper reports on the jury selection process).
353. 366 U.S. at 728.
354. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 104 S. Ct. 2885, 2889-91 (1984); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794, 802-03 (1975).
355. See, e.g., Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d 1171, 1183-84 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (reversible
error not to grant a second change of venue when atmosphere of community in which defendant
was tried was racially polarized by publications concerning trial).
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fortuitously resulted in a change of the racial composition of the jury
would it be useful in combatting the effects of routine racial bias.
The difficulty, then, with relying upon either voir dire or change of
venue for eliminating biased jurors, is that these techniques are
designed to check extraordinary bias, bias peculiar to a person or locale. 356 If prejudice is narrowly conceived as open animosity toward
blacks, these techniques offer significant protection to black defendants. If we focus instead on the forms of racial bias that are less overt
and less hostile but much more prevalent, then attempting to eliminate
all biased jurors is futile.
C.

Controlling Jury Deliberations

The last set of doctrines arguably bearing on racially biased verdicts are those relating to the control of the content of jury deliberations. Courts try to regulate the content of deliberations in three ways:
first, by prohibiting inflammatory arguments (and those that have no
foundation in the evidence); second, by instructing the jury as to the
proper subjects of deliberation; and third, by reviewing allegations of
juror misconduct. These techniques for controlling bias can be disposed of rather quickly, for their shortcomings are both obvious and
not easily remedied.
1.

Prohibiting Racially Inflammatory Arguments

A closing argument that addresses irrelevant issues or contains an
appeal to passion constitutes a federal constitutional violation if the
argument "so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. " 357 This due process standard,
sometimes bolstered by state constitutional or statutory requirements,
has been fairly strictly applied to arguments by the prosecutor tending
to inflame racial animosity. 358 Although an isolated racial innuendo
usually is not deemed reversible error if followed by instructions from
356. Another technique aimed at extraordinary situations is removal of an action from state
court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982). The statute provides that criminal proceedings commenced in state court may be removed if the defendant is denied or cannot enforce
a right in the courts of such state under any Jaw providing for the equal civil rights of United
States citizens. Early liberal interpretations of the statute failed to survive and the right of removal is now sharply limited. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). See
generally Note, Racial Discrimination in a State Court as a Basis/or Removal to a Federal Court,
13 WAYNE L. REv. 456 (1967) (analyzing the Court's decision in City a/Greenwood and other
cases interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1443).
357. Donelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).
358. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 303 (1956), and cases cited therein.

1678

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:1611

the court to disregard it, 359 extreme or repeated racial slurs and arguments obviously designed to ignite racial tensions or promote racial
fears are generally held to require a new trial. 360
Certainly the lower courts' refusal to tolerate racially inflammatory remarks is a desirable development. The large number of cases
in which prosecutors persist in making such arguments, 361 however, is
less than encouraging, for prosecutors must believe that juries will respond to such appeals. Of course, the attitudes upon which those
prosecutors are trying to get the jury to fixate are present regardless of
whether or not an unprincipled advocate calls attention to them. As
was made clear in Part I, the influence of race upon guilt attribution
does not depend upon overt manipulation of racial hostility. Controlling prosecutors' arguments, therefore, can do nothing to interrupt
those more subtle mental processes.
2. Instructing the Jury to be Impartial
The Supreme Court has imposed only modest jury instruction requirements: the judge must instruct the jurors that the defendant is
presumed innocent until proven guilty; 362 he must instruct that the
prosecution is required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 363 and he must avoid instructions that infringe upon the
defendant's constitutional rights. 364 Nevertheless, virtually all courts
provide some general or cautionary instructions as well as instructions
concerning the specific offense with which the defendant is charged.
Model instructions commonly include an admonition to consider
359. See Id. at§ 7; see also id. at§§ 8-9 (admonishment of, or retraction by, counsel sufficient
to remove prejudice in some instances).
360. One notable exception is the repeated use of the word "colored" or "nigras" to refer to
black defendants, despite defense objections. See, e.g., State v. Kirk, 205 Kan. 681, 472 P.2d 237
(1970); Rouse v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1957); State v. Alexander, 255 La. 941,
233 So. 2d 891 (1970), revd. on other grounds sub nom., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972); State v. Crockett, 421 P.2d 722 (Mont. 1967).
361. See Later Case Service, 45 A.L.R.2d 303 (1980); Annot., supra note 358, at 303.
362. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978). But see Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S.
786, 789 (1979) (per curiam) (failure to give instructions on presumption of innocence does not
violate federal constitution if other instructions adequately convey the principle).
363. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (prosecution must prove every element of
offense beyond a reasonable doubt). The federal courts of appeals have held that failure to instruct the jury regarding the prosecution's burden is reversible error if properly objected to. See,
e.g., United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1008 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907
(1978); United States v. Corrigan, 548 F.2d 879, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1977).
364. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (forbidding comments by the prosecution or instructions by the court that suggest that silence of the accused can be taken as evidence of guilt).
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the evidence in the case "without prejudice, fear, or favor," 365 or some
equivalent phrase. 366 Model instructions generally do not provide for
a specific admonition regarding racial prejudice, 367 although some
judges may choose to include such an instruction at their discretion.
Even if use of instructions were to become more widespread, though,
the black defendant facing an all-white jury would gain little protection against racial bias. One reason to doubt the efficacy of racial bias
instructions is that general research indicates that jurors often do not
comprehend or attend to jury instructions. 368 A second reason is specific to the problem of race and guilt attribution: because the process
involved is probably unconscious for most jurors, instructing them to
put racial prejudice out of their minds or to ignore the defendant's
race in assessing the evidence is unlikely to be productive. Jurors who
believe they are being fair will not be affected by even the sternest
warnings that they must be fair. Finally, there is some evidence from
mock jury studies that instructing jurors to disregard a fact results in
greater emphasis being given to that fact. 369 Thus, instructing jurors
to ignore the defendant's race might exacerbate the effect of race upon
guilt attribution.
3.

Reviewing Juror Allegations of Misconduct

The general rule that jurors may not impeach their verdicts is very
old370 and widely accepted. 371 In 1966 the Supreme Court carved out
a narrow exception to that rule, holding that where jurors alleged that
a bailiff had, in effect, become a witness against the defendant, this
violated the defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to be
confronted with witnesses against him and required reversal. 372
365. SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE CoMMITIEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
MANUAL ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES § 2.03 (1965).
366. See, e.g., COMMITIEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISrRICT JUDGES AssOCIATION OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2A (1979) ("without prejudice or
sympathy").
367. See sources cited at notes 365-66 supra.
368. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478,
480-82 (1976).
369. Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated
Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 345 (1973); Wolf & Montgomery,
Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgment of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 205 (1977).
370. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915); Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944
(K..B. 1785).
371. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1J 606[03], at 606-22, 23
(1982); Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court Under Rule
606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924-25 (1978).
372. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
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One lower federal court has extended the exception to allegations
that extraneous racial issues were improperly introduced into deliberations by a juror, reasoning that introduction of those issues violated
the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. 373 This
reasoning would seem to swallow the entire rule against jurors impeaching their own verdicts, since virtually all allegations of juror misconduct involve a denial of the right to an impartial jury. Most courts
have not thus far adopted this view of the Constitution's requirements
and seem unlikely to do so. 374 A few jurisdictions have, however,
ruled that statutory language permitting juror testimony on an
"outside influence" affecting jury deliberations encompasses testimony
concerning racial prejudice expressed by one of the jurors. 375
The concerns of finality and protecting jurors from harassment
make it unlikely that the rule against jurors' impeachment of a verdict
will totally give way to the desire to inhibit expression of racial prejudice in the jury box. But even if a racial prejudice exception to the rule
were widely adopted, very few cases of biased adjudication of guilt
would be affected. In part this is due to the fact that the jurors who
participated in the biased deliberations are the only source of information, and it would be surprising if very many of them came forward.
More importantly, current social patterns make it unlikely that overt
expressions of bias would often be manifested. Jurors who are aware
of anti-black sentiments are unlikely to voice them for fear of social
disapproval, and most jurors will not be aware of any hostile feelings.
That bias is not openly manifested is no assurance that it does not
affect outcomes.
Thus, like the prohibitions against racially inflammatory arguments and the giving of instructions concerning impartiality, review of
jurors' statements during deliberations is oflimited help in eliminating
the effect of the defendant's race upon his chances of conviction. All
three means of controlling the content of jury deliberations focus on
373. Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
374. See, e.g., United States v. Schroeder, 433 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1024 (1971), 401 U.S. 943 (1971); State v. Folck, 325 N.W.2d 368, 371-73 (Iowa 1982);
State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 614 (N.D. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981); State v.
Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167, 168-69 (S.D. 1983).
375. State v. Callender, 297 N.W.2d 744, 745-46 (Minn. 1980); see also People v. Leonti, 262
N.Y. 256, 258, 186 N.E. 693, 694 (1933) (affidavit admissible to show juror lied during voir dire
and verdict therefore was null); cf. State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 271-72, 176 A.2d 465, 467-68
(1961) (religious prejudice); After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734,
738-40, 324 N.W.2d 686, 689-90 (1982) (religious prejudice in a civil case). Contra Smith v.
Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 489-90 (S.D. Iowa 1978); Cherensky v. George Washington-East
Motor Lodge, 317 F. Supp. 1401, 1403-04 (E.D. Pa. 1970); see also Johnson v. Hunter, 144 F.2d
565, 567 (10th Cir. 1944).
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conscious and deliberate injection of the defendant's race into the decisionmaking process. Because racial prejudice in the 1980s rarely takes
this form, these doctrines do little to eliminate its effects.

Ill.

DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION FOR MINORITY
RA.CE DEFENDANTS

Of the existing techniques for eliminating racially biased adjudications of guilt, none even approaches comprehensive protection. Each
of these procedures could be improved to provide more effective protection, but even liberal (and unlikely) changes will not cure their inadequacies, because all of the surrounding doctrines evolved to control
somewhat different kinds of bias. Nonetheless, that overruling Swain
and Ristaino would not provide complete protection for the black defendant does not argue against doing so. The equal protection analysis
in Swain is fundamentally flawed by its failure to consider the use of
peremptory challenges from the defendant's viewpoint and its erroneous assumptions regarding the partiality of white jurors; the due process reasoning of Ristaino is contradicted by empirical findings on the
prevalence of prejudice. Thus, the minimal accommodation to the realities of racial prejudice would seem to be the overhaul of peremptory
challenge and voir dire doctrines. The more difficult question is
whether the equal protection clause requires more than largely passive
accommodations, and if so, what measures might be suited to the task
of providing the black defendant with comprehensive protection
against racial bias.

A.

The Equal Protection Argument that Further Safeguards
Are Required

To determine whether further safeguards are required, one begins
by asking whether the status quo violates the assurance of equal protection of the laws. This question may be divided into three parts.
First, do equal protection constraints apply to the activity in question?
Second, assuming that equal protection constraints do apply, what
level of scrutiny do they impose on the classification at stake? Third,
can that classification survive the appropriate level of scrutiny?
1.

The Pertinence of Equal Protection Constraints

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 376 Equal protection constraints
376. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
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therefore do not impinge upon purely private activities; 377 governmental action is a prerequisite to equal protection scrutiny. 378 When a
government employee acts in his official capacity, there is no doubt
that governmental action has been taken. Although this obvious form
of state action is not present when jurors - ordinary citizens - determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, such determinations nevertheless do constitute state action and hence compel equal protection
review.
The state cannot evade the fourteenth amendment's mandates simply by delegating discrimination to private individuals. When individuals perform traditionally public functions, 379 or when the state
actively encourages or participates in the questionable activity, 380 action taken by private individuals will be deemed state action. In recent
years the Supreme Court has taken a restrictive view of earlier state
action decisions, 381 but even under the newer cases the jury's determination of a defendant's guilt would constitute state action. The Court
has limited the public function strand of state action doctrine to those
few functions "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State," 382 but
even the narrowest reading of that phrase would include the adjudication of criminal liability. Moreover, the jurors' deliberations and verdicts might also meet the alternative test for the involvement strand of
state action doctrine. The Court's requirement of "significant involvement"383 and even its hint that only a "symbiotic relationship" 384
would suffice is easily satisfied here; the state calls together the individ377. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
378. The fourteenth amendment by its language does not reach action by the federal government, but the Court has interpreted the fifth amendment's due process clause to include an equal
protection component. Although the Court has not explicitly compared the reach of the fourteenth and fifth amendment equal protection requirements, they appear to be coextensive. See,
e.g., Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Kore•
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
379. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
380. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
381. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (shopping center not within public
function strand of state action doctrine); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) (termination of service policies by heavily regulated utility not state action despite state
approval of termination provision where provision never the subject of regulatory body's hearings or scrutiny); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (operation of state liquor
regulation scheme did not sufficiently involve state in discriminatory guest policies of licensed
private clubs so as to make those policies state action).
382. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
383. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
384. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
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uals that form the jury, instructs them as to their task, and then relies
upon their conclusions to determine whether imprisonment or fines
may be imposed upon the defendant. Because the sixth amendment
prevents the state from trying criminal offenses without the participation of a jury, the state is totally dependent upon the action of jurors
for the enforcement of its criminal laws. It is hard to imagine more
significant benefit to the state from the activity of private
individuals. 385
2. Determining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
That guilt determinations are made by jurors does not insulate
them from equal protection scrutiny, but not all equal protection scrutiny is stringent. In assessing an equal protection claim, a court "must
first determine what burden of justification the classification created
thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and
the individual interests affected." 386 Although the individual interests
affected by verdicts - freedom from stigma, incarceration, and monetary penalties - are of great importance, they have never been deemed
"fundamental interests" for equal protection purposes. For this reason, most criteria for determining guilt need only bear "some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose." 387 This minimal scrutiny
would seem to be satisfied through ordinary evidentiary requirements
that facts given to the jury for consideration must bear some probative
relationship to the issues in dispute. 388 Imposing a more stringent
standard of review based upon the individual interest affected would
subject all decisionmaking criteria (all facts submitted to the jury) to a
heavy burden of justification, probably making proof of guilt
impossible.
Thus, not all factors that enter into a jury's decision require close
review, but some do. Classifications that disadvantage a suspect class,
such as a racial minority, must be "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."389 If a racial classification is used to
385. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) states that normally non-neutral involvement in the discriminatory activity (which is not present here) is required, but makes
an exception where the result of neutral involvement "would be • • . to enforce a concededly
discriminatory private rule," as barred by Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and that exception is applicable here.
386. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974) (citations omitted); see
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
387. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (describing standard to be used in reviewing
most forms of state action).
388. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 401-02.
389. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
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determine guilt, this greater burden of justification should be imposed
on the government. The question then becomes whether verdicts influenced by racial prejudice are racial classifications.
Were judges to instruct jurors that some weight should be given to
the defendant's race because black defendants are more likely to be
guilty, there would be no question that a racial classification had been
employed. That race was to be only one factor in the jury's verdict
would not alter the equal protection analysis; if an explicit racial classification contributed to the decision to impose a substantial unpleasant consequence, strict scrutiny would be required. 390 Similarly, if a
prosecutor argued that race should be a factor in the determination of
guilt, or jurors acknowledged that it had been a factor influencing deliberations, strict scrutiny's heavy burden of justification would be imposed. But in most cases no explicit racial classification is at issue.
Race appears to influence guilt determinations primarily through an
unconscious process, and even when the process is conscious, the prospect of social disapproval renders disclosure of that process unlikely.
That a policy or action is facially neutral with respect to race, however, does not preclude a finding that a racial classification has been
used. 391 The black defendant's claim is that these apparently legitimate determinations of guilt are discriminatory in effect. In other
such "disproportionate impact" cases, the Supreme Court has stressed
that "the invidious quality of a [governmental action] claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 392 Thus, the level of scrutiny that should be applied
to white jurors' determinations of the guilt of black defendants depends
upon whether the empirical findings discussed in Part I establish a racially discriminatory purpose.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 393 Justice Powell's majority opinion, "without purporting to be exhaustive,"394 summarized some "subjects of proper
inquiry" 395 in the determination of racially discriminatory purpose.
An "important starting point," declared Powell, would often be the
390. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26566 (1977) (if race is a motivating factor in decision, then choice presumed to be illegitimate).
391. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
392. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1944).
393. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
394. 429 U.S. at 268.
395. 429 U.S. at 268.
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impact of the official action. 396 He explained:
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. . . . The evidentiary inquiry is then
relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that
in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence. 397

This passage contains two interesting footnotes. In the first, Powell
acknowledged that several of the jury selection cases fell into the
"clear pattern" category despite the fact that the statistical pattern did
not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion, for the "nature of
the jury-selection task" led to a finding of unconstitutional discrimination. 398 The other relevant footnote explained why less extreme statistical patterns usually were insufficient proof of purposeful
discrimination: "In many instances, to recognize the limited probative
value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the 'heterogeneity' of the Nation's population." 399
If the conclusions of Part I are accepted and the external validity
of the mock jury studies discussed in Part I therefore acknowledged,
the evidence that racial bias is a factor in guilt adjudication would
seem to fall within the "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race" category, even though the studies do not display the extreme statistical pattern described as the norm for "clear pattern" evidence. Not all white jurors find all black defendants guilty or acquit
all white defendants; nevertheless, the "clear pattern" standard should
be deemed satisfied for a reason analogous to that found in the jury
selection cases.
The "nature of the jury-selection task" demands a lesser statistical
disparity because ordinarily it relies upon random chance; if the state
has not interfered with random chance, a substantial underrepresentation of minorities on the jury venire would be extremely unlikely. In
contrast, in most governmentally made decisions, many factors are
evaluated and considered; it is quite likely that correlations between
race and other decision outcomes are spurious, or, in the Court's
phrase, the consequence of "the 'heterogeneity' of the Nation's population." The results of the mock jury studies are, like the jury selection cases, "unexplainable on grounds other than race," albeit not
because random chance should have determined the jurors' decisions.
396.
397.
398.
399.

429
429
429
429

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at
at
at
at

266.
266 (footnotes omitted).
266 n.13.
266 n.15 (citations omitted).
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In the laboratory experiments, it is careful control, rather than random chance, that eliminates noninvidious explanations. Although
many factors were evaluated and considered by the mock jurors, none
of these factors can account for the correlation between race and the
final decision. Because all of the other factors were held constant,
spurious correlations between race and guilt attribution were not possible. In these studies, the "heterogeneity of the Nation's population"
could not create the appearance of reliance on race when it did not
exist, for the mock trials were not heterogeneous but identical with
respect to all factors except the defendant's race. Under these circumstances, the risk of erroneously inferring discrimination on the basis of
race disappears; any intelligible version of the purposeful discrimination requirement has been met.
Moreover, several of the factors deemed relevant in Arlington
Heights to proving purposeful discrimination absent a "clear pattern"
showing are present here. The historical background of the decisions,
"particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes,"400 is one of these factors. In a broad sense, the long history
of deliberate exclusion of blacks from jury venires in southern states is
an example of this factor, and the cooperation of law enforcement officials in vigilante lynchings and farcical trials is another. 401 The second
factor suggested by Powell, the "specific sequence of events leading up
to the challenged decision," 402 does not heighten suspicion in these
cases, but the third, "[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,"403 is arguably present in the repeated use of peremptory challenges to eliminate black jurors. 404 The mock jury studies and the
capital sentencing data provide evidence in the fourth category mentioned in Arlington Heights, substantive departures from routine decisions.405 Finally, "contemporary statements by members of the
400. 429 U.S. at 267.
401. See T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, 2 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1357, 1371 (3d ed. 1967); R. GINZBURG, supra note 2.
402. 429 U.S. at 267.
403. 429 U.S. at 267.
404. In cases that challenge a single governmental decision (such as Arlington Heights) departures from the normal procedural sequence are gauged by comparing the decision at issue
with all prior decisions. In contrast, when a group of decisions are challenged (such as in Yick
Wo or Washington v. Davis) the meaningful comparison is between the procedures used in most
instances and those used in the disputed decisions. Thus, we should compare the procedures
used in cases with black defendants with the procedures used in all other cases, rather than look
for historical changes in the treatment of black defendants.
405. 429 U.S. at 267. Here the relevant substantive departure is not a historical one, as it
would have been in Arlington Heights; the appropriate comparison is between the outcomes in
cases involving black defendants and outcomes in all other cases. See note 404 supra.
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decisionmaking body,"406 in this case jurors' statements describing biased deliberations, provide sporadic evidence of discriminatory
purpose.407
Critics of the purposeful discrimination requirement have often argued that proving purposeful discrimination is virtually impossible
under Arlington Heights. 408 Some have stressed that those who wish
to discriminate will hardly be stupid enough to leave evidence of the
Arlington Heights variety,409 while others have pointed out that because bias often operates at the margins of consciousness, even forthright decisionmakers will rarely supply litigants with indications of
their true purposes.410 This subconscious bias is precisely the obstacle
confronting the individual black defendant. Whether or not race has
been a factor in the determination of his guilt, h~ will almost never be
able to demonstrate its influence. It is the presence of aggregate data
that makes his case. Perhaps this is not so surprising; claimants who
have been successful in proving purposeful discrimination despite
facia}Jy neutral classifications have always relied on aggregate data. 411
To take an extreme example, Yick Wo could never have prevailed
without showing how many other Chinese Americans had been denied
laundry permits.412 Even at that time, the only tracks left by the discriminating body were statistical. That black defendants have a claim
depends upon the happenstance of social scientists being interested in
investigating race and guilt attribution, not upon the actual existence
of discrimination in the guilt adjudication process. Should the Court
refuse to accept the mock jury studies and the other empirical evi406. 429 U.S. at 268.

401. See notes 33 & 373-74 supra and accompanying text.
408. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theones of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. RE.v. 540 (1977); Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights
and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961; Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban
Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. RE.v. 1041 (1978).
409. Eisenberg, supra note 408, at 47-48, 115; Perry, supra note 408, at 551; Schwemm, supra
note 408, at 1031; Simon, supra note 408, at 1070.
410. See, e.g., Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1163,
1165 (1978).

.

411. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and cases cited in notes 194-207
supra, with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
412. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Permits to operate laundries in wooden
buildings were granted to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants, but to none of about 200
Chinese applicants. There were over 300 laundries in the city and all but about ten were constructed of wood. Two hundred forty had Chinese owners. Yick Wo and more than 150 other
persons of Chinese descent had been arrested for violating an ordinance prohibiting the operation
oflaundries in wooden buildings without a permit, but all of the 80 or so noncomplying laundries
owned by Caucasians had been left alone.
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dence, the equal protection claim would collapse and could not be
revived.
Even if this evidence were accepted, and despite the fact that the
Arlington Heights "clear pattern" standard appears to have been met,
one might still object that discrimination that is the result of a primarily unconscious process - which is what the empirical evidence points
to here - cannot be denominated "purposeful." However, in this
context the adjective "purposeful" may be a misnomer and certainly is
misleading, 413 for subconscious reliance on race also triggers strict
scrutiny.
The cornerstone of the purposeful discrimination requirement is
the underlying policy of the equal protection clause that "all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 414 The term "purposeful discrimination" was coined to differentiate de facto discrimination from de jure, 415 not to differentiate between conscious and
unconscious reliance on race in decisionmaking. De facto discrimination, or disproportionate impact, standing alone does not implicate
equal protection concerns because the persons differently treated may
not be "similarly circumstanced" with respect to other relevant attributes or policies. In contrast, the victim of unconscious racial discrimination, exactly like the victim of conscious discrimination, is treated
differently by the decisionmaker despite being "similarly circumstanced" with respect to all relevant criteria. The focus is not on the
badness of the decisionmaker, but on the fairness of the decision. 416 If
a state were to delegate hiring decisions to a personnel officer who
always found black applicants to be "incompatible" or "unattractive,"
the honest statement of that officer that he believed his decisions were
413. Terminology has always been difficult in equal protection doctrine; witness the confu•
sion engendered when the Court stated in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), that racial
"motivation" alone did not render state action constitutionally suspect. The Court's explanation
that "the focus [in prior cases that alluded to discriminatory motive] was on the actual effect of
the enactments, not upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they did," 403 U.S. at
225, led many lower courts to hold that "de facto" discrimination invoked strict scrutiny. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,244 & n.12, 245 (1976) (citing and disapproving these cases).
414. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (striking down state tax
law favoring local corporations that did no local business); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374 (1886) (classification violates equal protection mandate if it "make[s] unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances").
415. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976).
416. This, I think, is the only reasonable interpretation of Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971). The reason that the racial animus that motivated the decision to close the Jackson,
Mississippi, swimming pools did not invoke strict scrutiny was that the record showed "no state
action affecting blacks differently from whites." 403 U.S. at 225. While the Court's conclusion
that blacks in the Palmer case were not affected differently than whites is certainly open to dispute (at the very least, stigma flowing from the decision was not equally distributed), the Court's
premise that different treatment must be the basis of an equal protection claim seems correct.
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never affected by the applicant's race certainly would not allow the
state to avoid the heavy burden of justification imposed by all racial
classifications.417 Likewise, when we know that the defendant's race
will probably affect the decisions of white jurors, their honest but inaccurate assertions to the contrary should not preclude strict scrutiny.
3. Applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard
At least in theory, not all racial classifications violate the Constitution; they are subject to strict scrutiny but may be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means. 418 Thus, one last
issue must be resolved before we can reach a conclusion concerning
whether racially biased determinations of guilt are violating the fourteenth amendment's equal protection mandate: ~an the use of race as
a factor in guilt determination be justified under the strict scrutiny
standard?
I would hope the answer to this question is self-evident. It is hard
to imagine a more offensive use of race than as a factor deemed probative of guilt of a criminal offense. Nevertheless, it might be argued that
offensive or not, it is rational for jurors to incorporate their knowledge
that blacks commit proportionately more crime than do whites. 419
This argument fails for two reasons: first, this use of race to escalate
the likelihood of guilt probably is not rational, and second, even if it
were rational, mere rationality does not satisfy strict scrutiny.
Jurors might assume from their familiarity with newspaper reports
of crime or crime statistics that a black (or Hispanic or Native American) is more likely to engage in common law crimes than is a white
person; at a subconscious level, this is probably what they do assume.
But such an assumption is erroneous for several reasons. First of all,
arrest records are not accurate indicators of disproportionate involvement; to some extent they reflect selection biases in the criminal justice
system.42° Consequently, experts disagree on the extent to which
417. In a somewhat analogous situation, the Supreme Court has held that a jury commissioner's honest statement that he did not know any blacks qualified to serve on juries and for this
reason, rather than prejudice, did not select any blacks to fill the jury rolls, carries little weight in
assessing whether an equal protection violation has occurred. See Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356
U.S. 584 (1958); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
418. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
419. Some courts have accepted similar reasoning in probable cause determinations. For
example, in United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals approved the Drug Enforcement Administration's use of "Hispanic background" as a
factor increasing the likelihood that the suspect is a drug courier. For a criticism of this decision
and others permitting the use of race as a factor in detention decisions, see Johnson, Race and the
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
420. See Hindelang, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes, 43 AM. Soc.
REv. 93, 94-97 (1978) (discussing numerous studies). Self-report studies show negligible racial
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arrest rates should be attributed to differential involvement or differential processing.421 Although most experts would agree that disproportionate involvement explains some of the arrest statistic differential,
the problem remains that there is no way of knowing how much more
likely it is that a black person will commit a common law crime than
that a white person will do so. Jurors who read crime statistics will
overestimate the differential involvement; those who read newspapers
will grossly overestimate the differential involvement.422
Even if the differential involvement could be accurately assessed
and jurors were familiar with such an assessment, factoring that assessment into the likelihood that a defendant on trial has committed a
crime of which he is accused would be irrational. Although it may be
that, knowing nothing about a person but his race, it is more likely
that a black person committed a common law crime than that a white
person did so,423 it does not follow that it is more likely that a black
defendant accused of such a crime is more likely to be guilty than a
white defendant similarly accused. More blacks are arrested and
brought to trial than are whites; earlier processes - the gathering of
evidence and the decision to bring charges - have already swallowed
any predictive power that the race of an individual may have. Only if
we thought that arrest rate differences underestimated racial differences in criminal activity would it be rational to factor race into the
determination of guilt.;24
Even if using race as a factor in the determination of guilt were
rational, this would not satisfy strict scrutiny. Only once has the
Supreme Court sustained a nonremedial425 racial classification after
applying the strict scrutiny test, 426 and this decision has been widely
differences in criminal involvement, thus suggesting a selective processing interpretation of arrest
·statistics. Id. at 96-97. Victim surveys show disproportionate black involvement, but a smaller
disproportion than is reflected in arrest statistics. Id. at 97-99 (summarizing studies),
421. Compare McNeely & Pope, Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crime: A
Response to Hindelang, 8 REv. BLACK PoL. EcoN. 405 (1978), with Hindelang, supra note 420.
422. J. Mayas, supra note 162, at 49, 56.
423. Certainly if all criminal activity, including white collar crime, is considered, the proportionate involvement of any group is entirely speculative. This is because whites are much more
frequently involved in white collar crime than are blacks and the extent of white collar crime is
largely unknown. See generally C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4147 (1978).
424. Because we know that arrest rates overestimate differential involvement to some extent,
it would actually be more rational to assume that, ceteris paribus, a white defendant on trial is
more likely to be guilty than is a black defendant. See notes 421-21 supra and accompanying
text.
425. The Court upheld a remedial classification in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980), but the classifications at issue here are certainly not remedial.
426. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States,
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criticized.427 Certainly the arguments for permitting jurors to consider the defendant's race do not come close to meeting the requirements of a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means. 428
"Convicting the guilty" could be viewed as a compelling state interest, at least in the abstract. But even if the interest in convicting the
guilty were held to satisfy the ends requirement, the use of race as a
factor in guilt adjudication is not a necessary or precisely tailored
means to the accomplishment of that end. As discussed above, it is
probably not even a rationally related means; certainly it is unnecessary, for the state could produce other, far more reliable indicators 9f
guilt.429
B. A Miranda-Model Proposal

That the use of race as a factor in guilt determinations is depriving
black defendants of the equal protection of the laws may be clear, but
this does not automatically imply that relief must be granted to the
recipients of unequal treatment. Even if the right to a racially neutral
adjudication of guilt is recognized, it can be argued that when the
right is covertly violated, there can be no remedy. This would not be
because there is no appropriate remedy; the appropriate remedy would
be reversal of the conviction and a new trial by unbiased jurors. The
difficulty is instead in recognizing when the right has been violated.
Because the proof that violations are occurring comes entirely from
aggregate data (including the mock jury studies) it is not possible to
ascertain whether a violation has occurred in a particular case.
This argument is probably correct with regard to individual remedies. 430 To reverse all convictions of black defendants tried by white
juries because some of them are-tainted by a constitutional violation is
320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding earlier West Coast military curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry without explaining the standard of review).
427. See, e.g., M. GR0DZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED (1949); Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45
C0LUM. L. REv. 175 (1945); Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489 (1945); cf. Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus: Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28
CoRNELL L.Q. 414 (1943) (criticizing military evacuation of Japanese Americans from certain
west coast areas). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 n.20.(1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (defending Korematsu).
428. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (stating in dicta that the defendant's race
is an impermissible factor in the sentencing process).
429. See FED. R. Evrn. 404(b), which provides that evidence of the defendant's prior crimes
is inadmissible to show propensity to commit crime - the evidence is considered more prejudicial than probative. Consideration of crimes committed by other same race people would be even
less probative of whether a specific defendant committed a specific crime.
430. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (upholding denial of motion to have
one-third of the venire be composed of blacks).
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extreme.431 Moreover, reliance on individual remedies may create
endless circles: conviction, reversal, new trial, conviction, and so on.
Any feasible remedy must be a group remedy and any attractive remedy must be prophylactic. At this point, the analogy of Miranda v.
Arizona 432 comes to mind.
1.

The Need for Prophylactic Measures

The parallels between the problem confronting the Court in Mirq,nda and the one at issue here are instructive. Prior to Miranda, the
Court had been engaged in case-by-case attempts to determine which
police methods rendered a defendant's confession involuntary.433 One
of the frustrations of this approach was that an infinite variety of complex factual patterns was possible, which rendered the precedential
value of earlier cases - to police and to the lower courts - quite
limited. But the primary impetus to Miranda was the majority's sense
that vigilance on the voluntariness front was not sufficient to protect
the defendant from compelled self-incrimination. The Court noted
first that because interrogation takes place in private, it is difficult to
know exactly what has occurred.434 The opinion also stressed "that
the modem practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented."435 The switch from physically coercive methods to psychologically coercive methods made line drawing
extremely difficult; at what point should
psychological ploy be
deemed compulsion rather than "enlightened and effective" police
detective work? 436 After reviewing some of the interrogation techniques recommended by experts, the Court expressed its concern that
"[e]ven without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or the specific
stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of

a

431. If we knew that all of the convictions were obtained through unconstitutional procedures, the fact that most of them would have been obtained even if proper procedures had been
employed would not argue against wholesale reversal of all the tainted convictions. For example,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel required in all felony cases), was properly
given full retroactive effect. Here, however, not all of the convictions were obtained through an
unconstitutional procedure (biased guilt determination), although some were.
432. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
433. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 1192 (1944); see
also Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 102-03 (1966) (arguing that the
Court's workload precluded adequate review of voluntariness cases).
434. 384 U.S. at 445, 448.
435. 384 U.S. at 448.
436. 384 U.S. at 449.
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individuals."437 Finally, the Court concluded that "without proper
safeguards" the process of custodial interrogation contained "inherently compelling pressures" that undermined the privilege against selfincrimination.438 The "proper safeguard" imposed by the Court consisted of a prophylactic measure designed to counteract the "inherently compelling pressures,"439 namely, the now famous "Miranda
warnings." 440
As with custodial interrogation, earlier doctrinal paths focusing on
case-by-case analysis of the presence of unconstitutional factors have
failed to solve the problem of the influence of racial bias in jury deliberations. 441 The reasons for the failure of this individualized approach
are also similar. First of all, jury deliberations, like custodial interrogation, are conducted in private. Actually, jury deliberations are even
less accessible to analysis than is custodial interrogation because with
custodial interrogation, unlike jury deliberations, a witness for the
other side (the defendant) is present and all witnesses are deemed competent to testify concerning their observations.
The second reason for the failure of the individualized approach to
juror bias also parallels a factor stressed by the Miranda Court: the
replacement of blatant forms of unconstitutional action with more
subtle violations. Just as interrogation techniques have shifted from
the physical to the psychological, the manifestation of prejudice has
shifted from the overt, and often hostile, to the covert, and often unconscious. Techniques, such as voir dire, that may have aided in the
elimination of the openly prejudiced from the jury are largely futile
with their modern counterparts. The Court's description of the new
interrogation techniques as "trading on the weaknesses of individuals"
is also an oddly apt characterization of the process of white jurors
evaluating the evidence against a black defendant; it is not the malevolence of white jurors that threatens constitutional values, but their susceptibility to culturally dictated distortions of judgment. But of course
this historical shift from animosity to unconscious stereotyping does
not diminish the harm wrought by racial bias; as with psychological
437. 384 U.S. at 455 (footnote omitted).
438. 384 U.S. at 467.
439. 384 U.S. at 467-74.
440. [The defendant] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
384 U.S. at 479. The Court also required that the exercise of these rights be "scrupulously
honored," 384 U.S. at 479, and described the government's burden of proving that the defendant
waived these rights as "heavy." 384 U.S. at 475.
441. See Part II supra.
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pressure in custodial interrogation, "a heavy toll on individual liberty"
is the consequence.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Miranda that prophylactic
measures were required to counteract the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation thus would seem to require prophylactic measures
to counteract the inherent bias arising when white jurors are assigned
to determine the guilt of black defendants. The most obvious counterbalance to the bias of white jurors is the mandatory inclusion of black
jurors in the decisionmaking process. Before turning to the details of
such a counterbalance, however, I will digress a moment to consider
the objection that choosing Miranda as a model is building one's house
upon sand.
Miranda has been widely criticized, both from the right and from
the left, 442 and the Supreme Court continues to chip away its edges.443
But whether or not Miranda was rightly decided, the Court's underlying logic is unassailable - or at least, unassailed: When serious
breaches of constitutional norms frequently occur in a setting where
they cannot be discovered (and thus cannot be remedied after the
fact), prophylactic protection of those norms is appropriate. 444 Actually, Miranda is not the only case that proceeds on this logic, 445 but I
chose it as a model because its reasoning on the necessity for prophylactic measures is more explicit than that found in most cases and because the steps in that reasoning have close parallels in the problem of
racial bias and guilt adjudication.
Criticism of Miranda has focused not on its underlying logic, then,
but on its doctrinal and empirical premises. Some critics dispute the
442. See notes 446-49 infra; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968) (congressional effort to overrule
Miranda by authorizing the admissibility of all confessions that are "voluntarily given").
443. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) (failure to give Miranda warnings to
defendant questioned while in custody in his home did not bar admissibility of subsequent station
house confession immediately preceded by Miranda warnings); New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
2626 (1984) (Miranda warnings requirement is subject to a "public safety" exception); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to
impeach defendant's credibility).
444. For a recent affirmation of that logic, see Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 (1985)
(''Thus, in the individual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.").
445. Most commonly, prophylactic remedies have been imposed to safeguard the rights of
criminal defendants. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (exclusionary rule imposed to deter fourth amendment violations); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (imposing requirement of counsel at post-indictment line-ups to combat potential of suggestiveness);
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (potential for prejudice for defendant tried on
recidivist charges requires assignment of an attorney); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)
(potential for prejudice in capital cases requires assignment of an attorney); cf. Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of choice" plan unconstitutional where plan did not
result in a unitary school system). But see United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (exclusionary rule imposed to avoid implicating judiciary in constitutional violations).
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premise that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
implicated by psychological pressure on the defendant, at least when
the pressure is not applied in the courtroom. 446 Other critics argue
that such psychological pressure rarely was brought to bear upon defendants and contend that the "evidence" provided by interrogation
manuals was insufficient proof that constitutional violations occurred
with any frequency. 447 Finally, critics have contended that the remedy imposed by Miranda will not have the counterbalancing effects
hypothesized by the Supreme Court; those on the right have argued
that Miranda only provides the guilty with more room to manipulate
the criminal justice system,448 while those on the left have protested
that Miranda is doomed to be ineffective, in part because the warnings
are underinclusive, and in part because the ruling relies upon the police, who create the pressure to confess, to counteract that pressure. 449
Obviously, none of these particular criticisms applies to the problem of
racially biased jury deliberations or to a solution involving the inclusion of black jurors. The constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws is well established and clearly applies to the criminal trial setting;
the evidence that racial bias frequently affects criminal trials is strong;
and the proposed remedy does not suffer either the defect of letting the
guilty go free or of relying upon the violators of that right for the
enforcement of the remedy. Thus, Miranda is good authority for the
general proposition that prophylactic measures are necessary to prevent a constitutional violation such as racially biased determinations
of guilt, although the question of whether any particular proposal is an
appropriate and effective safeguard can only be answered by considering its advantages and disadvantages in some detail.
2.

The Defendant's Right to a Jury Including Racially
Similar Jurors

Although the United States Supreme Court has summarily rejected
446. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505-14 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 526 (White,
J., dissenting); Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859,
926-37 (1979).
447. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499, 501 (Clark, J., dissenting), 532-33 (White, J., dissenting).
448. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting), 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Grano,
supra note 446. But see Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh -A Statistical Study, 29 U.
PITI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1967) (conviction rates of law enforcement agencies unaffected).
449. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital:
The Attempt To Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1394-98 (1968); Faculty Note, A
Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967);
Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1549-79,
1612-14 (1967); cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (critic on the right noting
that the new rules "do nothing to contain the policeman who is prepared to lie from the start").
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a right to racially similar jurors,450 acknowledging such a right is less
innovative and less radical than it may sound. Several African countries, mindful of the realities of racial prejudice, have recognized some
variation of this right. 451 For analogous reasons, English law for a
time provided alien defendants with juries composed of six aliens and
six citizens;452 this practice was sporadically mimicked in the new
world colonies, but eventually faded into obscurity. 453 At least two
commentators have argued that the English practice should be revived
in this country for minority race defendants. 454
Because the aim is to prevent a wrong rather than to make a victim
whole, the details of any system for mandatory inclusion of racially
similar jurors are not inevitable. Any plan will be somewhat arbitrary,
just as the exact content of the Miranda warnings is somewhat arbitrary. I am not wedded to any of the details that follow, for they are
not crucial. What is crucial is commitment to some realistic plan for
eliminating the effects of racial bias on the determination of guilt. I
make the following proposal then, not in the belief that it is perfect,
but with the hope that an outline of one possible system for including
racially similar jurors will spawn further discussion.
The first issue to be confronted is what is meant by "racially similar." The meaning of this phrase is least problematic for black defendants: a black defendant has the right to some blacks on the jury
panel.455 The same right to "racially similar" jurors should be afforded to Native American and Hispanic defendants; although the empirical evidence concerning prejudice against Native Americans and
Hispanics is less extensive, the available evidence does suggest that at
least in some parts of the country, stereotypes of these groups are as
450. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,413 (1972) (brief statement that there is no
right to the inclusion of racially similar jurors).
451. See Mittlebeeler, Race and Jury in Nigeria, 18 How. L.J. 88, 97 (1973) (right to mixed
juries recognized for a time); Mittlebeeler, Race and Jury in Rhodesia, 15 How. L.J. 181, 196
(1969) (accused blacks tried by judge and two black assessors); see also Mittlebeeler, Race and
Jury in South Africa, 14 How. L.J. 90, 94-95 (1968) (right to judge trial to avoid prejudice by
white jurors).
452. See Ordinance of the Staples, 21 Edw. 3 st. 2, c. 8 (1353) and 28 Edw. 3, c. 13 (1354); see
also Trial by Jury; and the Abolition of de medietate linguae by s. 5 of the Naturalization Act,
1870, 68 Souc. J. 949 (1924).
453. See LaRue, A Jury ofOne's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 850-62 (1976); Potash,
Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J. 80, 93 (1973).
454. LaRue, supra note 453; Potash, supra note 453; see also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAw 273-74 (1980) (posing the split jury as a hypothetical for discussion).
455. Even here questions concerning classification may arise; they are best answered by referring to social definitions rather than fractions of ancestry.
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strong as stereotypes ofblacks.456 Moreover, these stereotypes include
some traits relevant to propensity to commit crime, and thus might be
expected to affect guilt attribution. 457 "White" defendants should be
granted a reciprocal right to some "white" jurors because the mock
jury studies show that black jurors treat white defendants much the
same way that white jurors treat black defendants. This leaves defendants of Asian ancestry. Here the question is a close one. Prejudice
against Asian Americans appears to be much less intense and widespread than prejudice against other minority racial groups458 and,
even among the prejudiced, stereotypes of Asian Americans less commonly include propensity to commit crime.459 On the other hand, a
rule that accords the same rights to all racial groups is likely to seem
fairer to the layperson, and therefore might generate fewer undesirable
side effects. This consideration, coupled with the fact that in a few
areas stereotypes of Asian American criminality may be made common, seems to tip the scale toward extending the right to defendants of
Asian ancestry. 460
I would not extend this right to individual white ethnic groups.
The cost of doing so would be exorbitant, and the benefits are not
apparent. Ethnicity, unlike race, is most often not apparent to jurors,
and thus usually could not be the basis for distortion of judgment.
More significantly, the empirical evidence provides no support for the
claim that ethnicity alters the attribution of guilt. 461 It would be incorrect, however, to assume that because all ·"whites" should be
lumped together, all "nonwhites" should also be treated as interchangeable. The phrase "nonwhite" in itself suggests racism; is the
only distinction worth making whether one may be considered white?
Moreover, such a bifurcation of the population does not accord with
456. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21; Lipton, supra note 15; Smith & Dempsey,
supra note 15, at 593, 594; J. Solemou, supra note 15, at 58, 72; see also note 16 supra.
457. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21; Lipton, supra note 15; J. Solemou, supra
note 15; see also United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908, 912 (8th Cir. 1974); W. DOUGLAS,
WE THE JUDGES 399 (1956) ("Experience shows that liquor has a devastating effect on the North
American Indian and Eskimo.").
458. H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21; Smith & Dempsey, supra note 15, at 593.
459. H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 21.
460. In some cities, such as San Francisco, "Chinatown" gangs are widely feared, and may
be the source of stereotypes about Asian American criminality. In more remote communities,
any racially different person may be deemed more likely to commit a crime.
461. One might hypothesize that mere ethnicity would alter the attribution of guilt in a community where two white ethnic groups were engaged in intense competition. But to produce
such competition, it is likely that the number of persons in each group would be quite large and
this would make the elimination of all sympathetic or neutral jurors from the jury a very rare
event. At least at this time, the risk of ethnic bias infecting guilt determination seems both
speculative and small.

1698

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 83:1611

the relevant empirical data, which shows that minority group members replicate the majority's view of all racial minorities except their
own.462 Thus, granting a black defendant the right to some Hispanics
on his jury would probably not diminish the likelihood of biased guilt
adjudication.
The next question is the number of racially similar jurors to which
a defendant should be entitled. Perhaps the obvious candidate is the
historically split jury, which would entitle the defendant to six jurors
of twelve, or half the total number of jurors in jurisdictions using
smaller juries.463 The disadvantage to the split jury is that six jurors of
the defendant's race might be difficult to obtain in some areas. Moreover, a split jury requirement would provide an incentive for the state
to elect the use of smaller juries, a change generally deemed undesirable. 464 The extreme response to practical difficulties is to limit the
defendant's right to one racially similar juror. Unfortunately, this alternative would probably render the right meaningless. Twelve Angry
Men 465 to the contrary, jury dynamics research shows that a single
dissenting juror virtually never succeeds in hanging a jury, let alone
reversing its predisposition.466 Both laboratory and field studies show
that without a minority of at least three jurors, group pressure is simply too overwhelming: one or two dissenting jurors eventually and
inevitably accede to the majority's view. 467
These findings suggest that a reasonable compromise between ex462. H. BLALOCK, supra note 155, at 96; G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CUL•
TURAL MINORmES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 195-98 (1972); see
also J. LEVIN & W. LEVIN, supra note 174, at 74-75 (studies show an unwillingness among
Americans of diverse ethnic backgrounds to have close social relations with blacks, Japanese,
Chinese, Hindus, and Turks, and a widespread preference for individuals of European descent).
463. The Supreme Court has approved juries as small as six. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970). But see Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-member jury unconstitutional).
464. See, e.g., M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 107 (1977); Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve:
Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and the Size of the Jury, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1004
(1980); Saks, Ignorance ofScience Is No Excuse, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 18; Zeise!, Twelve Is
Just, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 13; Zeise!, The Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A. J. 367
(1972); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 (1978) (reviewing articles and studies
critical of the six-person jury and refusing to uphold a five-person jury). But see, e.g., Thompson,
Six Will Doi, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 12 (arguing that smaller juries expedite trial process and
thereby fulfill guarantee of the right to a speedy trial).
465. Twelve Angry Men is a classic movie about jury deliberations. Eleven jurors initially
vote for conviction, but the lone dissenter, played by Henry Fonda, convinces them all to reach a
verdict of acquittal.
466. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 27, at 463; M. SAKS, supra note 464, at 16-18
(reviewing several studies); Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV,
744, 748 (1959) (not a single jury hung with a minority of less than three on the initial vote);
Simon & Marshall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 211, 227 (S. Nagel ed.
1972); see also Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in GROUP DYNAMICS 189, 190-93 (D. Cartwright ed. 1960).
467. M. SAKS, supra note 464, at 16-18; Broeder, supra note 466, at 748; Simon & Marshall,
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pediency and effectiveness is to assure the defendant three racially similar jurors. It is true that were this proposal to operate as planned,
hung juries (rather than verdicts of acquittal) would result in those
cases where an all-white jury would have acquitted a white defendant.
To render acquittal the predicted result, however, would require ten
racially similar jurors. The likelihood that practical obstacles would
then be deemed insurmountable makes it preferable to focus on
preventing wrongful convictions. Furthermore, it seems likely that
prosecutors would often choose not to retry the defendant in cases
where subsequent interviews with jurors revealed racial polarization.
Of course, one would expect that in most cases involving minority race
defendants the strength or weakness of the evidence will result in a
unanimous verdict just as it does in most cases involving white defendants; it is only in marginal evidence cases that we would expect to find
some different verdicts than would be obtained under the current
system.
The right to racially similar jurors would belong to the defendant
and not to the prosecution or the public. The defendant could waive
the right if he wished, but his decision to do so would have to meet the
traditional standard of "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."468
It seems prudent to leave open the door for experimentation with
alternative remedies. The Miranda Court's reasoning on this point,
too, is apposite:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the
exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot
say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as
it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of
our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
following safeguards must be observed. 469
supra note 466, at 227 (hung juries extremely rare unless initial minority was at least four jurors);
see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 27, at 463.
468. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
469. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). See also United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413-14
(1984) ("The Court has . . . not seriously questioned, 'in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence . . . where a Fourth Amendment
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A state might develop sophisticated voir dire techniques or other effective devices for screening out unconsciously biased jurors; a state
might develop a comprehensive and demonstrably effective set of instructions; or a state might prove that its educational system had eliminated the relationship between race and guilt attribution among its
citizens. Any of these developments would be preferable to the race
conscious, inconvenient measures here proposed, but until the Court is
shown "other procedures which are at least as effective," it should
require the safeguards described above.
These requirements should not invalidate convictions obtained
before their imposition, for two reasons. First, the proposed rules fall
into the category of a "clear break with the past," and under the
Court's current retroactivity doctrine, the impact of such a rule should
be limited to subsequent cases. 470 Second, whether or not one agrees
with this general view of retroactivity, it is probably a necessary compromise where truly prophylactic requirements are involved;471 retroactivity of prophylactic requirements would impose enormous law
enforcement and finality costs, most of which could not be justified as
redressing identifiable constitutional violations.
C. Meeting Theoretical and Practical Objections
The biggest obstacle to the acknowledgment of a right to racially
similar jurors is inertia. That obstacle can be surmounted only by conviction, persistence, and time. Another kind of obstacle, however,
consists of people interested in the problem of racial bias, but disturbed by the proposed remedy for specific reasons. Since these people
can become allies, I will offer some tentative responses to the most
likely objections.
l.

Equal Protection Concerns

Although the proposed right to racially similar jurors is intended
to prevent equal protection violations, concern that the remedy may
also violate the fourteenth amendment is foreseeable. An analogous
violation has been substantial and deliberate. . . .' ") (emphasis added) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)).
470. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982).
471. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) ("prophylactic standards" of Miranda
must be balanced against law enforcement costs where violation of standards occurred before
their promulgation). I do not mean to indicate support of the Johnson standard in cases not
involving prophylactic measures. For example, I think that if and when the Court reverses
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), that decision should be retroactive, for where the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a racially selective manner, constitutional standards
have been demonstrably violated.
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objection is frequently raised regarding affirmative action programs
and certainly has not been adequately resolved. 472 I would contend,
however, that the two aspects of affirmative action that have caused so
much difficulty have no counterparts in the mandatory inclusion of
racially similar jurors.
The first difficulty presented by affirmative action is the question of
the standard to be applied. Race conscious remedies do not always
violate equal protection; the Court has upheld such remedies in the
busing cases473 and the redistricting cases. 474 With these two remedies,
the strict scrutiny standard is deemed met and the controversy resolved. 475 Most members of the Court, however, believe that affirmative action measures generally fail strict scrutiny; shifting majorities
are created as the three members who believe that affirmative action
sometimes meets this most stringent standard476 alternately ally themselves with those who· believe it never can and that all such measures
must be struck down477 and with those who contend that a more lenient standard, heightened scrutiny, should be applied to affirmative action programs and can be quite often satisfied.478
This difficulty is avoided with a requirement of racially similar jurors because the strict scrutiny standard can be met. Avoiding the conviction of the innocent479 is a compelling governmental interest.480
472. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
473. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
474. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977).
475. For other examples of race-conscious remedies, see James v. United States, 416 F.2d
467, 472 (5th Cir. 1969) (purposeful inclusion of blacks in grand jury permissible to extinguish
effects of earlier racially discriminatory practices), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970); Brooks v.
Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967); Long Warrier v.
Peacock, Civil No. 69-122 (W.D.S.D. filed Aug. 14, 1969) (ordering jury commissioners to take
necessary steps, including identification of potential jurors' races, to insure fair representation of
Native Americans on juries).
476. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980), Burger, C.J., writing for the Court,
found that the affirmative action program survived even the strict scrutiny test articulated in
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Powell, J., applied the strict scrutiny
test in his concurring opinion. 448 U.S. at 498. Stevens, J., agreed that affirmative action programs might pass strict scrutiny, but applied a more stringent, "unquestionably legitimate" test,
which the Fullilove program failed. 448 U.S. at 535.
477. Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting in Fullilove, expressed their view that governmental racial classifications are never permitted by the Constitution. 448 U.S. at 522-32.
478. Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., believe that racial classifications may be
justified by showing "an important and articulated purpose for its use." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361.
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., also applied this "heightened scrutiny" test to the affirmative action program at issue in Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 519.
479. For a consideration of what should be encompassed by the term "innocent," see text
following note 18 supra.
480. But see Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (university practices requiring at least two minority race students to be appointed or elected to student legislature and
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Remedying past economic discrimination (and prophylactically
preventing future discrimination through the use of quotas?) is also a
good candidate for a compelling governmental interest. But to call
any affirmative action measure "necessary" or "narrowly tailored"
stretches these phrases sorely and to many, stretches them beyond recognition, thus threatening the vitality of the strict scrutiny standard.
Under affirmative action programs some minorities who have not been
the victims of discrimination will receive benefits, and at a cost to
some nonminorities who have not benefited from discrimination. 481
Moreover, the distribution of the compensation cannot be tailored to
individual grievances; most victims of discrimination will not benefit
at all from affirmative action programs and a few will benefit enormously. In contrast, granting defendants racially similar jurors is both
necessary and narrowly tailored. The right is not bought at the expense of other possibly blameless individuals; 482 neither white defendants nor white jurors "lose" anything. The "amount" given to each
defendant is the same, and is tailored to prevent wrongful conviction;
no one gets "more" than he deserves. And, at least at the present
time, there are no racially neutral measures available to accomplish
the same end. 483
The second difficulty with affirmative action programs is not,
strictly speaking, an equal protection concern, but is closely connected
to the values protected by the equal protection clause. It is often obgiving student defendant in disciplinary proceedings the right to require a majority of the judges
on his panel of the student honor court to be of his race denied white students right to equal
protection in the absence of a showing that these practices were necessary to achieve a compelling state interest).
481. But see Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2588 (1984) (limiting court-ordered preferential treatment to identified victims of discrimination); EEOC v. Local
638, 532 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1976) (allowing preferential treatment only when its effect is not
concentrated upon a relatively small ascertainable group of nonminority persons).
482. See Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & Pun. AFF, 3,
8 (1974) (distinguishing busing cases from affirmative action cases on this basis).
It is possible that this system might impose additional burdens on blackjurors, although that
seems unlikely. What is more likely is that some black jurors who would have sat out their jury
service waiting to be selected for a jury will instead serve as jurors and that some black jurors
who would have sat on civil juries will instead serve on criminal juries. Should acknowledgment
of this right occasionally serve to increase the burden of jury service upon black jurors, the
validity of their complaints can be assessed. Perhaps overburdened black jurors should be
viewed as are the black children selected for busing: innocent and unfortunate but necessary.
Alternatively, some special compensation might be offered them.
483. Recognizing a right to a bench trial (which defendants do not now possess, see Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965)) would not accomplish the same goal. Judges too may factor
race into their determinations of guilt, not consciously, but unconsciously. Even if we were sure
that judges would not let race affect their verdicts, a bench trial is not a substitute for a racially
neutral jury because the rate of acquittals in jury trials is substantially higher. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, supra note 27, at 59. With bench trials as their only alternative, black defendants would
still be disadvantaged due to their race.
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jected that affirmative action programs do not promote, but actually
retard, the goal of racial equality. Opponents argue that despite their
laudable purposes, the programs inadvertently increase the level of
hostility directed toward minority group members484 and reinforce
stereotypes of minorities as inferior.485 Whether these empirical assumptions concerning the majority's reaction to the enactment of such
programs are correct is open to question, 486 and whether they override
other policy concerns is hotly debated. 487 In any event, these possible
drawbacks clearly do not afflict a proposal to inclqde racially similar
jurors on criminal juries. Because the allocation of scarce goods is not
at issue (as it is in affirmative action programs), one would not expect
the acknowledgment of this right to increase hostility toward minorities; because minorities could not be seen as being "handed" special
benefits instead of "earning" them, no implications concerning their
abilities would be rational.
That this reform would draw the population's attention to the persistence of racial prejudice seems to me a desirable side effect, rather
than one to be avoided. The goal of racial equality is unlikely to be
reached absent awareness that it does not yet exist.
2. Resistance to a Judicially Created Remedy
Some critics might concede the desirability of the proposed inclusion of racially similar jurors, but object to any judicial role in bringing it about. It might be argued that my concession that the details are
somewhat arbitrary is a concession that the job of fashioning a remedy
is more properly left to legislators; compromises are their forte.
This position misses the fact that absent judicial action there will
be no relief from ongoing constitutional violations. Legislative action
would be less problematic, but it is extremely unlikely. The minorityrace criminal defendant - unlike the minority-race entrepreneur, laborer, or student - has virtually no lobbyists. He can and will be
forgotten by all but the courts, for very few will wish to be counted in
484. See, e.g., Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67
CALIF. L. REv. 3, 18 (1979); Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution:

Weber, Dayton, and Columbus, 1979 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 12-13.
485. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 484, at 8, 18; Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice
Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 21, 59 (1979); Kitch, supra note 484, at 13; see also
Rice, The Legality ofDe Facto Segregation, IO CATH. LAW 309, 320 (1964) (any consideration of
racial balance in schools implies inferiority of black children).
486. See Jacobson, The Bakke Decision: White Reactions to the U.S. Supreme Court's Test of
Affirmative Action Programs, 27 J. CONFLICT REsOLUTION 687 (1983).
487. Compare Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1043 (1979), with Kitch, supra note 484; compare Gegan, De Jure Integration in Education, 11 CATH. LAW 4, 14 (1965), with Rice, supra note 485, at 320.
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his camp. Furthermore, although prophylactic remedies in general are
better left to the legislature, the Court has often been forced to devise
its own remedies in the criminal procedure sphere.488 The alternative
is the acceptance of repeated violation of the Constitution - a result
no American court should be willing to tolerate. 489
Furthermore, the proposed remedy does not foreclose legislative
initiative.490 It may even spur legislatures to consider alternatives.
Until they do, a judicially created remedy is required to protect minority-race defendants from unconstitutional convictions.
3. Reluctance to Rely upon Social Science Data
The feeling that courts should not rely upon social science data
may stem from several different sources.491 A specific objection to relying upon social science data in a particular case may arise from lack
of confidence in the profferred data. Social science reasoning was
prominent in the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education 492
opinion and this gave critics the opportunity to point out the sparsity
of data supporting that case's reasoning. 493 Questions about the reliability of any kind of evidence are always legitimate, but in this case the
empirical evidence, as discussed in Part I, is consistent and
convincing.
A second source of reluctance to rely upon social science data inheres in the fear that litigants have misrepresented the implications of
that data. Persons not trained in social science methodology may feel
caught in a double bind: if they draw their own conclusions, they risk
embarrassing errors, but if they rely on those with expertise for conclusions, they risk the incorporation of the experts' biases. Such fears
are rational in many circumstances. For example, the Supreme
488. See note 445 supra and accompanying text.
489. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also United
States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule necessary
because judiciary must avoid participation in constitutional violations).
490. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), often criticized as usurping the legislature's role
in balancing the rights of pregnant women and fetuses. See, e.g., Dixon, The ''New" Substantive
Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 84-87; Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
491. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887-90 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (discussing
the limitations inherent in social science research evidence), petition for cert. filed, No. 84-6811
(U.S. May 28, 1985).
492. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
493. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 (1955); Gregor, The Law, Social
Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. R.Es. L. REV. 621 (1963); van den Haag,
Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases - A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6
VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960); see also Goodman, DeFacto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972) (reviewing more recent data).
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Court's conclusion that reducing jury size to less than twelve does not
affect the likelihood of acquittal494 has been harshly criticized as an
entirely illogical inference from the jury size experiments cited by the
Court.495 But this second source of reluctance to rely upon social science data also is inappropriate in considering whether to acknowledge
a right to racially similar jurors. Here only the first step in reasoning
to this remedy depends upon social science principles; once the external validity of the mock jury studies is established, the remainder of
the argument for racially similar jurors depends largely upon legal
principles. Because the argument concerning external validity is
neither technical nor complicated,496 the risk of a naiye blunder is
small.
The last reason lawyers often regard social science data with suspicion is that such data are subject to change as social conditions
change. This fact may be disconcerting, for holdings based upon that
data must then be revised, but it need not threaten the legitimacy of
earlier decisions; doctrine is not properly viewed as unstable simply
because its application to today's facts produces different outcomes
than its application to yesterday's facts. Moreover, given the historical stability of racial prejudice, drastic changes in the social science
data relevant to the right to racially similar jurors are quite unlikely.
Certainly the cost of periodic reviews of holdings based upon social
science data is preferable to immutable holdings premised on intuitive
and erroneous assumptions about the nature of social reality.
4. Implementation Problems

Finally, there will be those whose protest is based on practical considerations. How could such a right be implemented? Undoubtedly,
assuring the inclusion of racially similar jurors would be somewhat
inconvenient. In most cases, it would be no more than that, for crimes
by minority-race defendants most often will occur where significant
numbers of the minority group reside. 497 That surmounting ordinary
implementation difficulties is unlikely to be an enormous burden is
494. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
495. Kaye, supra note 464; Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemible" Differences: Empirical
Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975); Zeise! & Diamond, "Convincing
Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1914);seea/so Saks, supra
note 464; Zeise), • . • And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971).
496. See Part I. B. 2. supra.
491. See Note, The Case for Black Juries, 19 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (arguing that this
fact should be used to advantage by drawing vicinage lines around racial communities).
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suggested by the English and African experiences. 498 Occasionally a
substantial problem of obtaining enough jurors of the defendant's racial background will arise. When it does, there are several alternatives. The prosecution might seek a waiver from the defendant,
perhaps by offering the defendant additional peremptory challenges or
extraordinary voir dire privileges, or perhaps by offering something
uniquely suited to the particular case. Alternatively, states might seek
to develop safeguards of other sorts that would be routinely implemented in such cases and hope to satisfy the courts that these measures were adequate protection against racially biased verdicts; one
might expect that courts would view such substitutes more generously
where provision of racially similar jurors had been attempted but
proved impossible.
Substantial inconvenience has been suffered to prevent minorities
from serving on juries, at one time by deviously excluding them from
the jury rolls, and currently by exercise of the peremptory challenge.
If the goal of racially unbiased juries is truly valued, substantially
more inconvenience should be countenanced to assure its achievement
than was expended to thwart its accomplishment.499 Furthermore, the
inclusion of racially similar jurors has desirable side effects that in part
offset any inconvenience it creates. First, it obviates the need to respond to an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with the racially selective use of peremptory challenges. Although the California and
Massachusetts courts have demonstrated that direct regulation of the
peremptory challenge is possible, such regulation is more intrusive,
more difficult, and more time-consuming to enforce than is a right to
the inclusion of racially similar jurors. Second, the inclusion of racially similar jurors increases the likelihood of accurate assessment of
the evidence. Racially similar jurors are more likely to interpret the
demeanor of the defendant correctly than are racially different jurors500 and may be able to supply relevant insights about neighborhoods and subcultural patterns that are unavailable to racially
different jurors.501 Finally, the inclusion of racially similar jurors is
likely to increase perceptions of fairness, both by the defendant and by
498. See notes 451-54 supra and accompanying text.
499. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (requiring consideration of substantially inconvenient remedies to correct past constitutional violations).
500. See LaFrance & Mayo, Racial Differences in Gaze Behavior During Conversations: Two
Systematic Observational Studies, 33 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 547 (1976); Turner,
Beidel, Hersen & Bellack, Effects of Race on Rating of Social Skill, 52 J, CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 474 (1984).
501. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 17, at 33; see also Peters v. Kilf, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972)
(opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, J.J.), discussed in text at supra notes
214-17; Broeder, supra note 23, at 24, 30; Davis & Lyles, Black Jurors, 30 GUILD PRAC, 111,
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courtroom observers. Confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system is valuable in itself, 502 and it may also pay dividends in citizen
cooperation with law enforcement. 503
CONCLUSION

The reader may suspect that the method of looking to other disciplines to gain understanding of how prejudice operates has applications beyond the realm of criminal trials. Does this approach presage
a new form of argument for mandatory minority participation in other
spheres? Should "Black Aptitude and the White Teacher," "Black
Merit and the White Manager," or "Black Sanity and the White Psychiatrist" be anticipated?
Although the empirical evidence on the changing nature of prejudice provides an additional policy rationale for supporting affirmative
action programs, I do not think that analogous constitutional arguments for including minorities will be compelling with respect to other
decisionmaking positions. This is in part because the seriousness of
the consequence at stake here argues more strongly for prophylactic
intervention by the courts than do the prospects of lost job or scholarship opportunities, and in part because a remedy in this area does not
have the same tailoring problems as does one in areas where scarce
benefits must be assigned. Moreover, the empirical evidence demonstrating that bias alters judgment other than guilt attribution has not
yet been systematically compiled. Perhaps it never will be. The content of stereotypes about racial minorities may make the effect of race
on guilt attribution much stronger than the effect of race on judgments
of competence or intelligence. Or, unconscious stereotypes may be reinforced by the setting of a criminal trial; jurors may have had latent
biases concerning propensity to commit crime that are activated by the
fact of a criminal accusation. Even if race has an equally strong impact on other decisions, the interest of social scientists in those other
decisions may never be intense enough to generate convincing evidence of that impact.
In any event, the issues of whether prophylactic measures to prevent discrimination in other contexts are constitutionally compelled,
113, 118, 119 (1973); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HAsL.J. 1417, 1418-1419 (1969).
502. Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (community participation in the administration of criminal law, through jury service, critical to pubic confidence in the criminal
justice system).
.
503. Certainly confidence in the police is widely thought to increase citizen cooperation. See,
e.g., C. SILBERMAN, supra note 423, at 204.
TINGS
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and what such measures might be, can be left for another day. Action
on the problem of racially biased guilt adjudication, however, need not
and must not be postponed. It might be argued that more conservative measures ought to be tried first: Swain and Ristaino should be
overruled and then the situation reassessed. But for the reasons discussed in the body of this Article, such modest reforms cannot eliminate the influence of racial bias on jury verdicts. Certainly they are
more desirable than no action, but to propose them as adequate protection for the minority-race defendant is disingenuous. Further delay
before the adoption of a comprehensive solution buys only more
wrongful convictions. The dissent in People v. Payne, s04 an Illinois
case rejecting the Wheeler/Soares doctrine, recounts a revealing story:
In Cobb, another capital case, the defendant's first two trials ended in
hung juries. Injury selection at those trials the prosecution cumulatively
exercised 28 out of 41 peremptory challenges against prospective black
jurors and succeeded in limiting participation by black persons on each
jury to one. At the third trial the prosecution used 8 out of 11 peremptory challenges against black people and finally succeeded in obtaining a
conviction by an all-white jury. sos

The dissenting judge is undoubtedly correct in his conclusion that
this cannot be justice. Nevertheless, one wonders why he deems the
actions of the prosecutor the central fact in this sequence of events.
Suppose that black jurors participated in the defendant's first two trials, both of which ended in hung juries, but at the third trial, by
chance, an all-white jury were selected and a capital conviction obtained. The process might be less wicked, but the result would not be
more just.
Focus on the motives of the perpetrators of discrimination is misplaced. Just as the equal protection clause does not extend to a promise of equal results, it is not limited to an assurance of positive affect.
The fourteenth amendment aims to eliminate unfair treatment. That
there is less hostility toward minorities and less deliberate discrimination is a good sign, but it is not the end of the road. The road to
equality of treatment is long, and the fact that we no longer stand at
the beginning of that road is hardly a reason to call a halt.

504. 99 III. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983).
505. 99 Ill. 2d at 153, 457 N.E.2d at 1211 (Simon, J., dissenting).

